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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Although cross-border healthcare has existed for a long time, the adoption of Directive 
2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare has revived 
interest in this topic. Moreover, it has opened another legal path to access cross-border 
healthcare, next to the coordination Regulations and purely national legal provisions. It 
may provide cross-border patients with more options, but at the same time makes the 
interaction between distinctive legal instruments more complex. 
There are two possibilities regarding cross-border healthcare. One is affiliation to the 
public healthcare system (i.e. social health insurance or national health service); the 
other is unplanned or planned cross-border healthcare, while maintaining coverage in the 
home public healthcare system. 
(1) Although no major issues can be detected in the area of affiliation of EU mobile 
citizens to the Member States’ healthcare schemes, it cannot be denied that legal, 
administrative and practical issues require specific attention. For active persons, 
contribution periods are as a rule aggregated and payment of contributions monitored. 
However, the complexity and diversity of affiliation to healthcare systems throughout the 
EU and especially diverging concepts of residence (with an emphasis on students and 
other non-active persons) and its interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) (of essence in particular in residence-based schemes) require further 
attention of the EU legislature. 
Member States generally do not adopt measures which are specifically aimed at 
facilitating access to their healthcare scheme for mobile EU citizens. However, certain 
national legislations or administrative practices can be detected as enabling mobile 
citizens to affiliate to the local healthcare scheme, mainly through administrative 
intervention, smooth procedures for affiliation and the provision of information to 
citizens. The avoidance of gaps in health coverage when moving to another Member 
State can be found in case-by-case administrative practice. 
Healthcare and health coverage may play an important role in applying other, non-
coordination EU instruments. Access to healthcare, especially of indigent workers, may 
be considered as a social advantage under Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 and a residence 
requirement under Directive 2004/38/EC. 
(2) Cross-border patients may remain covered by the public healthcare systems of their 
Member State of affiliation while receiving healthcare in another Member State. The 
articulation between EU cross-border healthcare routes is only very briefly envisaged in 
Directive 2011/24/EU. However, the Directive does not clarify its interaction with the 
Regulations despite the fact that regulating the relationship between the two instruments 
is one of its main objectives. The coordination Regulations ignore the case law on cross-
border healthcare as free movement of services and do not mention the Directive at all. 
By contrast, the Directive cannot be read on its own. It constantly relates to the 
Regulations regarding key factors such as its scope of application or the Member State 
responsible for the reimbursement of healthcare costs.  
Both the scope of unplanned and planned healthcare and the distinction between these 
two concepts are not always clear. The intention of the patient may not always be explicit 
and clear and may change when already in another Member State. Moreover, applying 
the Directive also to unplanned healthcare may lead to paradox situations, considering 
that prior authorisation may be required for certain kinds of healthcare, regardless 
whether it is unplanned or planned. This could be solved by not applying the Directive to 
unplanned healthcare (and leave it to the coordination Regulations and purely national 
law where reimbursement may be foreseen) or by expressly stipulating that prior 
8 
 
authorisation may not be required for necessary or even urgent treatment. Legislative 
action might be necessary in order to provide more clarity in this respect. 
At the same time, it could be argued that unplanned healthcare under the Regulations is 
the most common application of cross-border healthcare. Nevertheless, it may present 
dilemmas as to the notions of temporary stay outside of the competent Member State, 
what can be considered as unforeseen and necessary healthcare, and the extent of 
reimbursement. Moreover, if the Directive is also applied to unplanned care it may lead 
to undesirable results (of freeriding between the two instruments) and increased 
administrative burden for national healthcare systems seeking the best possible option 
for the patient. 
A parallel application of the Regulations, the Directive and purely national legislation may 
lead to legal and practical problems also with planned healthcare. It is argued that the 
automatic authorisation rule should be applied when the administrative procedure for 
granting prior authorisation would last too long, whereby the procedural time limits 
should be stricter than under general administrative procedural rules. Problems are 
detected not only in relation to lengthy and burdensome administrative procedures, but 
also to disadvantageous financial arrangements and the lack of comprehensive and 
reliable information provided to the patients. The situation gets even more complicated 
when special rules for frontier workers and pensioners are taken into account. Here, 
some simplification would be in order. 
Practical problems may occur for a cross-border, i.e. mobile, patient if the same 
healthcare providers offer public and private healthcare. In many Member States public 
providers may offer private healthcare and vice versa, private providers may be included 
in the public healthcare provision, while at the same time they are allowed to offer 
private services as well. The latter are as a rule guaranteed without waiting lists, but with 
higher tariffs and direct payment. Therefore, it is “easier” for healthcare providers to 
treat mobile patients as private patients. Nevertheless, such steering is not allowed and 
is supervised and sanctioned in some Member States. 
The behaviour of the mobile patient is decisive. S/he has to decide whether s/he would 
like to be treated as a public or a private patient, with a distinction in applicable tariffs. 
In order to exercise free choice, s/he has to be properly informed. One of his or her main 
concerns is the reimbursement of the healthcare costs, whereby Member States may 
apply distinctive reimbursement methods, more or less favourable to mobile patients. 
Special problems may arise if purely private healthcare cannot be used (for public funds) 
in the home Member State, since it can be used in another Member State when the 
cross-border element is present. Moreover, purely private healthcare can be used also in 
the Member State where there is no such possibility in case of incoming mobile patients 
(who may claim reimbursement from public funds later on in the Member State of their 
affiliation). This opens a question of reverse discrimination of non-mobile national 
patients.  
It is argued that all forms of access to high quality healthcare should be guaranteed to 
both mobile and national patients and EU law should not produce undesired effects for 
national patients, who are still in the majority, compared to mobile patients.  
There are several possibilities to do so. One is legislative action at EU level. If CJEU case 
law was codified in the Directive, the time might have come to codify all cross-border 
healthcare rules in a single legislative instrument, which would bring clarity and ease a 
bit the complexity of cross-border healthcare possibilities. Moreover, access to clear and 
reliable information is emphasised with all aspects of affiliation to the healthcare system 
of another Member State as well as cross-border healthcare stricto sensu. It is argued 
that the same format should be used across the EU and even the EU itself should provide 
reliable information when diversity across Member States does not allow them do to so. 
FreSsco Analytical Report 2016 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Health is one of the most important values that influences the existence and further 
development of every individual and society as such. The right to health is one of the 
fundamental human rights, indispensable for the exercise of other human rights. 
Especially when health is impaired or lost, and sickness or injury occurs, it is essential to 
restore health as soon as possible, by means of high-quality and sustainable healthcare 
provision, accessible to all, be it in the home Member State or abroad. 
People were and still are treated in another country for a variety of reasons. If healthcare 
can be provided in another Member State without waiting, by a (highly specialised) 
healthcare provider, who is of good reputation (assuring safe and good quality 
treatment), and possibly providing a method of treatment not available in the home 
State within the medically necessary time, persons are more willing to seek and receive 
healthcare abroad. 
This is even more the case if the two Member States concerned have a similar language 
and culture, if there is less administrative complexity, if costs are predictable (and 
covered) and information on all economic, social and legal aspects is available. Hence, 
people may choose healthcare abroad out of necessity or out of preference. 
Cross-border healthcare is enabled by bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded 
directly by the contracting States or passed by international organisations, and in the EU 
predominately by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems and Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border 
healthcare. Hence, cross-border healthcare was not invented by the (transposition of) 
Directive 2011/24/EU. It existed long before, and unplanned medical treatment in 
another Member State was provided also by Regulation (EEC) No 3/58 on social security 
for migrant workers. The possibility of planned healthcare in another Member State, 
covered by the national public healthcare system, was introduced by Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71. It has been further developed through the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). 
It is recognised that different aspects related to the topic of access of EU citizens to 
healthcare in cross-border situations have already been the subject of several reports by 
the trESS1 and FreSsco networks2 and other reports.3 Furthermore, with the adoption of 
Directive 2011/24/EU the European Commission (EC) services cooperated closely with 
the Member States on various topics of legal interpretation relating to the relationship of 
the new Directive with the existing social security coordination rules. In the past years 
several Working Parties of the Administrative Commission dedicated to this topic have 
taken place. Additionally, the EC adopted a report on the operation of the Directive on 
patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and submitted it to the European Parliament 
and to the Council in 2015. The next report is scheduled for 2018 and subsequently 
every three years. 
                                                 
1 Cf. ROBERTS, S. (ed.), SCHULTE, B. (ed.), GARCÍA DE CORTAZAR, C., MEDAISKIS, T., and VERSCHUEREN, H. 
trESS Think Tank Report 2009, Healthcare for Pensioners; LHERNOULD, J.-P. (ed.), SCHULTE, B. (ed.), FILLON, 
J.-C., HAJDU, J., and VERSCHUEREN, H., trESS Think Tank Report 2010, Healthcare provided during a 
temporary stay in another Member State to persons who do not fulfil conditions for statutory health insurance 
coverage; and VAN OVERMEIREN, F., VERSCHUEREN, H. and EICHENHOFER, E. (2011), Social security 
coverage of non-active persons moving to another Member State, trESS Analytical Reports. 
2 JORENS, Y.  and DE CONINCK, J., Reply to an ad hoc request for comparative analysis of national legislations: 
Administrative procedures for cross-border healthcare, FreSsco, European Commission. 
3 Among them a report submitted by ICF GHK in association with Milieu Ltd in 2013, A fact finding analysis on 
the impact on the Member States' social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to 
special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence. 
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The objective of the present report is to conduct a follow-up study of the earlier studies 
due to recent developments in cross-border healthcare; to look more in depth into 
certain aspects that were previously not examined in detail; and to analyse new legal 
aspects that came up recently as a result of new CJEU case law. To achieve these 
objectives, the report is structured around two distinct scenarios of access to healthcare 
in another Member State, namely access of EU nationals to the healthcare system in the 
residence Member State and access to healthcare in a Member State other than the 
Member State of social health insurance or national health service coverage.  
Therefore, the next chapter (chapter 2) describes the national legal frameworks in the EU 
Member States as to affiliation to the healthcare system in the view of EU mobile 
persons. A disaggregation is made in categories of employed persons, self-employed 
persons, students, and non-active persons. At the same time potential problems to get 
affiliated are presented. It is also scrutinised whether the way of financing the individual 
healthcare systems is of particular relevance in this context. Moreover, the interrelation 
with other Union legislation, such as Directive 2004/38/EC and Regulation (EC) No 
492/2011 is presented. 
The subsequent chapter (chapter 3) analyses access to healthcare in another Member 
State and discusses possible practical problems with the implementation of Regulation 
(EC) 883/2004, Directive 20011/24/EU and purely national law. The distinction is made 
between unplanned and planned cross-border healthcare. 
Special attention (under a separate chapter, i.e. chapter 4) is devoted to the relation 
between public and private provision of healthcare. More specifically, it is scrutinised 
which bodies are part of the public social security systems and which are to be 
considered as purely private providers in each Member State and how to distinguish 
between them in practice. 
Information or a lack of it is of essential importance in all aspects of cross-border 
healthcare. Therefore, a separate chapter (under point 5 of the present report) is 
dedicated to the possibilities of better informing patients when they exercise their right to 
cross-border healthcare.  
The starting point of the present report is coordination of national social security systems 
in the EU, as agreed by the Member States. The evolution of several possibilities for 
cross-border healthcare, provided especially by the judgments of the CJEU and codified 
in Directive 2011/24/EU are analysed in relation to the existing social security 
coordination mechanism. 
FreSsco Analytical Report 2016 
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2. AFFILIATION OF MOBILE EU CITIZENS TO THE NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
2.1. Conditions of affiliation to the Member States’ national 
healthcare systems 
As Regulations (EC) Nos 883/20044 and 987/20095 merely coordinate the social security 
systems of the Member States, the conditions of affiliation to the social security schemes 
have remained within the competence of the Member States. EU law does not detract 
from the Member States’ powers to organise their social security schemes.6 As social 
security law is not harmonised at EU level, it is for the national legislation to determine 
the conditions concerning the right or the duty to be insured with a social security 
scheme as well as the conditions for entitlement to benefits.7 However, CJEU case law 
has confirmed at many occasions that, when exercising those powers, the Member States 
must comply with Union law.8  
It goes without saying that this EU legislative framework is fully applicable to the 
healthcare schemes of the Member States, as a branch of what is defined as ‘social 
security’ at EU level9 and despite national distinctions between ‘social security’ and 
‘healthcare’. This means that Member States are in principle free to decide on the 
financing of, access to and benefit entitlement of their national healthcare schemes. 
However, they should take into account the boundaries of that freedom as set by EU 
primary and secondary legislation. 
                                                 
4 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems. OJ L 166 of 30 April 2004. 
5 Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying 
down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems. OJ L 284 of 30 October 2009. 
6 See Duphar, C-238/82, EU:C:1984:45, 16; Poucet and Pistre, C-159/91 and C-160/91, EU:C:1993:63, 6; 
Sodemare, C-70/95, EU:C:1997:301, 27; Decker, C-120/95, EU:C:1998:167, 21; Kohll, C-158/96, 
EU:C:1998:171, 17; Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, C-157/99, EU:C:2001:404, 44; Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, 
C-385/99, EU:C:2003:270, 100; Inizan, C-56/01, EU:C:2003:578, 17; Leichtle, C-8/02, EU:C:2004:161, 29; 
Watts, C-372/04, EU:C:2006:325, 92, 146; Stamatelaki, C-444/05, EU:C:2007:231, 23; Hartlauer, C-169/07, 
EU:C:2009:141, 29; Commission v Italy, C-531/06, EU:C:2009:315, 35; Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes 
and Others, Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07, EU:C:2009:316, 18; Commission v Germany, C-141/07, 
EU:C:2008:492, 22; Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07, EU:C:2010:300, 
43; Commission v Spain, C-211/08, EU:C:2010:340, 53, 75; Elchinov, C-173/09, EU:C:2010:581, 40, 57; 
Commission v Luxemburg, C-490/09, EU:C:2011:34, 16, 32. 
Recitals 10 and 35 of the Preamble of Directive 2011/24/EU also confirm that it fully respects the 
responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of social security benefits relating to health and for the 
organisation and delivery of healthcare and medical care and social security benefits, in particular for sickness. 
7 See Coonan, C-110/79, EU:C:1980:112, 12; Paraschi, C-349/87, EU:C:1991:372, 15; Stöber and Piosa 
Pereira, Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95, EU:C:1997:44, 36; Decker EU:C:1998:167, 22; Kohll 
EU:C:1998:171, 18; Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms EU:C:2001:404, 44, 45, 85; Müller-Fauré and Van Riet 
EU:C:2003:270, 100; Inizan EU:C:2003:578, 17; Watts EU:C:2006:325, 92; Stamatelaki EU:C:2007:231, 23; 
Commission v Spain EU:C:2010:340, 53; Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, 40, 57; Commission v France, C-512/08, 
EU:C:2010:579, 29; Commission v Luxemburg EU:C:2011:34, 32. 
8 See the AG’s Opinion in Decker & Kohll, EU:C:1997:399, 17-25; Decker EU:C:1998:167, 23; Kohll 
EU:C:1998:171, 19; Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms EU:C:2001:404, 44, 46, 88; Müller-Fauré and Van Riet 
EU:C:2003:270, 100; Inizan EU:C:2003:578, 17; Watts EU:C:2006:325, 92; Stamatelaki, C-444/05, 
EU:C:2007:231, 23; Hartlauer EU:C:2009:141, 29; Commission v Italy EU:C:2009:315, 35; Apothekerkammer 
des Saarlandes and Others EU:C:2009:316, 18; Commission v Germany EU:C:2008:492, 23; Blanco Pérez and 
Chao Gómez EU:C:2010:300, 43; Commission v Spain EU:C:2010:340, 53; Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, 40; 
Commission v France EU:C:2010:579, 29; Commission v Luxemburg EU:C:2011:34, 16, 32. 
9 Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The different social security branches were summed up in Article 3 
of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. To categorise a given branch of social protection of a Member State in the 
light of EU law as social security, it does not matter whether the benefits are enshrined in a general or a special 
scheme, are financed out of taxes or contributions or whether the administration is based on public or private 
law. 
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The central instruments of secondary legislation which impact the EU mobile citizen’s 
access to healthcare are Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 and their 
respective provisions concerning the coordination of “sickness benefits in kind”, 
hereinafter also simply referred to as ‘healthcare’.10 With its foundations and legal base in 
the free movement of workers,11 the EU social security coordination system has 
developed into a real EU citizenship instrument,12 impacting on cross-border social 
security entitlements for both economically active and inactive persons moving within the 
EU. 
As to the general impact of EU social security coordination on access to healthcare, it 
should be noted that socially insured EU mobile citizens, both economically active and 
inactive, are in principle entitled to healthcare in their Member State of residence. The 
latter may not be the competent State which is financially responsible for the healthcare 
services provided, but the insured persons will benefit from the residence State’s 
mandatory healthcare services as if they were insured there. In that regard, the concept 
of residence is crucial for the coordination of sickness benefits in kind under the 
coordination Regulations. 
It should already be noted that the area of healthcare is indulged with different concepts 
of residence at the national level (habitual residence, permanent residence, permanent 
stay, lawful residence, lawful presence, permanent establishment etc) and at the EU 
level, where the concept of habitual residence for social security coordination purposes is 
found next to the concept of legal residence as inferred by Directive 2004/38/EC.13 
Within the meaning of the coordination system, the Member State of residence is the 
State where the person’s centre of interests is located. Several factors were identified by 
CJEU case law,14 and a non-exhaustive list of factors can be found in Article 11 of 
Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. This list mentions the duration and continuity of presence; 
the person’s situation (working status and family ties); the exercise of a non-
remunerated activity; the source of income of students; the housing situation 
(permanent or not); and tax residence.15 If these criteria are not definitive, the persons’ 
intention, especially the initial reason to move abroad, should be considered. This 
European concept of residence supersedes any other deviating notion of residence at the 
national level, for the application of the coordination system. 
In principle and in the current state of EU law, there is no direct link between the above 
concept of habitual residence in the field of coordination of sickness benefits in kind 
(healthcare) and the concept of legal residence in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Indeed, as opposed to the impact of the latter on the access for non-active persons to 
social benefits like special non-contributory benefits (SNCBs) in other Member States,16 
                                                 
10 Some argue that ‘health care’ refers to provider actions, whereas ‘healthcare’ is a system. Moreover, 
sometimes ‘health care’ is used as a noun (e.g. ‘your health care is important’) and ‘healthcare’ as an adjective 
(e.g. ‘find a healthcare professional’). None of these distinctions is consistently applied and both forms are 
widely used. Moreover, Regulation (EC) 883/2004 uses a third form, i.e. “health-care” (recital 33). Since the 
Directive 2011/24/EU uses “healthcare” rather consistently, it is also used in the present report. 
11 Article 48 TFEU. 
12 JORENS, Y. & VAN OVERMEIREN, F. (2009). General principles of coordination in Regulation 883/2004. 
European Journal of Social Security 11(2) 16. 
13 See also COUCHEIR, M. (ed.), SAKSLIN, M.; GIUBBONI, G.: MARTINSEN, D.; VERSCHUEREN, H. (2008): 
trESS Think Tank Report 2008 – The relationship and interaction between the coordination Regulations and 
Directive 2004/38/EC. Note that several concepts elaborated in this report may require reconsideration in the 
light of developments in the recent case law of the CJEU. 
14 Swaddling, C-90/97, EU:C:1999:96, paragraph 29 and Knoch, C-102/91, EU:C:1992:303. 
15 These criteria can also be found in the European Commission Practical Guide on the applicable legislation in 
the EU, EEA and Switzerland, issued in December 2013. 
16 Brey, C-140/12, EU:C:2013:565, 77; Dano, C-333/13, EU:C:2014:2358; Alimanovic, C-67/14, 
EU:C:2015:597; and García-Nieto, C-299/14, EU:C:2016:114. See also VAN OVERMEIREN, F., VERSCHUEREN, 
H. and EICHENHOFER, E. (2011), Social security coverage of non-active persons moving to another Member 
State, trESS Analytical Reports, 1-54. 
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entitlement to healthcare in the residence State should currently still be evaluated solely 
under the concept of habitual residence, i.e. the person’s centre of interest as delineated 
by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. However, the CJEU’s recent ruling in Commission v 
United Kingdom17 is pointing in another direction, which could be the future direction for 
all “genuine” and “non-hybrid” social security benefits, including healthcare. In this case, 
the CJEU has indeed accepted that legal residence in accordance with Directive 
2004/38/EC can be required by a Member State for the purpose of granting the social 
benefits at issue (tax-financed family benefits), as such legal residence requirement is 
merely an entitlement condition provided by the national legislation, which is determined 
as the applicable legislation by (Article (11)(3)(e) of) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.    
From a national perspective, Member States may refer to the Directive’s concept of legal 
residence for entitlement to healthcare on their territory. Although a requirement to be 
legally residing on the territory for access to healthcare is as such not problematic, the 
interdependence between sickness coverage and legal residence might raise issues. 
Particularly, the condition of having comprehensive sickness coverage in order to 
establish legal residence as a non-active person could become the centre of the 
attention. It goes without saying that such requirements might be problematic from the 
coordination perspective and it remains to be seen whether legal residence requirements 
of Directive 2004/38/EC might also prevail over the EU coordination system’s residence 
concept in the field of healthcare, as it was the case for access to SNCBs and now also 
tax-financed family benefits (and with those, probably also other social security 
benefits).18 
It goes without saying that the mentioned access to the residence State’s healthcare 
system cannot be influenced by the provisions of Directive 2011/24/EU,19 as the latter 
merely impacts access to healthcare in a Member State of stay, i.e. in the case of a 
temporary residence in a Member State as opposed to habitual residence. Whilst staying 
in another Member State, the individual keeps her or his centre of interest elsewhere. 
With a view to the above, below it is first analysed what are the conditions of affiliation to 
the healthcare systems of the Member States in order to have a view on how EU citizens 
can access the healthcare schemes of the Member States when moving within the 
European Union. 
As both the European and national legislative framework are clearly diverse for different 
categories of persons, the results of this analysis will be disaggregated for employed 
persons, self-employed persons, students and the wider category of economically 
inactive people, hereinafter also referred to as “non-active persons”. 
2.2. Affiliation of economically active persons: employed and self-
employed persons 
If an EU citizen moves to another Member State to reside and work there, s/he and 
her/his family members20 will be entitled to healthcare in that State.21 As s/he will be 
entitled to equal treatment, s/he will have the same rights and obligations as insured 
nationals and can affiliate under the same conditions as nationals.22 If s/he is confronted 
                                                 
17 Commission v United Kingdom, C-308/14, EU:C:2016:436. 
18 Dano EU:C:2014:2358; Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597; and Garcia-Nieto EU:C:2016:114. 
19 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. 
20 Article 1 (i) (1) (ii): any person defined or recognized as a member of the family or designated as a member 
of the household by the legislation of the Member State in which he/she resides. In case the family members 
are not entitled to healthcare according to the legislation of the residence State, the legislation of the 
competent MS applies. See Delavant, C-451/93, EU:C:1995:176. 
21 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
22 Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
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with qualifying periods, s/he can invoke the periods completed under the legislation of 
another Member State.23 In the same regard, s/he will be able to appeal to the principle 
of assimilation when it comes to the legal effects of benefits, income, facts and events.24 
This access for mobile workers and their family members is fairly straightforward, as this 
is largely an internal affair of affiliation of non-nationals within the EU residing in the 
competent Member State.  
However, if an EU national works in one Member State and resides in another, s/he will 
be socially insured in her/his State of work, but will also be entitled to healthcare in 
her/his residence State as if s/he was insured there.25 To that end, the Member State 
where s/he is insured will issue an S1 form26 with which s/he can register for healthcare 
with the healthcare system in the residence State.27 S/he will be entitled to healthcare in 
the competent State as well.28 
In that regard, economically active mobile citizens are entitled to healthcare in their 
residence State, even if they are insured in another Member State. This also applies to 
family members residing outside the competent State whilst the insured person resides 
inside the competent State and vice versa. This has as an effect that residence 
requirements for access to healthcare in the competent State as well as requirements of 
contribution payment in the residence State are waived by EU social security coordination 
provisions. 
Categorising healthcare schemes is in se a difficult exercise, but in general a distinction is 
made between social insurance schemes and national health services, also known as 
Bismarckian versus Beveridgean systems. Social insurance systems (with a sub-
distinction between reimbursement systems and benefit-in-kind systems) offer protection 
to insured categories of persons and are funded through social security contributions. A 
national health service is universal, protects all residents and is mainly financed via 
general taxation.29 
In general, it is clear that the distinction between the different classical types of social 
security systems, i.e. Bismarckian versus Beveridgean systems or contribution-based 
systems versus residence-based systems, is fully reflected in the conditions for affiliation 
to the healthcare systems of the Member States. Also the fact that this distinction cannot 
be upheld in a dogmatic way becomes very clear, as a lot of Member States have a 
mixed system.30 
2.2.1. Contributory schemes 
In some Member States, the conditions for affiliation are clearly linked to the payment of 
contributions for economically active persons seeking access to healthcare (e.g. AT, BE, 
BG, CZ, DE, HU, HR, LT, LU, NL, PL, RO, SK and SI). Such contributions are paid by 
the employer and the employed persons or by the self-employed person him or herself. 
This payment must often be demonstrated by certifications or attestations to the 
competent institutions, or are verified via an automated system. 
                                                 
23 Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
24 Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
25 Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. See also VERSCHUEREN, H. (2001): Financing Social Security and 
Regulation (EEC) 1408/71. European Journal of Social Security, Vol 3 Issue 1, p. 14. 
26 Portable Document replacing the former E106 form. 
27 Article 24 (1) IR. 
28 This is the case for frontier workers and sometimes their family members.  
29 JORENS, Y. (2002): The Right to Health Care across Borders, in: MCKEE, M., MOSSIALOS, E., BAETEN, R. 
(eds): The Impact of EU Law on Health Care Systems Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, p. 83-84. 
30 HATZOPOULOS, Health law and policy the impact of the EU. In DE BURCA (ed.), EU Law and the Welfare 
State: In Search of Solidarity, 116-117. 
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Regardless of the above, several Member States that have a healthcare system based on 
contribution payment also have specific legislation enabling persons residing on the 
territory to access the healthcare system. These can be specific categories of persons in 
a situation where it is deemed that it is the state’s responsibility to provide healthcare as 
they are in a situation which merits consideration, but also more general safety net 
measures in order to guarantee the provision of healthcare to all persons (legally) 
residing on the territory of the Member State concerned (e.g. BE). 
In the contribution-based systems, the payment of contributions to the competent 
institutions is often the sole requirement for affiliation to healthcare. For employed 
persons, the contributions are generally paid directly by the employer, who is responsible 
for both employer and employee contributions, which are deducted from the salary of the 
employed person. Self-employed persons are individually responsible for the payment of 
contributions, which is calculated on their professional income. 
Examples of specific administrative requirements related to contribution payment in the 
Member States are affiliation to a health insurance fund or sickness fund or registration 
in the employment register for employed persons or in the commercial register for self-
employed persons. Administrative formalities, however, vary greatly throughout the 
Member States. 
In certain Member States, affiliation to the mandatory healthcare scheme is dependent 
on wage levels. In Austria, employees must earn an income of more than € 415.72 per 
month. Self-employed persons must also achieve a yearly income of € 4,988.64. In 
Germany, in principle all employers are covered, but employed persons earning more 
than € 56,250 per year may opt out of public health insurance and can then be covered 
by private health insurance. Self-employed persons should only affiliate to the German 
mandatory healthcare scheme if their profession is explicitly mentioned in the national 
health insurance legislation. Other self-employed persons should register with a private 
insurance. 
Upon presentation of an S1 form to be registered with the healthcare institutions of the 
Member State of residence with a contribution-based system, no contributions can be 
required, as the person is already insured in the competent State. However, this does not 
exclude the payment of certain contributions for additional services or complementary 
insurance with the health insurance fund or sickness fund to which the person registers. 
2.2.2. Residence-based schemes 
In most residence-based and tax-financed systems, i.e. the Beveridgean systems based 
on a national health service (NHS) concept, the distinction between economically active 
and economically inactive persons is fully redundant. The only condition for affiliation to 
the healthcare scheme is (legal) residence and no contribution payment is linked to 
access. Such schemes have often only included a reference to affiliation based on 
economic activity on the territory as a result of EU coordination legislation, as a result of 
which access should be guaranteed for economically active persons exercising 
professional activities on the territory. 
A good example of this explicit referral to EU-based inclusion of persons working on the 
territory can be found in the French healthcare system. Any person, whether s/he 
exercises a professional activity or is non-active, enjoys statutory healthcare insurance 
coverage if s/he has a stable and lawful residence in France. A person may lose coverage 
only if the condition of residence is no longer fulfilled. In this regard, the French 
healthcare system has clearly shifted from a genuine contribution-based scheme to a 
mixed scheme in which residence has even become a dominant factor.31 However, the 
                                                 
31 See also point 2.2.3, regarding recent developments in French healthcare legislation. 
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universal healthcare scheme also supports persons who exercise an employed or a self-
employed activity in France, even if their residence is not located in France, as well as 
persons who work abroad and who are subject to French social security in accordance 
with EU law and international conventions. For people who exercise a professional 
activity, insurance is granted without any condition of minimal remuneration/minimal 
working hours. In other words, affiliation is granted from the first working hour. 
In such schemes, mere legal residence (regardless of certain minimum entitlements to 
healthcare for illegal residents) on the territory of the Member State suffices to be 
affiliated to the healthcare scheme and no distinction is made between employed, self-
employed and economically inactive persons (CY, DK, EL, FI, IE, IS, IT, LV, MT, PT, 
SE and UK). In this case, the resident EU citizen merely needs to register with the 
competent authorities and will accordingly gain access to healthcare in the Member State 
like other residents of that State. 
In Denmark, a person is eligible to healthcare as soon as s/he has residence in Denmark 
and is registered in the Danish population register. Hence, any categorisation of persons 
is redundant in this specific context. Similarly, the ground rule to be entitled to treatment 
in the Finnish public healthcare system for a user fee, one must be a resident of a 
Finnish municipality. To be insured for healthcare benefits – or social security in general 
– one must fill in an application at the Social Insurance Institution (Kela). To be a 
resident of a municipality, an EU national needs to register with the police within three 
months, after which the magistrate files the place of domicile which determines which 
municipality is in charge of the person’s social and health services. However, for 
employed persons working more than four months in Finland, the work must meet 
specific criteria for coverage by the health insurance system (a minimum of 18 working 
hours per week and a salary according to a collective agreement or at least 1,173 € per 
month) to be entitled to all the benefits awarded by Kela under the Health Insurance Act. 
Any categorisation of persons is also redundant in Sweden, as residence is decisive. 
2.2.3. Mixed schemes 
In other Member States, affiliation is clearly based on a combination of residence and 
contribution payment. In actual fact, it can safely be said that all Member States, 
although in essence categorised as a contribution-based system, have some kind of 
mixture of both. A clear example can be found in Estonia. There are two main criteria to 
get affiliated to the Estonian health insurance system. Firstly, a person has to be a 
permanent resident of Estonia, or a person residing in Estonia on the basis of a 
temporary residence permit or the right of residence, or a person legally staying and 
working in Estonia based on a temporary ground for stay. Secondly, as the Estonian 
health insurance is financed through social taxes, for the person to be an insured person 
a payer of social taxes should pay social taxes for him or her or s/he has to pay social 
taxes him or herself. 
Another example of a mix of residence and contribution payment is the healthcare 
coverage in Switzerland (and Liechtenstein). Every person that has her or his 
residence in Switzerland is required to choose a sickness insurer and affiliate to this 
insurer within three month after arrival in Switzerland. Concerning the obligation to be 
insured, the law does not make any difference between employed, self-employed, non-
active persons etc. However, affiliated persons, whether economically active or inactive, 
need to pay healthcare contributions, which is only replaced by state intervention in 
specific cases. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the French system is undergoing a shift from a 
genuine contribution-based system towards a residence-based system. The trend 
became obvious in 1999 with the Universal Healthcare Coverage (Couverture Maladie 
Universelle – CMU). The universal tendency has been deepened with the reform which 
entered into force on 1 January 2016, where the CMU was replaced by the Protection 
universelle maladie (PUMA), a more fully residence-based insurance. However, the 
system remains partly (and illogically) under the historical influence of a professional 
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approach. It is still mostly funded by social security contributions shared between 
employers and employees (or self-employed persons). However, contributions now 
represent only 60% of the overall budget, whereas taxes (of various forms) count for 
approximately 33%. Also Spain has a hybrid system, which is explained more in detail 
below.32 
2.2.4. Healthcare as a social advantage 
As employed persons moving within the Union are using the free movement of workers 
as stipulated in Article 45 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 492/201133 regarding the equal 
treatment of workers and their families may come into play. However, it is abundantly 
clear that healthcare is generally not considered or treated as a social advantage within 
the meaning of that Regulation, but solely as a social security benefit coordinated 
according to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Equal treatment of mobile workers is 
considered to be guaranteed by the latter. 
Notwithstanding the above, some healthcare-related benefits could be considered as 
social advantages, as broadly defined by the CJEU, covering not only all benefits 
connected with contracts of employment, but also all other advantages which are open to 
citizens of the host Member State and consequently are also open for workers primarily 
because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their 
residence on the national territory.34 
In some Member States, healthcare benefits for indigent people could be qualified as 
such. What could be considered as a social advantage is state payment of the cost-
sharing part of medical care for all social assistance recipients in Slovenia. It is possible 
that an EU worker earns below the poverty line and is entitled to social assistance and 
thus to the coverage of the cost-sharing part as a social advantage. In the same way, in 
Hungary means-tested health service is paid by local governments and provided via 
healthcare providers to persons in need. Similarly, the subsidy to allow indigent persons 
to pay their sickness insurance premium in Switzerland and Liechtenstein could be 
regarded as a social advantage under Regulation (EU) No 492/2011. 
In Austria, according to national legislation, long-term care benefits are not subject to 
mandatory healthcare insurance but to a specific long-term care scheme. As long-term 
care benefits are considered sickness benefits in the sense of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004, this might cause problems in a cross-border situation, for example for a 
person receiving Pflegekarenzgeld – a long-term care benefit – living in another EU 
Member State. There is a pending case that concerns an employee working in Austria 
and residing together with his disabled child in Germany, while claiming Austrian 
Pflegekarenzgeld. This is a social benefit for employees which aims to compensate the 
loss of income caused by a reduction of working time to care for a family member. The 
Austrian authorities refused such an entitlement with the argument that the Austrian 
Pflegekarenzgeld must be considered a long-term care benefit in kind for the disabled 
person in the sense of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and therefore must not be exported 
to Germany. However, the Austrian Chamber of Workers holds the view that an export 
obligation can be based on Regulation (EC) No 492/2011 since the Pflegekarenzgeld must 
be qualified (at the same time) as a social advantage for the employee working in Austria 
in the sense of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 492/2011. So if the caring person was 
an employee in Austria before the employment ceased, a right to export the 
Pflegekarenzgeld might be based on Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011, as has 
                                                 
32 See 2.3.3.2. below. 
33 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 April 2011, which has replaced 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community. However, the new Regulation has not altered the provisions of the former. 
34 Hoeckx, C-249/83, EU:C:1985:139, 973. 
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been the case for other social advantages for which national residence clauses were 
waived.35 
2.3. Affiliation of economically inactive persons: pensioners, 
students and other non-active persons 
Firstly, economically inactive persons are subject to the legislation of the Member State 
of residence.36 This includes, in principle, the right to equal treatment with the citizens of 
this host State, also with regard to healthcare coverage.37 However, taking into account 
the CJEU’s recent case law,38 inactive citizens’ equal access to social benefits, including 
genuine social security benefits as coordinated by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, can 
clearly be limited by legal residence requirements as set out in Directive 2004/38/EC (cf. 
infra for further comments in that regard). 
Secondly, pursuant to specific rules in the sickness benefits chapter of Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004, in a number of situations the access to healthcare in the host State is at 
the expense of another State, even for economically inactive persons. This is the case for 
mobile citizens who are only temporarily staying in the host Member State while 
continuing to be covered by the health insurance of their residence State (which for that 
purpose issued a European Health Insurance Card – EHIC, cf. infra). This may also be the 
case for mobile persons habitually residing in the host State, such as pensioners only 
drawing a pension from another State. The latter State will reimburse, according to 
specific provisions agreed in this respect, the costs of the treatment for these 
pensioners.39 
2.3.1. Pensioners 
Pensioners can indeed be considered as a very specific category of economically inactive 
persons, as a specific coordination framework has been incorporated in the Regulations 
with regard to their healthcare entitlements.40 Pensioners are, like economically active 
persons, equally entitled to healthcare in their residence State, on account of a “pension 
State”. If they reside in a Member State other than that competent Member State, they 
will be entitled to healthcare in their residence State as if the pension entitling them to 
healthcare was paid by the latter. For this purpose, they must register in the residence 
State usually by means of an S1 form issued by the competent State and healthcare will 
be provided on account of that State.41 
The financial responsibility for the healthcare will always be allocated to a State from 
which the pensioner receives a pension. Indeed, for pensioners, the competent State is 
the Member State of residence, if the person receives a pension from that State entitling 
him or her to benefits in kind. If the pensioner does not receive a pension from his or her 
residence State, it will be the Member State paying the pension entitling the pensioner to 
benefits in kind if s/he resided there. This remains if the pensioner is entitled to 
                                                 
35 Meints, C-57/96, EU:C:1997:564; Meeusen, C-337/97, EU:C:1999:284; Hendrix, C-287/05, EU:C:2007:494; 
Geven, C-213/05, EU:C:2007:438; Hartmann, C-212/05, EU:C:2007:437. 
36 Article 11(3)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. This Article does not make a distinction between 
beneficiaries of long-term benefits (invalidity, old-age or survivors' pensions, pensions in respect of accidents at 
work or occupational diseases or sickness benefits in cash covering treatment for an unlimited period) and 
“other non-active persons”. All economically non-active persons falling within the scope of the Regulations are 
envisaged. 
37 Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
38 Commission v United Kingdom, C-308/14, EU:C:2016:436. 
39 Articles 23-26 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
40 See also ROBERTS, S. (ed.), SCHULTE, B. (ed.), GARCÍA DE CORTAZAR, C., MEDAISKIS, T., and 
VERSCHUEREN, H.: trESS Think Tank Report 2009, Healthcare for Pensioners. 
41 However, not every Member State always issues a PD S1 for their pensioners. For instance, there are some 
German pensioners in Spain without a PD S1, as far as they no longer have the right to healthcare in Germany. 
In order to legally reside in Spain they must have private comprehensive sickness insurance. 
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healthcare in the residence State only by virtue of his or her residence. If s/he receives 
pensions from several Member States other than the residence State, the competent 
State is the Member State that is paying a pension entitling the pensioner to healthcare if 
s/he resided there and to whose legislation, applicable to pension insurance, s/he was 
subject for the longest period.42 
Thirdly, the host State may not always be able to claim reimbursement of the costs for 
healthcare delivered to economically inactive EU mobile nationals from another Member 
State. In such situations, the equal treatment provision of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
884/2004 guarantees such persons’ entitlement to health coverage under the same 
conditions as the nationals of the host State resident in that State (e.g. entitlement 
purely based on residence, based on contributions for non-active legal residents). 
However, exactly in this area we can find the seeds for a potential clash between the EU 
social security coordination system and Residence Directive 2004/38/EC, cf. infra. 
The group of economically inactive mobile EU citizens is a large and diverse population of 
persons who may claim healthcare in the host Member States. In that regard, for the 
sake of clarity, we have divided this group into students on the one hand and other 
economically inactive persons (including pensioners) on the other hand.  
From this group, the present analysis excludes all insured persons who are temporarily 
inactive but still relying on their status of employed or self-employed person, receiving 
cash benefits because or as a consequence of their activity as an employed or self-
employed person (unemployed/jobseekers). They are still to be regarded as economically 
active as regards the coordination of sickness benefits.43 
2.3.2. Students 
The category of EU mobile students can roughly be classified in three main categories. 
The vast majority of students will remain insured in their capacity as family members in 
the Member State of habitual residence. In their Member State of studies, they will not 
be insured and will only be able to appeal to the sickness benefits coordination provisions 
in the event of a temporary stay.44 Secondly, if the mobile student is economically active 
(e.g. by performing a part-time job or evening/weekend work) and is regarded as an 
employed or self-employed person, s/he will benefit from the abovementioned 
coordination provisions for economically active persons and thus be ensured in the 
Member State of activity. Thirdly, a student can also be insured in the Member State 
where s/he studies, possibly in a specific healthcare scheme for students. 
For students, it should indeed be noted that this category of persons is generally 
regarded as a category benefiting from derived rights as family members of insured 
relatives, mostly their parents. Apart from their status of family member, personal 
affiliation of students to the Member States’ healthcare systems is usually linked to 
attending educational courses, registration with a school or university or paying school 
fees. Their affiliation to the healthcare scheme is generally subsidised by the state and 
subject to age limits. 
As to mobile EU students, it is repeatedly reported that Member States consider them as 
a category that is as a rule not affiliated to the healthcare system of the Member State of 
studies, as they normally do not habitually reside in the country where they study and 
consequently remain affiliated to the healthcare system of their Member State of 
residence. They are thus regarded as a typical category of mobile EU citizens which uses 
                                                 
42 Articles 23-25 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
43 Article 11, 2 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
44 VAN DER MEI, A.P., Free Movement of Persons within the European Community. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 
259. 
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the EHIC in order to receive medical treatment in the Member State where they are 
staying during the period of studies abroad, notwithstanding the fact that they could self-
evidently also shift residence temporarily to the Member State of studies. 
Students as such are in principle not covered as a separate insurance category by the 
mandatory healthcare scheme in Austria (unless they are employed, a family member or 
voluntarily insured), Finland (unless employed), France (unless ad hoc affiliation), 
Croatia and Malta (unless employed). Almost all Member States refer to the EHIC as 
the standard way for mobile students to receive medical care. 
Anyway, if a student shifts residence to her or his Member State of studies, s/he might 
seek access to the healthcare scheme of the latter in her or his own right and should be 
treated equally with national students in that regard. As to national conditions of 
affiliation specifically for students, we can refer to educational requirements such as 
those in Bulgaria, where they are insured under the state budget as persons under 18 
or, after they have reached that age, as full-time students until they have graduated 
from high school, but not later than they are 22 years old. Also students in full-time 
education in higher education institutions are covered until they are 22 years old, and 
PhD students in full-time state order education schemes. Foreign students in full-time 
education schemes are also covered until they are 26 years old and PhD students 
enrolled full-time by higher education institutions and scientific research organisations in 
Bulgaria. 
Specific coverage can be supported by the educational institution, like in Croatia (health 
insurance contribution to be paid by the scholarship provider), Hungary (provided by the 
university via private insurance companies during their first year of residence) or Poland 
(until students reach 26 years of age, they have health insurance as members of an 
insured person’s family; if the latter is not the case, they are insured by the college). 
Affiliation for healthcare as a student is logically often linked to a certain age 
requirement, as is e.g. the case in Germany (14 semesters of study and 30 years of age 
maximum), Estonia (no contributions under the age of 19, which can be continued for 
students over 19 when acquiring basic or general secondary education or formal 
vocational education in educational institutions founded in Estonia), Luxembourg (if 
they are under the age of 30 and if their income is less than the guaranteed minimum 
income), Romania (students under 26 with no income do not pay health insurance 
contributions but are insured by law), Slovenia (up to the age of 26) and Sweden. 
Students who have already been residing in Hungary for longer than 1 year (and have a 
registry card and address card) must be enrolled in the Hungarian State Health 
Insurance System (unless they have a valid European Health Insurance Card) and pay 
7,050 HUF (i.e. €22) a month. 
2.3.3. Other non-active persons 
Other categories of non-active persons except students are a broad category which is 
treated very diversely in the Member States’ healthcare schemes. In general and 
regardless of the abovementioned specific coordination rules for certain categories of 
non-active persons (like pensioners), we can make a distinction in the Member States’ 
national legislations between (1) affiliation of non-actives based on a specific status as 
opposed to (2) affiliation of non-actives based on residual provisions in order to 
guarantee an inclusive healthcare scheme for all persons legally residing on the territory 
of a Member State (and to a certain extent coverage for illegal residents). 
2.3.3.1. Affiliation based on a specific status 
This category of affiliation to national healthcare systems is related to the fact that a 
person has a specific social security status by receiving specific benefits or by being in a 
specific (health or other) condition or situation that is recognised by the Member States’ 
legislation as leading to inclusion in the healthcare scheme.  
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The first category can be detected in many Member States and relates to the affiliation of 
persons in receipt of social security benefits such as unemployment benefits, sickness 
benefits in cash, invalidity benefits or old-age pensions (or persons who are very close to 
retirement, e.g. EE). Also indigent people receiving social assistance are often integrated 
as a specific category of persons to be affiliated to the mandatory healthcare scheme. 
Next to this, affiliation can also be based on a very specific status meriting consideration 
by the healthcare scheme such as ‘war veteran’ (BG), ‘pregnant woman’ (EE) or ‘non-
working parent with a minimum of 3 children’ (EE) or ‘persons in the possession of a UK 
passport’ (MT). 
2.3.3.2. Affiliation based on residuary provisions to cover legal 
residents 
The second category of affiliation to the national healthcare system is based on national 
measures that can be regarded as inclusive measures to guarantee that persons who are 
residing in the territory of a Member State can gain access to healthcare, even though 
they lack the required status to be regarded as insured persons. Under this category, we 
for instance find ‘residence-based’ measures in contribution-based schemes, but also the 
possibility to affiliate on a voluntary basis to the mandatory scheme or an obligation to 
affiliate with a private insurance company. 
Examples of contribution-based systems that are broadened by residence-based 
measures can be found in several Member States. Although the Belgian healthcare 
system is in principle a contribution-based system, all persons domiciled in Belgium are 
covered and must pay personal contributions (€ 59, € 348 or € 697 per quarter) 
depending on the income level. Also in Croatia residence will lead to affiliation if no 
other insurance is available. In Hungary, economically inactive (EU and EEA citizens) 
residents (with a residence permit and an address registration card without income) pay 
a lump sum of HUF 7,050 (€ 22) as a flat-rate contribution to be covered against 
healthcare risks. In Lithuania, non-active EU nationals as well as their family members 
can participate in the Lithuanian health insurance system provided they have the 
certificate proving their right to live in the Republic of Lithuania. In such case, they pay 
the compulsory health insurance contributions or the latter will be paid on their behalf by 
the State (for certain categories like pensioners, children, unemployed persons etc). 
In certain Member States, voluntary insurance is offered as a residual back-up for non-
active persons, like for instance in Austria (non-active persons are not affiliated to the 
mandatory healthcare insurance scheme as long as they are not family members of an 
insured person or voluntarily insured),45 Luxembourg (a contribution of € 107.58 per 
month must be paid and the right to sickness benefits will be granted after three 
months) and Poland (persons who reside in Poland and are not covered by public health 
insurance may acquire the right to healthcare services by registering for voluntary 
insurance, in which case voluntary contributions need to be paid to the National Health 
Fund). 
It goes without saying that such inclusive measures will not be found in genuine 
residence-based systems, as affiliation to these systems is based purely on 
(legal/habitual) residence in the Member State. 
The Spanish hybrid system needs specific attention in this regard as legal residence 
plays a subsidiary role in order to be entitled to healthcare. The entitlement to healthcare 
                                                 
45 The right to voluntary healthcare insurance in AT applies only to those – independently of their nationality – 
who have their place of residence, i.e. centre of interests, in AT. An exception is made for students, as they 
only need to be temporarily staying on the territory. Benefits in kind based on voluntary healthcare insurance 
can be claimed only after a waiting period of three or six months, respectively. Also in this case an exception is 
made for students. They are not confronted with any waiting periods. 
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in Spain is identified in a specific law on healthcare, different from the Social Security 
Law. This law created in 2012 the concept of an “insured” person entitled to healthcare 
who is not always a “person insured in the Social Security System”. Both "insurances" 
are granted by the National Institute of Social Security (INSS). However, while the 
“persons insured in the Social Security System” pay social security contributions, the 
“healthcare insured persons” do not pay contributions (healthcare is financed by taxes).  
In order to determine whether a person is entitled to healthcare, the INSS checks first if 
s/he fulfils the general requirements to be considered a “healthcare insured person” (i.e. 
whether the person is an employee or a self-employed person active and insured under 
the social security system; whether s/he is a pensioner or is receiving a periodical benefit 
from the social security system including unemployment benefits; or whether s/he is an 
unemployed person whose unemployed benefits have expired). If the person does not 
fulfil any of the above, s/he could, subsidiarily, be considered a "healthcare insured 
person" if s/he is legally residing in Spain and has no right to compulsory healthcare 
coverage in any other way. Until August 2016, this latter group of insured persons also 
had to fulfil a specific requirement that was declared null and void by a Constitutional 
Court judgment.46 In essence, in order to be considered a “healthcare insured person”, 
the person’s income could not exceed a certain threshold to be fixed in a Royal Decree 
(set at € 100,000). The Court considered that this clause infringed the hierarchy of rules 
as far as any amount had to be established by a Law. Thus, nowadays any legal resident 
can without any threshold be “healthcare insured” irrespective of income until an 
amended Law is passed. 
2.4. Access to healthcare and legal residence based on Directive 
2004/38/EC 
Although access to healthcare is coordinated at EU level by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
and No 987/2009, health insurance for non-active persons is also crucial for the 
assessment of their legal residence on the territory of a Member State in the framework 
of Directive 2004/38/EC. The condition of having comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover in a host Member State for a stay of more than three months for students and 
(other) non-active persons according to Article 7 (1) (b) and (c) of Directive 2004/38/EC 
is indeed vital for their right to reside in the host State, conferred on them by EU 
legislation. 
The concept of comprehensive sickness insurance as laid down in Article 7 of Directive 
2004/38/EC is not further defined, neither in Directive 2004/38/EC nor by the CJEU. The 
only attempt to define the concept can be found in the Communication on better 
transposition of the Directive47 in which it was defined as “any insurance cover, private or 
public, contracted in the host Member State or elsewhere, as long as it provides 
comprehensive coverage and does not create a burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State. In protecting their public finances while assessing the comprehensiveness 
of sickness insurance cover, Member States must act in compliance with the limits 
imposed by Community law and in accordance with the principle of proportionality.” As 
this definition does not elaborate on the possible criteria to assess the 
comprehensiveness and thus remains rather vague, this may leave room for different 
national interpretations of what can be regarded as sufficient coverage in order to legally 
reside in the host State. As this residence requirement is aimed at preventing 
disproportionate pressure on the Member States’ public purse, this lack of guidance on 
how to implement may have a negative impact on the rights of mobile citizens if Member 
States were to interpret this too strictly. 
                                                 
46 TC 139/2016 15 August 2016. 
47 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States COM/2009/313. See also case 
Baumbast, C-413/99, EU:C:2002:493. 
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Comprehensive coverage could be based on both mandatory health insurance as well as 
on private health insurance. Moreover, mandatory coverage can be based on insurance in 
another Member State (evidenced by an EHIC or a S1 form) but also on equal access to 
the healthcare scheme of the host State. 
In a situation where the Regulation designates the Member State of residence as the 
competent Member State, this Article guarantees equal access to the residence-based 
sickness benefits of a host Member State as soon as the person establishes his or her 
habitual centre of interest there. Moreover, it even seems fully supported by the text of 
Directive 2004/38/EC that the entitlement to sickness benefits under Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 cannot be regarded as a burden on the “social assistance system” of a host 
Member State. Indeed, Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2004/38/EC does not contain 
any reference to “not becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State” with regard to the comprehensive sickness insurance requirement, as is 
the case for the sufficient resources requirement of the same Article. This indicates that 
the appeal to sickness benefits in the host Member State cannot be regarded as an 
appeal to the social assistance system of that Member State, although the 
abovementioned proposed definition of comprehensive sickness coverage in 
Communication 2009/313 seems to point in another direction. In that regard, it is 
interesting to see that the comprehensive sickness insurance condition is monitored 
differently throughout the EU, if it is monitored at all. 
In some Member States, the fulfilment of the comprehensive sickness insurance cover is 
not verified at all (EE, EL, IT and LT), whereas specifically in the Netherlands it is not 
verified ex ante but can be verified at a later stage during the period of residence on the 
territory. Union citizens who wish to reside in the Netherlands for more than 4 months 
must register within five days in the municipality where they wish to live (in the Personal 
Records Database). However, since January 2014 there is no longer a duty for Union 
citizens to inform the immigration authorities of their arrival and intention to reside in the 
Netherlands. The authorities do not, or no longer, structurally establish whether Union 
citizens actually satisfy the conditions for lawful residence. However, the National 
Healthcare Institute and the Social Insurance Board do have access to the Personal 
Records Database and can contact a person who is registered as a resident and ask him 
or her to present evidence of being insured for medical care. 
In the other Member States, the comprehensive sickness coverage condition is verified 
by specific legislation or administrative practices as a transposition of the provisions in 
Directive 2004/38/EC upon application for residence in the Member State concerned (e.g. 
in ES upon registration in the Central Register of Foreign Nationals, or by means of 
Identity Malta upon residence application in MT).  
For some Member States, it is explicitly mentioned that the condition of having a 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover is interpreted very broadly and not restrictive, 
like in Austria (travel insurance for the Schengen area is sufficient), Croatia (all 
mandatory or private insurances are accepted) and Romania (Romanian, other EEA or 
private insurance are accepted). In Switzerland, the lack of health insurance leads to an 
automatic affiliation to a Swiss insurer. The cantons exercise supervision over every 
person living or working in Switzerland, they inform the population about the mandatory 
sickness insurance, and request persons to prove that they have chosen an insurer. If a 
person does not comply with this obligation, the administration of the canton affiliates a 
person by a formal decision to any insurer of the canton’s choice. 
In France, the requirement is thoroughly verified as the coverage should be comparable 
to French mandatory health coverage. For the French authorities, the insurance is 
deemed to be comprehensive if it covers the basket of care such as listed by the French 
Social Security Code. This condition can be fulfilled by the sole application of the foreign 
legislation or by the combined application with Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. When an 
EU citizen is privately insured, it is required by French local healthcare institutions to 
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verify that the care basket is comparable to the French statutory one. For the 
administration, the main criterion is that there cannot be any categories of care, goods or 
services excluded from the coverage which would be covered by the French statutory 
insurance. However, some differences are tolerated, for instance on the conditions of 
coverage/reimbursement. Reimbursements need not be exactly identical. The local 
institutions must verify that the private contract will not be a source of financial burden 
for the French social security system. 
In Slovenia, the Ministry of the Interior has published guidelines on what is considered 
as ‘suitable’ health insurance for foreigners. For non-active EU citizens, it should cover at 
least urgent treatment. It is a condition for the right to reside and a residence permit 
may be annulled if there is no (longer) suitable health insurance. This may be obtained 
by inclusion in the Slovenian mandatory health insurance, guaranteed by bilateral social 
security treaties, Regulation (EC) 883/2004, voluntary inclusion (of foreigners) in the 
mandatory health insurance in Slovenia or private health insurance. 
Non-active EU nationals entering the UK are required to have full healthcare insurance. 
In order “to avoid the overburdening of the National Health Service - NHS with 
treatments for unemployed and economically inactive non-UK citizens, access to the NHS 
is not considered to be sufficient to meet the requirement of comprehensive sickness 
insurance for EU migrants, and instead private health insurance is required. However, in 
2012 the Commission addressed a reasoned opinion to the UK, requesting it to consider 
NHS cover as sufficient sickness insurance when assessing whether or not a non-active 
EU citizen has a right to reside in the country”.48 
The UK position is indeed a very good example of the tension between EU coordination 
and the EU Residence framework, which can be regarded as a new ‘chicken or egg’ 
debate similar to that regarding SNCBs falling under the Residence Directive’s definition 
of social assistance. In essence, the main question is whether the Regulation’s equal 
treatment rights for inactive persons after a residence and therefore social security 
competence shift (in application of Article 11(3)(e)) can be prevented by Member States’ 
requirements on legal residence. From the recent case Commission v United Kingdom,49 
it can be concluded that the answer has already been provided by the CJEU, as it clearly 
considers legal residence as meant in Directive 2004/38/EC as “neutral entitlement 
condition” in a Member State’s social security legislation. Indeed, also access to social 
security benefits as coordinated by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 can be restricted by 
legal residence requirements in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC. Although this now 
seems to be a well-established legal development, this cannot prevent some critical 
reflections. 
It should be observed that the CJEU has always referred to the burden on the social 
assistance system or the protection of public finances with clear references to the 
sufficient resources requirement for legal residence. Relying on healthcare in the Member 
State of residence is however connected to the separate requirement of comprehensive 
sickness cover. In that regard, a distinction can still be made between the sufficient 
resources requirement and the comprehensive sickness cover requirement. As already 
mentioned, the text of the Directive itself does not indicate whatsoever that the 
entitlement to sickness benefits in a host State could be regarded as a burden on the 
social assistance system of that State. On the contrary, as to sickness coverage, it does 
not mention this goal of preventing the overburdening of the host State’s system.  
Moreover, where SNCBs clearly have a link with social assistance as hybrid benefits with 
features of both social security and social assistance, this is not the case for healthcare. 
The latter is a classic benefit that fully corresponds to the CJEU’s definition of genuine 
                                                 
48 European Commission, Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights, press release, 
26.04.2012, cited by Eva-Maria Poptcheva Members' Research Service European Parliamentary Research 
Service ‘Freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens’ 10/06/2014 140808REV1. 
49 Commission v United Kingdom, C-308/14, EU:C:2016:436,  
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social security benefits.50 Such argument has nevertheless already been overruled in 
Commission v United Kingdom for family benefits. 
In that judgment, the CJEU has made a chronological and systemic distinction between 
the conflict rule of Article 11(3)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and a legal residence 
requirement for entitlement to a social security benefit. According to the CJEU, they are 
unrelated, as the first provision is merely a conflict rule determining the applicable 
legislation to avoid positive and negative law conflicts, whereas the latter is merely a 
national provision framing access to a social security benefit within the competence of 
the Member States. One cannot disregard that this reasoning seems to contain a flaw, as 
it neglects the overlapping of the national requirement with the EU conflict rule. Indeed, 
the artificial distinction between the determination of the legislation of the Member State 
of “residence” as the applicable legislation and the legal “residence” requirement as an 
entitlement condition is problematic. It circumvents the essence of the debate, namely 
that the national requirement in actual fact can be said to go against the conflict rule by 
introducing a different concept of residence (legal residence instead of factual residence). 
In that regard, it could be considered as national legislation that should be waived due to 
the direct applicability of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, paving the way for equal 
treatment. However, the problem is that this national legislation is fully supported by EU 
legislation, namely Directive 2004/38/EC. The debate is slightly similar to that in the 
framework of the patient mobility case law, in which the CJEU was wriggling every which 
way to hold that the prior authorisation requirement for planned care in Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 was perfectly compatible with the case law condemning such prior 
authorisation at numerous occasions. Nowadays, it is the Regulation that is the victim of 
such systemic-legal correct but still – from the ratio legis of EU social security 
coordination – at least contestable case law. 
On top of this, looking at the ‘welfare tourism prevention’ aspect behind the mentioned 
case law, it cannot be neglected that ‘seeking healthcare services’ is in se more 
circumstantial than the entitlement to SNCBs or to social security benefits providing 
financial aid. Whereas the latter mainly aim to provide for financial support (in the event 
that a person does not reach the minimum subsistence level, in the event of costs for 
children etc) in the Member State of residence, healthcare primarily intends to address 
physical (and mental) needs due to the specific health circumstances of the beneficiary. 
The underlying principles of, respectively, financial aid versus circumstantial health needs 
should therefore be taken into account when assessing the “drivers to shift residence”. 
As such, one could come to the conclusion that the financial aid as provided by SNCBs 
would more likely inspire welfare tourism rather than the provision of healthcare 
services. This is also supported by the fact that persons clearly have a preference of 
being medically treated close to their home and within the system they are familiar with, 
rather than seeking care in other countries with another healthcare system and in 
another language. Residence shifts inspired by healthcare tourism therefore come across 
as a contradictio in terminis.  
Finally, a central part of the dialogue is without any doubt the fact that the right to 
healthcare is a fundamental right acknowledged in Article 35 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In that regard, the CJEU’s legal reasoning 
that a conflict rule leads to the application of legal residence requirements in the national 
legislation in the Member State of residence, resulting in inactive persons falling between 
two stools, does not suffice. 
Although apart from the direction in Commission v United Kingdom, of which it is unsure 
whether it would ‘contaminate’ healthcare, there is no other indication that the 
comprehensive sickness coverage requirement would follow the same route as the 
sufficient resources requirement, recent case law of the CJEU has proven to be very 
                                                 
50 Hoeckx EU:C:1985:139, 973. 
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much in favour of Member States’ arguments to protect their social welfare circle from 
unjustified claims of non-active persons. In that regard, it would not be surprising if a 
claim for equal treatment to healthcare provision under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
might be considered as the non-fulfilment of the sickness coverage requirement for legal 
residence in Directive 2004/38/EC, in order to prevent ‘welfare tourism’. It could indeed 
be argued that both requirements (on sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness 
cover) follow the same logic, i.e. avoiding equal treatment between a person in 
temporary residence and nationals, not only with regard to social assistance but also 
regarding healthcare. This situation would only change once s/he becomes a permanent 
resident. 
Considering the above, a more unified information and an EU-wide clarification of the 
“comprehensive sickness coverage” condition under Directive 2004/38/EC would be 
required. A clarification of the relationship between the comprehensive sickness 
requirement and sickness benefits coordination would be necessary in order to avoid 
distinctive (narrower or broader) interpretations by the CJEU (as is the case with the 
sufficient resources requirement for non-actives). Moreover, the distinctive concepts of 
residence in the Regulations and in the Directive cause problems. For instance, if a 
person stays in another Member State for more than three months, s/he has to register 
as a resident. To that end, s/he needs comprehensive sickness insurance cover. It needs 
to be clarified which role healthcare entitlements based on EU social security coordination 
can play in that regard. In that regard, the social security coordination rules should be 
adapted to elucidate the relationship between the fundamental principle of equal 
treatment and its possible limitations based on legal residence for economically inactive 
persons. This will definitely support legal certainty for mobile citizens and national 
administrations. 
2.5. Problems related to the affiliation of EU mobile citizens to the 
healthcare schemes of the Member States 
In the vast majority of the Member States, no problems are reported regarding the 
affiliation of EU citizens to the healthcare scheme. If the latter comply with the conditions 
of affiliation or can provide proof of their insurance in another Member State, they are 
granted equal access. 
In some Member States, the complexity of the system or the lack of information 
regarding the process of affiliation can pose a problem. In Estonia, a person has to be 
registered in different registers before s/he gets the insurance cover, which could cause 
some confusion, but at the same time the registration processes are easy and quick. In 
Finland, such confusion could be generated by the complex insurance scheme, but also 
as to the exact entitlement to benefits and due to language barriers. In Hungary, 
especially the process to receive an insurance number (TAJ) is very cumbersome. Some 
informational problems may also arise when a mobile citizen enters the Portuguese 
territory, but it is expected that the central and local services, healthcare centres and 
units of the NHS have the capability to transmit the information and to undertake all 
necessary measures to ensure that healthcare is provided on time. 
In some Member States, the requirement of legal residence on the territory in order to be 
able to affiliate to the healthcare scheme could be problematic, as is shown by the below 
examples.  
Those who fall under the residual category that is insured because they are domiciled in 
Belgium may fail to obtain a right to healthcare. Foreigners who are not entitled to stay 
for more than three months or who are not entitled to establishment are excluded. 
Economically inactive EU citizens have a right to reside only if they have a full healthcare 
insurance. Therefore, certain citizens may fail to obtain a right to reside, and thereby fail 
to obtain a right to benefits in kind.  
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In France, the current insurance system was implemented in January 2016. Therefore, 
no urgent practical problem has yet been identified by national healthcare institutions. 
However, past experience indicates that at least two problems may occur at local level. 
One is the evaluation of the condition of stable residence. The person must establish a 
continued presence for at least three months on the French territory. The definition of 
stable residence may be problematic in practice. A Circular51 explains how to determine 
whether someone’s residence is stable. Furthermore, the way of counting the three 
months of residence raises questions. To what extent should account be taken of prior 
periods of residence completed in other EU Member States? Another Circular52 considers 
that the principle of aggregation must apply as long as the periods of residence in the 
other country opens healthcare rights (in other words, as long as the periods of residence 
were completed in a country with a residence-based healthcare scheme). Other 
administrative sources consider that aggregated periods of residence abroad should be 
taken into account if they correspond to a period of insurance for any of the risks covered 
by the coordination Regulations. It is unlikely that the principle of aggregation is correctly 
implemented at local level. This is also the conclusion of NGOs who deal with practical 
cases. Another issue is that, even if an EU citizen is subject to French social security law 
according to EU rules, he or she may not be insured in France if there are remaining 
healthcare rights in another EU country. He or she might keep using the EHIC instead of 
claiming healthcare insurance in France. Indeed, according to the central administration, 
as long as a patient can present a valid EHIC there is no reason to assess whether he or 
she should be insured in France. This situation would affect mainly non-active EU citizens 
and non-active persons who are family members of workers.53 
Finally, in Switzerland, specific affiliation problems are related to residence outside 
Switzerland. Persons who have their residence outside Switzerland but in an EU Member 
State may have to pay higher contributions than persons living inside Switzerland 
because sickness insurers are allowed to calculate contributions according to the country 
where a person has his or her residence. Furthermore, family members of a person 
working in Switzerland do not have the choice of insurer if they are living outside 
Switzerland; they are automatically affiliated to the insurer of the working parent, which 
is an exception to the general rule of the free choice of insurer. 
Although reportedly no major issues can be detected in the area of affiliation of EU 
mobile citizens to the Member States’ healthcare schemes, it cannot be denied that legal, 
administrative and practical issues require specific attention. Especially the complexity 
and diversity of affiliation to healthcare systems throughout the Union should inspire 
reflection with regard to better information exchange (cf. infra). 
2.6. The financing of the scheme 
As to the financing of the schemes,54 it is accepted EU-wide that this does not seem to 
have an impact on the affiliation of EU mobile citizens. Whether the scheme is financed 
through contributions or general taxation, or through a mix of both like in most Member 
States, is not directly related to affiliation problems or affiliation in general. In most 
Member States, it is explicitly reported that there is no correlation between financing and 
affiliation. In a very limited number of Member States, some distant interdependence is 
detected between financing and affiliation. 
In Germany, the way of financing a system of healthcare coverage has a dimension with 
regard to social policy and with regard to coverage. Germany has decided in favour of 
                                                 
51 Circular DSS/2A/2B/3A n°2008-245 of 22 July 2008. 
52 Circular DSS/DACI/2010/461 of 27 December 2010. 
53 Letter from the Social Security Minister, 24 August 2012. 
54 See THOMSON, S, FOUBISTER,T., and MOSSIALOS, E. (2009): Financing health care in the European Union. 
Copenhagen: World Health Organization, p. 23-48. 
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insurance also because this increases a system’s detachment from day-to-day fiscal 
politics and thus gives the system more autonomy. The gaps, such as the ones which an 
insurance system linked to employment may have, are filled by expressive rules covering 
certain other groups and professions and finally by the provision that also those persons 
are covered who have no other health insurance and who, on the basis of their status, 
are entitled to statutory health insurance or who were in the past insured by the 
statutory health system. 
In Croatia, the way of financing in some cases influences the affiliation to the Croatian 
healthcare system and the level of benefits. Firstly, persons residing in Croatia but falling 
neither within the scope of insured persons, nor of family members or other categories of 
insured persons, have to pay the mandatory health insurance contributions themselves. 
They are entitled to health insurance benefits, provided they have previously paid a one-
time contribution (the amount of such a contribution is calculated on the basis of a 
minimum contribution base multiplied by the number of months between the last 
mandatory affiliation to the health insurance system in Croatia or another Member State, 
but can amount to a maximum of 12 months). Secondly, all insured persons have the 
right to healthcare benefits in kind, regardless of the basis of their affiliation. 
Nevertheless, the level of benefits in kind differs depending on who is obliged to pay 
social security contributions and on the fact whether the contributions were actually paid. 
Persons for whom someone else is obliged to pay social security contributions (e.g. 
workers, since the payment of contributions is the employer’s obligation) or those whose 
healthcare is financed through taxes have all the rights as long as they have the status of 
an insured person. However, insured persons who are obliged to pay social security 
contributions themselves but have failed to do so for 30 days or more only have the right 
to emergency healthcare. They can regain the right to standard healthcare only after 
paying the owed amount of contributions with interest. 
2.7. National legislative measures and/or administrative practices 
to facilitate the access to healthcare for mobile EU citizens 
2.7.1. General measures to facilitate access for mobile EU citizens 
Regardless of the EU social security coordination-based facilitation (equal treatment, 
aggregation, assimilation), Member States generally do not seem to adopt measures 
which are specifically aimed at facilitating access to their healthcare scheme for mobile 
EU citizens. In the majority of the Member States, no measures designed to facilitate 
such access can be reported. However, it should be noted that in somewhat less than 
half of the Member States certain national legislation or administrative practices can be 
pinpointed as enabling mobile citizens to affiliate to the local healthcare scheme, mainly 
through administrative intervention, smooth procedures for affiliation and the provision 
of information to citizens. 
In Belgium, the avoidance of gaps can be found in case-by-case administrative practice. 
A reported case concerns a person who was insured in France and received a number of 
treatments there, before becoming subject to Belgian law. Belgian law provides that 
eight treatments are due. The question was whether the treatments received in France 
should be deduced from that number. The Belgian institution decided that the patient 
would remain entitled to eight treatments, regardless of the number of treatments 
received before the Belgian law became applicable. 
Another case of potential gaps in healthcare coverage concerns a person who was 
insured in the Netherlands, where he worked and resided. Having committed an offence 
in Belgium, he was extradited to that country, where he was put in pre-trial detention. 
The Netherlands terminated his insurance. Later, the person concerned was free on 
parole with an ankle monitor in Belgium. Belgian healthcare covers persons who have an 
ankle monitor provided that they are condemned, which the person concerned was not. 
In order to avoid an interruption in social protection, the Belgian authorities considered 
that his place of habitual residence lied in Belgium. 
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These two examples illustrate that interruptions in coverage can be very fact-specific. 
While admittedly a small sample, they seem to suggest that there is a willingness to 
avoid interruptions in coverage, by tailoring solutions to the facts of the case. 
In Switzerland and Liechtenstein, if an individual affiliates to the healthcare scheme in 
time, the affiliation works retroactively and such “as of the day of arrival”, as a result of 
which no gaps should occur. Such smooth affiliation in the event of a timely registration 
and the consequent smooth administration is also reported in Estonia (state and local 
government bodies work very quickly; most things can also be done electronically, and 
the exchange of data between the bodies is quite good), Finland (if a person has 
difficulties to get healthcare, s/he may ask the competent authorities for a certificate of 
entitlement to medical care in Finland), Croatia (if the competent institution establishes 
that the EU national has neither public nor private health insurance from another Member 
State, it establishes for such a foreigner the status of insured person and informs the 
competent tax authorities), Iceland (you can apply for an exemption for not being 
registered to healthcare in the event of sudden illness or injury, for kidney patients and 
for individuals who have an infectious disease and get full treatment), Malta (Maltese 
legislation applies from the moment the person pays the first weekly social security 
contribution) and France (coverage as of the first day of work). 
In different Member States, the avoidance of gaps is explicitly linked to providing 
sufficient and accessible information, e.g. on websites, or via brochures or leaflets. The 
website of the Czech Health Insurance Bureau offers, in English, quite detailed 
instructions for patients coming to the Czech Republic concerning cases in which they 
would need healthcare.55 In Greece, clarifications on affiliation are provided through 
newsletters or circulars, drafted by the competent authorities. Also in Italy, many 
information channels can be consulted containing useful information for EU citizens.56 
In Portugal, the Central Administration of the Health Service prepared the ‘Welcome 
Guide on Access to the Health System by Foreign Citizens’, the main objectives of which 
were to provide a set of guidelines to ensure the identification and the necessary 
procedures for the registration and access of foreign nationals to the Portuguese Health 
System (SNS). Amongst the specific goals of the document, these guiding instruments 
were specifically designed to identify all foreign citizens and nationals with priority rights 
in another country assisted in units providing healthcare. They also serve to clarify the 
necessary procedures for registration of foreign citizens and nationals with priority rights 
in another country in the health system.  
In the UK, the Department of Health has published a toolbox57 to help NHS trusts comply 
with their responsibilities to EEA patients, including pre-attendance forms for all patients 
to fill in when being admitted. According to the Department of Health carrying out checks 
is “a quick and simple matter that need not add more than a few seconds to the booking-
in process”.58 
If visitors from the EEA ask for information on accessing healthcare in the UK, they can 
be directed to a dedicated website.59 
Sufficient information for patients is undoubtedly a crucial point for facilitating access to 
healthcare, especially given the great diversity of healthcare systems across the EU. In 
                                                 
55 http://www.kancelarzp.cz/en/temp-in-cr/eu-insured-temporary. 
56 E.g. the website of the Ministry of Health: 
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that regard, it is highly recommendable to take further initiatives at EU level in order to 
guarantee a common minimum framework of information provision on healthcare 
affiliation as well as to share best practices with regard to facilitating access to healthcare 
for EU mobile citizens. 
2.7.2. Specific measures concerning access to maternity benefits in 
kind 
It is remarkable that in largely the same Member States as those where specific 
measures or practices to avoid gaps for EU mobile citizens were reported, also specific 
measures for access to maternity benefits in kind could be detected. 
In Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the affiliation is also retroactive for healthcare related 
to maternity and childbirth. Therefore, a pregnant woman that settles in Switzerland is 
insured as from day one, once she has her residence in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
In Estonia, all pregnant women whose pregnancy has been verified by a doctor or 
midwife are considered to be persons equal to insured persons up to three months after 
the predicted date of delivery. This also applies to EU citizens who have registered their 
right of residence in the Estonian Population Register. Having insurance cover, they get 
all the health services they need. In the same line, in Portugal a pregnant woman and 
infants are considered priority groups in medical assistance either in healthcare centres 
or hospitals. They are also exempt from the payment of fees. In Romania the birth is 
ensured for all women in maternities, assisted by specialised medical personnel. 
In Italy, EU citizens who hold an E112 form issued in their country of origin and who are 
pregnant have the right to register with the SSN and therefore enjoy all the health 
benefits related to the period from immediately before to immediately after the delivery 
under the same conditions as Italian citizens. Furthermore, EU citizens (as well as non-
EU citizens) lacking health coverage who do not have the pre-requisites to register with 
the SSN, who neither have a risk certificate issued by their country of origin nor a private 
insurance, and who are indigent can still enjoy urgent and non- deferrable benefits, 
among which the protection of maternity and the voluntary interruption of pregnancy on 
equal terms compared to women registered with the SSN. 
In Cyprus, special rules have been reported but only for socially vulnerable groups such 
as Roma, refugees etc. 
In Spain, Poland and Sweden, specific entitlements for pregnant women in national 
healthcare legislation do not seem to apply to mobile EU citizens, which is rather 
controversial. 
In Spain, specific measures for pregnant women are in place but not for EU mobile 
citizens. Treatments during pregnancy, child birth and the post-partum period are 
provided free of charge to third-country nationals in an irregular administrative situation 
(not registered as residents nor authorised to reside).60 According to the national 
legislation, this regulation does, however, not apply to EU nationals, who have to rely on 
their own regulatory framework (the EU coordination Regulations). Furthermore, the 
same regulation envisages that if their stay is for less than three months, they cannot be 
considered as foreign persons neither registered nor authorised to reside in order to 
receive the mentioned treatments linked to pregnancy. However, in general terms, EU 
nationals cannot enjoy fewer rights than third-country nationals in an irregular 
                                                 
60 Most Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autónomas), responsible for granting and providing 
healthcare, go even further than this legal provision (Law 16/2003, Article 3ter(b)) and grant complete 
healthcare to all foreigners in an irregular administrative situation, even if since 2012 the national law states 
that they cannot be considered healthcare insured persons in Spain. A recent judgement by the Constitutional 
Court considered that such legal exclusion is in accordance with the Spanish Constitution (TC 139/2016, 15 
August 2016). 
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administrative situation. In practice, EU national women will presumably also be covered 
even if they are not insured under another social security system and cannot be treated 
based on the EHIC or S1 form.  
In Poland, a constitutional provision is related to healthcare for pregnant women, but 
this is not applied to all EU citizens. The Polish Constitution obliges the state to extend 
particular care to persons younger than 18 years of age and pregnant women. According 
to the Act on Publicly Funded Healthcare Benefits, women in pregnancy, during childbirth 
and for up to six weeks in the postnatal period have the right to healthcare benefits 
regardless of whether they are insured. However, these regulations only apply to persons 
with Polish citizenship, refugee status, subsidiary protection or the status of a temporary 
resident to connect with the family after meeting conditions from the refugee act. EU 
citizens can receive healthcare benefits only if they are insured in their country of origin 
or in Poland. 
In 2006, Sweden was criticised for not offering undocumented migrants the same 
healthcare, on the same basis as residents in Sweden, and Sweden therefore did not 
comply with its international human rights obligations. In July 2013, a new Swedish law 
entered into force granting undocumented migrants entitlement to healthcare on the 
same basis as asylum seekers, though not the same entitlement to healthcare as 
residents in Sweden. According to the law, they are entitled to maternity benefits in kind 
and other care that “may not be deferred” to a subsidised price. However, whether the 
law is applicable to EU citizens staying in Sweden without a right to residence is not clear 
and today some County Councils offer care to this group whereas others do not. 
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3. ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE 
3.1. Various legal routes  
This chapter deals with the different legal routes that persons insured in one Member 
State have at their disposal to access healthcare in another Member State. Such patients 
could, in theory, be treated under 
 the coordination Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and No 987/2009; 
 Directive 2011/24/EU and its national implementation; or 
 their own national legislation. 
Besides, in some Member States there are International Social Security Agreements 
(bilateral or multilateral) that provide for additional rights to access cross-border 
healthcare.  
Below, the three legal routes mentioned are examined in detail, including a summary of 
their main principles, an assessment of their impact and the interaction between them. 
Moreover, a review of the challenges derived from their application and the repercussions 
of both EU legal instruments on national healthcare systems are analysed. 
3.1.1. The Coordination Regulations as a starting point 
The structure of this chapter is based on that of the EU coordination Regulations, 
distinguishing firstly between unplanned and planned healthcare situations, continuing 
with an analysis of the impact of the Directive in both scenarios61 and ending with a 
review of the alternative options for accessing cross-border healthcare envisaged by 
national legislation and international agreements. 
Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and No 987/2009, the first route, set a common 
legislative framework for the coordination of social security systems, including healthcare 
as a sickness benefit in kind. They are based on the principle of free movement of 
persons,62 originally workers, and lay mainly outside the freedom to provide services 
principle.63 
Directive 2011/24/EU and its national implementation, the second route, is derived from 
relevant CJEU case law on the refusal of reimbursement claims for planned healthcare 
costs that lacked previous authorisation under the Regulations. This case law grants 
patients the right to a different kind of reimbursement on the basis of the freedom to 
provide services enshrined in the Treaties since the late 1990s.64 Until 2006, as a result 
of Watts,65 it was not clear whether that affected all national healthcare systems 
regardless of how they are organised, managed or financed.66 
                                                 
61 Scenarios which, as is well-known, are not envisaged by the Directive itselfw. 
62 For the purpose of healthcare, insured persons entitled to healthcare in a Member State. 
63 With the exception of the so-called Vanbraekel supplement, see 3.3.1.4., below. 
64 Decker EU:C:1998:167; Kohll EU:C:1998:171. It has been considered that this case law is connected to a 
1984 judgment on the exportation of foreign currency, i.e. Luisi and Carbone, C-286/82 and C-26/83, 
EU:C:1984:35. After Kohll and Decker, judgments in Vanbraekel, C-368/98, EU:C:2001:400; Smits and 
Peerbooms EU:C:2001:404 were also relevant. 
65 Watts, EU:C:2006:325. 
66 This delay could be considered a key factor to explain why the findings of the case law were not included in 
the new simplified Regulations. See CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D. Cross-border healthcare in the EU: Interaction 
between Directive 2011/24/EU and the Regulations on social security coordination, ERA forum (2014) 15. p. 
361. 
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Obviously, the inclusion of CJEU case law in the Directive does not prevent the direct 
application of evolving CJEU case law and the Treaty principles on which it is based. The 
risk of this third route cannot be ruled out as far as the CJEU case law and the Treaties 
can differ from the Directive and its implementation.67 The CJEU interpretation of the 
Treaties and of previous case law can evolve,68 not to mention that circumstances under 
which a ruling took place may change. 
Special attention should be given to the special rules envisaged by EU legal instruments 
regarding two specific groups of persons and their family members: frontier workers and 
pensioners (whose legal position has already been analysed in the past). residence 
outside the competent Member State could give rise to particular legal issues and 
interpretative problems, which merits further analysis. 
Side by side with these EU instruments and case law, there are parallel schemes that can 
be more beneficial for patients. Under certain circumstances, such as urgency, some 
Member States reimburse patients for medical expenses incurred abroad based 
exclusively on national law. Others envisage a worldwide reimbursement of treatment 
costs against national tariffs, not always subjected to prior authorisation. Finally, some 
Member States entitle their insured persons to access healthcare in another State under 
a bilateral or multilateral agreement on social security. International agreements signed 
between Member States and Third States are out of the scope of this report.69 
3.1.2. Interaction between the EU cross-border healthcare routes 
The relationship between EU cross-border healthcare routes is only envisaged, briefly, in 
the Directive. As they were adopted before the entry into force of the Directive, the 
Regulations ignore the case law on cross-border healthcare and free movement of 
services70 and do not mention the Directive. Neither has this been taken into account in 
all the reforms introduced after 2011. 
The Directive, by contrast, cannot be read on its own. It constantly relates to the 
Regulations regarding key factors such as its scope of application or the Member State 
responsible for the reimbursement of healthcare costs. Here there is a significant 
terminological divergence. Under the Directive, the “Member State of affiliation”, debtor 
State or the one responsible for the reimbursement, is defined as the competent 
authorising Member State under the Regulations,71 i.e. the one responsible for issuing 
the PD S2 or the authorisation for getting planned healthcare. In general, the competent 
Member State under the Regulations and the Member State of affiliation under the 
Directive are the same. There is an exception for pensioners and their family members 
residing in a Member State different from the competent one, when the said State is 
refunded the healthcare provided by means of fixed amounts.72 In this case, the Member 
                                                 
67 See FILLON, J.-C. Cross-border healthcare: towards coordination of two patient mobility routes in JORENS, Y 
(ed.) et al, 50 Years of Social Security Coordination Past-Present-Future, European Commission, Luxembourg 
(2010). p. 218. 
68 See STRBAN, G., Patient mobility in the European Union: between social security coordination and free 
movement of services, ERA Forum (2013) 14(3). p. 406. 
69 They could, however, be relevant when receiving unplanned healthcare abroad. According to AC 
Recommendation S2 (2014/C 46/09), the principle of equal treatment should apply, in principle, in cases where 
the competent Member State has concluded a bilateral agreement with a third country in which provisions on 
sickness benefits in kind which become medically necessary in a third country (during a period of stay) are 
included, and provided that the third country is prepared to cooperate in individual cases. This right to 
healthcare derives directly from the CJEU judgment in Gottardo, C-55/00, EU:C:2002:16, establishing that the 
bilateral conventions on social security involving a Member State and a third country should apply to all EU 
nationals unless there is an objective justification for not applying it. 
70 With the exception of the so-called Vanbraekel supplement, see 3.3.1.4. 
71 Regardless of whether or not prior authorisation is envisaged under the Directive. 
72 Article 63 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. There is a list of Member States charging fixed amounts in Annex 
3, currently including CY, ES, IE, NL, PT, FI, SE and UK. 
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State of residence is responsible for issuing the PD S2 for planned healthcare under the 
Regulations and, consequently, is the State of affiliation under the Directive. If the 
pensioner resides in a Member State refunded on the basis of actual expenditure, the 
competent Member State under the Regulations would continue issuing the PD S2 and 
therefore would continue being the State of affiliation. Therefore, if in the future fixed 
amounts were generally replaced by actual expenditure as the only way to be refunded, 
this exception and the distinction between the Member State of affiliation and the 
competent Member State will disappear.73 
Surprisingly, the Directive does not devote a specific article74 to its interaction with the 
Regulations despite the fact that it declares, in its first Article, that regulating their 
relationship is one of its main objectives. However, considering other articles and recitals 
of the preamble, the following conclusions can be reached. 
The main rule of interaction, also the most obvious one, is that both routes of 
reimbursement cannot be used simultaneously. Logically, double reimbursement is 
forbidden.75 
A basic premise, in order to carry out a further analysis, is determining if both 
instruments can be used simultaneously or not.76 It should be taken into account that 
even if their scope of application largely overlaps, they are not identical. This question is 
better answered in a negative way, that is by establishing when only one instrument is 
applicable and interaction is not an issue. 
The Regulations are the only applicable route in the following three situations: 
 Firstly, in Switzerland, as the Directive is only applicable in the EU and is being 
implemented in the EFTA countries.77 
 Secondly, in the case of healthcare received in some third countries on the basis 
of social security agreements78 between a Member State and a third country. 
Thanks to the so-called “external dimension of social security co-ordination”,79 
which does not apply to the Directive. 
                                                 
73 There is a work group led by the United Kingdom identifying the possible problems derived from changing the 
refund system from fixed amounts to actual expenditure. Germany has already experienced this change, 
although it does not have a national healthcare system. 
74 Some recitals of the Directive are devoted to this task. Its legal enforceability, however, is doubtful as far as 
preambles only clarify the legislature’s intention and the interpretation of the articles. 
75 In this regard see Recital 30 of the Directive Preamble; Article 2(m), stating that the Directive applies without 
prejudice to the Regulations; and the first sentence of Recital 28, i.e. “This Directive should not affect an 
insured person’s rights in respect of the assumption of costs of healthcare which becomes necessary on medical 
grounds during a temporary stay in another Member State according to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004”. 
76 In practice both routes can be used in a complementary way. In Member States where the authorisation 
under the Directive route is imposed, the patients can use this latter for being reimbursed from a first 
outpatient visit to a doctor. Once they decide to receive surgery, they can ask for an S2 authorisation to receive 
healthcare under the Regulations as long as the provider is included in the social security system or the national 
legislation authorises it. 
77 The Directive has been applicable in Norway since March 2015. In Iceland the implementation has been in 
force since 1 June 2016. In Liechtenstein it has not yet been approved. 
78 The judgment in Gottardo EU:C:2002:16 points out that the bilateral conventions on social security involving 
a Member State and a third country should apply to all EU nationals unless there is an objective justification for 
not applying it. AC Recommendation S2, for its part, establishes that the healthcare provisions included in the 
bilateral convention apply to anyone entitled according to the legislation of the Member State, regardless of 
where they reside.  
79 Regarding the external dimension see European Commission COM (2012) 153, 30 March 2012. 
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 Thirdly, in the case of treatments that are explicitly excluded from the material 
scope of the Directive.80 
For its part, the Directive is exclusively applicable in two situations: 
 Firstly, and the most relevant situation, when the patient requires healthcare from 
a purely private provider that is not affiliated or contracted with the social security 
system. This is a game changer for patients from national health systems, such as 
in the United Kingdom, where private healthcare is normally not covered. 
However, it should be underlined that patients from Member States that already 
envisaged the reimbursement of healthcare costs incurred with a purely private 
provider abroad, such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, or the Netherlands, were 
already entitled under the Regulations to the reimbursement of healthcare costs 
incurred with a foreign private provider against their national tariffs, according to 
Article 25(B)(7) of the implementing Regulation.81 
 Secondly, for third-country nationals insured in Denmark, as far as they are 
excluded from the Regulations route.82 
If both the Regulations and the Directive are applicable,83 the patients should choose one 
instrument over the other after being actively and thoroughly informed of their rights by 
the National Contact Point. In the absence of an explicit choice in favour of the Directive, 
the Regulations should be applied. The patients cannot be deprived of the presumably 
more beneficial rights granted by the Regulations. This preferential application is only 
referred to explicitly in a provision devoted to healthcare treatments that require prior 
authorisation under the Directive and under the Regulations.84 
To find out which route is more beneficial for the patient several aspects must be taken 
into consideration. For instance, if the national implementation envisages prior 
authorisation and other administrative requirements, if there is co-payment of the 
differences between the tariffs of reference in the Member States involved. A further 
analysis of these aspects, distinguishing between unplanned and planned situations, will 
be carried out in this chapter. 
3.2. The distinction between unplanned and planned healthcare 
Among the various discrepancies between Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 and Directive 
2011/24/EU, one of the most obvious is that the latter does not make a distinction 
between unplanned85 and planned86 healthcare, but applies to health services87 in 
general. 
                                                 
80 Long-term care, organ transplants and public vaccination programmes. Long-term care is controversially 
excluded from the scope of the Directive although it is a sickness benefit in kind that falls within the scope of 
freedom to provide services. See Article 1(3) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
81 Regarding the meaning of this obscure Article see 3.3.1.3, section Healthcare subjected to upfront payment. 
82 “The Directive applies to all third country nationals who are entitled to healthcare benefits in Denmark. Said 
beneficiaries are not covered by the Regulations as Denmark is not bound by Regulation 1231/2010/EU OJ L 
344, 24 December 2010. For them, Denmark cannot be a Competent MS under the Regulations but could be a 
MS of Affiliation under the Directive. It should be noted that the right to cross-border healthcare does not in 
itself entitle a patient to enter, stay or reside in a MS (Recital 18 of the Preamble of Directive 2011/24/EU). The 
Directive does not bypass national laws on immigration.” CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D. Cross-border healthcare 
in the EU: Interaction between Directive 2011/24/EU and the Regulations on social security coordination, ERA 
forum (2014) 15.p. 366. 
83 This possibility was recognised by CJEU case law regarding the right of reimbursement based on the freedom 
to provide services before the Directive was in force. See the judgment in Vanbraekel EU:C:2001:400, 
paragraphs 37 to 53 and Watts EU:C:2006:325, paragraph 48. 
84 See Article 8(3) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
85 Article 19 and 27 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
36 
 
The Regulation has traditionally applied this distinction since the beginning of the 1970s, 
when the rules on planned healthcare were introduced.88 To date, different rules apply to 
these two scenarios, while the decisive criterion between unplanned and planned 
healthcare is the (initial) intention of the patient. Unlike in case of unplanned or 
occasional care, where the need for healthcare during a temporary stay abroad manifests 
itself unexpectedly,89 healthcare is considered as planned or scheduled when a patient 
travels to another Member State with the intention to receive medical treatment there. 
Nevertheless, the intention of the patient is not always as explicit as not to raise the 
question how it can be investigated among real life circumstances. The CJEU faced this 
dilemma in the case of a chronically ill patient who travelled to Germany to visit his son. 
During his temporary stay in Germany, he was admitted to a clinic in Munich for 
cardiovascular disease. His health insurance fund refused to reimburse his medical costs 
on the ground that his hospital treatment in Germany had been planned. The CJEU ruled 
that when a person with a pre-existing pathology travels abroad, it cannot be 
automatically presumed that s/he intends to obtain medical treatment in that Member 
State.90 However, it can happen that a chronically ill patient or a pregnant woman who 
prefers to give birth abroad tries to make his or her medical travel look like a holiday – 
during which medical necessity occurred – and the authorities do not have many tools to 
prove otherwise. 
Austrian authorities also reported on a recent problematic case of distinction between 
unplanned and planned healthcare, which concerned an Austrian national who wanted to 
undergo a sex-changing operation in Germany. The planned treatment was not 
authorised, but the patient obtained the desired healthcare anyway. However, after the 
operation, due to post-operative complications, another surgery was needed and he had 
to stay in the German hospital for another week. The patient argued that the latter 
operation was not planned and occurred as a necessary treatment, so he claimed for 
reimbursement of the related costs. The request for reimbursement was turned down 
and the Austrian authorities confirmed that “(w)hat is essential for the distinction 
between ‘planned’ and ‘occasional’ healthcare is the purpose of the stay abroad which led 
to healthcare.”91 Thus, the question is not only how the intention of the patient can be 
investigated and proved when uncertain, but also at which moment in time the intention 
is decisive: is the question settled already in the moment of travel as it can be seen in 
the Austrian argumentation based on the “purpose of the stay”, or may the intention of 
the patient change over time? 
This latter issue can be demonstrated in cases where the patient receives treatments of 
different kinds. For example, if an insured person suffers an accident and breaks his or 
her leg and subsequently it gets operated on, the situation is rather clear. However, if – 
at the same time – his or her kidney stones are removed (and no prior kidney pain could 
be demonstrated, as a result of which necessity would be clearly present), the competent 
institution might question whether this service consumption was still unplanned. If we 
                                                                                                                                                        
86 Article 20 and 27 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
87 Article 1 (2) of Directive 2011/24/EU stipulates that the Directive applies to the provision of healthcare to 
patients, regardless of how it is organised, delivered and financed; except for the services enumerated in Article 
1 (3), i.e. long-term care services, services related to organ transplantation and public vaccination 
programmes. 
88 The possibility to obtain non-planned medical care during a temporary stay abroad was already offered by 
the very first set of coordination Regulations (Regulation No 3 of the Council concerning social security for 
migrant workers and Regulation No 4 of the Council laying down detailed rules for implementing and 
supplementing the provisions of Regulation No 3 concerning social security for migrant workers), whereas – as 
a rather progressive step at that time and that level of European integration – provisions on planned care were 
introduced in 1972 by Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 (see especially Articles 22 (1) (c) and 22 (2) of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71). 
89 The healthcare has to be unforeseen in the sense that it has to become necessary during a trip that a person 
has undertaken for non-medical purposes. 
90 Ioannidis, C-326/00, EU:C:2003:101. 
91 JORENS Y. and LHERNOULD J-P., trESS European Report 2013, p. 29-30. 
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apply the Austrian authorities’ interpretation, we might come to the conclusion that at 
the moment of the journey abroad, none of the medical interventions were planned, but 
it might happen that the patient who had to undergo surgery anyway, decided to fix 
another health problem all at once. 
It can be argued that this approach, namely applying a distinction between unplanned 
and planned healthcare, seeks to balance between the migrant person’s right to access to 
healthcare and the competent Member State’s interest in controlling resources. While in 
case of unplanned care the possible occurrence of healthcare provision, and thus the 
financing obligation of the competent Member State, is adventitious, in case of planned 
care the healthcare provision is the reason and the goal of the journey, and thus almost 
certainly evokes the financing obligation of the competent Member State. This logically 
explains why different administrative procedures are in place and unplanned care can be 
received simply by presenting an EHIC, whereas obtaining planned care under the 
Regulation’s regime requires a prior authorisation from the competent institution in the 
form of a Portable Document S2. 
Directive 2011/24/EU does not differentiate between such types of medical treatments. 
The reason for this is that – as already mentioned in the previous subchapter – unlike 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, which is based on the free movement of persons, the 
Directive grew out of the case law of the CJEU on the free movement of healthcare 
services. This case law repeatedly underlined not only that the freedom to provide 
services includes the freedom for the recipients of services (including persons in need of 
medical treatment) to go to another Member State in order to receive those services 
there,92 but also that medical treatments are subject to the Treaty rules on free 
movement of services.93 The CJEU confirmed that indeed both unplanned and planned 
care falls under the scope of healthcare services in the meaning of the Treaty.94 
The lack of distinction between unplanned and planned care in the Directive has both 
advantages and disadvantages. 
A good side is that neither different rules must be applied, nor must the intention of the 
patient be taken into account. The lack of distinction annuls the problem that the 
difference in the administrative procedures under the Regulation’s regime might be a 
source of fraudulent use of patients’ mobility rights. Since unplanned healthcare does not 
require prior authorisation and its coverage is not limited to the benefit basket of the 
competent Member State, if the basket of treatments is more generous in another 
Member State, some patients might see it as a ‘back door’ to receive healthcare in the 
latter country. Thus, patients might be tempted to take a short trip to this Member State 
and pretend to require an unforeseen treatment instead of embarking on a less attractive 
administrative process. The treating medical professional, who is in charge of deciding 
whether a treatment is necessary for the patient, might not be in the position to detect 
such techniques.95 For example, in Spain dental coverage by the public healthcare 
system is limited to certain urgent treatments. An urgent dental extraction is covered, 
but the dental filling is not. If a patient insured in Spain goes on holiday in Luxembourg 
for a month and has a toothache, s/he could visit any dentist working with the 
Luxembourg National Health Fund (Caisse Nationale de Santé – CNS) and should receive 
the same treatment as anyone insured in Luxembourg, considering the duration of the 
stay. If the doctor considers it necessary to perform a dental cleaning and a filling, Spain 
                                                 
92 See among others Luisi and Carbone EU:C:1984:35, paragraph 10; Watts EU:C:2006:325, paragraph 87; 
Stamatelaki EU:C:2007:231, paragraph 20; Commission v Spain EU:C:2010:340, paragraphs 48-50; Elchinov 
EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 37; Commission v France EU:C:2010:579, paragraph 31; Commission v 
Luxembourg EU:C:2011:34, paragraph 35. 
93 Kohll EU:C:1998:171, paragraph 21. 
94 Commission v Spain EU:C:2010:340, paragraph 50. 
95 Concerning this kind of abuse, see JORENS, Y., DE SCHUYTER, B., and SALAMON, C. (2007), Towards a 
rationalisation of the EC Co-ordination Regulations concerning Social Security?, Ghent: Academia Press, p. 139. 
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should reimburse the invoice envisaged under Luxembourg social security law.96 
Moreover, dilemmas related to some specific groups of patients, such as pregnant 
women and chronically ill persons,97 in case of which the investigation of the patient’s 
intention can be even more problematic due to a pre-existent medical condition, are 
irrelevant. 
As a disadvantage, applying the same set of rules to each healthcare provision can result 
in paradox situations. This is especially true when we apply the Directive’s authorisation 
rules consistently in each situation regardless whether the healthcare service required is 
unforeseen. 
Since the Directive permits Member States to provide for a system of prior authorisation 
for the reimbursement of certain costs of cross-border healthcare services, theoretically it 
would be possible that a Member State refuses to reimburse the costs of unplanned 
hospital treatment obtained without a prior authorisation at a purely private provider. For 
instance, suppose an insured person suffers a ski accident during a skiing holiday abroad 
and the emergency helicopter takes him or her to the nearest private clinic located in the 
ski resort. In this case, the application of the Regulations does not even come into play, 
since purely private providers operating outside the statutory healthcare system are 
excluded from their scope.98 Under the Directive’s rules, the patient can request 
reimbursement of the medical costs based on the domestic tariffs in the Member State of 
affiliation. However, since the Directive allows – and as it is shown later in this report 
numerous Member States used this possibility – to make the reimbursement of hospital 
costs dependent on prior authorisation, the competent Member State is free to refuse the 
reimbursement due to the lack of prior authorisation. Although it was not reported that 
any Member State would apply this exact method, the reality of this problem is proven 
by the fact that this question was expressly addressed in the Administrative Commission 
(AC). The Secretariat of the AC was of the view that a treatment should be reimbursed if 
it becomes necessary during a temporary stay and prior authorisation cannot be 
requested.99 Undeniably, this interpretation is perfectly logical and realistic – in case of 
an accident (i.e. urgency or immediate necessity) it is unrealistic to expect the patient to 
request an ex ante authorisation under the Directive just in case s/he suffers an accident 
and is admitted to a private facility. However, it is not entirely in line with the current 
wording of the Directive, which does not even recognise the notion of medical necessity 
in this respect. Additionally, the interpretation given by the Secretariat is not binding for 
the Member States either. 
This ‘legal hiccup’ leads back to a more basic question which has been the subject of 
academic debate100 ever since the adoption of the Directive: does the Directive apply to 
unplanned care, and also, was the Directive intended to be applicable to unplanned care 
in the first place? 
While answering the first question, namely whether the Directive applies to unplanned 
care, attention shall be paid to the definition of patient, according to which natural 
persons both seeking to receive and actually receiving healthcare are considered 
patients101 including both planned (“seek to receive”) and unplanned healthcare 
                                                 
96 Dental care is reimbursed in Luxembourg at the rate of 88%. Specific reimbursement rates and conditions 
apply for dental prostheses. 
97 See Ioannidis EU:C:2003:101. 
98 However, sometimes this kind of private coverage could be reimbursed under the Regulations, but only in 
some Member States and always considering their own tariffs (Article 25(B)(7) of the implementing 
Regulation). See 3.3.1.2, section Healthcare subjected to upfront payment. 
99 Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Services (2011), Minutes of the Working 
Party of the Administrative Commission on Patients’ mobility, AC 332/11, 4 October 2011. 
100 See among others BIEBACK, K-J. (2013), Rechtlinie 2011/24/EU – Patientenrechtlinie, in: FUCHS, M. (ed.), 
Europäisches Sozialrecht. Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 656; and STRBAN, G., Patient mobility in the European 
Union: between social security coordination and free movement of services, ERA Forum (2013) 14(3), p. 398. 
101 Article 3 (h) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
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(“receive” – it can be argued that in the event of unforeseeable medical treatment 
evoked by an accident or sudden illness the patient is usually not in the position to 
actively seek healthcare). It is far from clear-cut, though, because at the same time the 
Preamble provides that the Directive should apply to individual patients who decide to 
seek healthcare in a Member State other than the Member State of affiliation,102 where 
the word decide and seek suggest that the Directive was basically constructed to cover 
only planned care. However, the Commission’s interpretive note cleared up the situation 
by pointing out that both the Regulations and the Directive apply to planned and 
unplanned healthcare.103 Although the note itself is legally not binding, the Member 
States did implement the Directive accordingly. Either way, whether it was the original 
intention of the European legislature to include unplanned care in the scope of the 
Directive, remains debateable.104  
Although the Directive undoubtedly strengthens European patients’ right to access to 
unplanned healthcare abroad, as it opens up the general possibility to be reimbursed for 
treatments obtained from private providers outside of the statutory scheme, it would be 
desirable to expressly codify into the Directive that the reimbursement of costs of 
medical services which become necessary during a temporary stay abroad cannot be 
made dependent on a prior authorisation of any kind, including the requirement of a 
referral from a medical doctor. Nevertheless, this change would necessitate the 
introduction of certain – not completely unproblematic – terms as well, such as necessary 
care105 or temporary stay.106 
3.3. Unplanned healthcare 
3.3.1. Unplanned healthcare under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
The term unplanned is not mentioned in the Regulations but is used in contrast to 
planned or scheduled healthcare, the authorised type of healthcare treatment defined in 
Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Unforeseen healthcare treatment is, 
undoubtedly, the most common cross-border healthcare situation: millions of European 
Health Insurance Cards have been issued and are used in the EU every year.107 
                                                 
102 Recital 11 of the Preamble of Patient Mobility Directive 2011/24/EU. 
103 ‘Guidance note from the Commission on the relationship between Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and 
987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems and Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of 
patients’ rights in cross border healthcare’, AC 246/12, p. 4. 
104 In the proposal, the Commission indicated that the new Directive “would allow patients to seek any 
healthcare in another Member State.” The expression seek unequivocally implies that the original intention was 
to “put in place an alternative mechanism based on the principles of free movement and building on the 
principles underlying decisions of the Court of Justice,” which at that time exclusively concerned planned care 
abroad. European Commission: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare. COM (2008) 414 final, 2.7.2008, p. 4. 
Moreover, the preamble of the proposed Directive expressly stated that “(t)his Directive does not address the 
assumption of costs of healthcare which become necessary on medical grounds during a temporary stay of 
insured persons in another Member State” (Recital 20 of the Preamble, COM (2008) 414, p. 25.) and similarly, 
in Chapter III the proposal referred to “insured persons travelling to another Member State with the purpose of 
receiving healthcare there or seeking to receive healthcare provided in another Member State.” (Article 6 (1), 
COM (2008) 414, p. 25.) 
Later on, in an infringement procedure against the Kingdom of Spain, the CJEU ruled that necessary healthcare 
as well as planned healthcare is classified as a service within the meaning of the Treaty. Commission v Spain 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:340, paragraphs 47-50. This is the approach which was codified in the Directive. 
105 The concept of ‘necessary’ under the Regulation’s regime needed to be clarified partly by the CJEU and 
partly by the Administrative Commission on several occasions, as is analysed later in this report, see 3.3.1.2, 
section Necessary healthcare treatment.   
106 The unclear nature of this notion was illustrated well by a recent case before the CJEU (I v Health Service 
Executive, C-255/13, EU:C:2014:1291). This case is scrutinised later in this report. See 3.3.1.1, section 
Temporary stay.  
107 In 2013 35.5 million EU cards were issued and almost 200 million cards were in circulation; PACOLET, J. and 
De Wispelaere, F., The European Health Insurance Card – EHIC Questionnaire, Network Statistics FMSSFE, 
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Unplanned healthcare can be described as the necessary and unforeseen healthcare 
received during a temporary stay outside the competent Member State that has a non-
medical purpose. As will be shown, the notion of unplanned healthcare is based in 
undefined legal concepts such as temporary stay or necessary treatment,108 with ‘chronic’ 
interpretation problems. The Implementing Regulation,109 the AC Decisions and 
Recommendations110 and case law have tried to clarify this blurred legal outline that 
sometimes makes it difficult to determine which situation the insured person is in, and 
more importantly, which Member State has to bear the healthcare expenditure and to 
what extent. 
3.3.1.1. The scope of unplanned healthcare  
Temporary stay 
In order to receive unplanned healthcare under the Regulations, the insured person or 
family member must be on a stay outside the competent Member State.111 It is important 
to distinguish between staying and residing in a Member State. When a person resides in 
a Member State, in principle, s/he would neither be entitled to unplanned healthcare 
using the EHIC, nor to healthcare reimbursement under the case law or Directive 
24/2011/EU, as far as the situation lacks the cross-border element on which the freedom 
to provide healthcare is based.112 Besides, the number of residents is a key factor in 
correctly determining the healthcare services needed under a national health system. 
The difference between staying and residing, however, is not always easy to establish. 
According to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 ”staying” means temporarily residing,113 while 
“residing”114 means setting the habitual residence. The Member State of residence, with 
only one existing for the purpose of social security coordination,115 is defined as the State 
where the person’s centre of interests is located.116 As mentioned above,117 the factors 
included in Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 can be used in the event of 
disputes regarding residence between national institutions or between an insured person 
and a national administration.118 
The unique situation of Mr I. is a good example of the underlying complexity.119 In the 
judgment in Mr I. the CJEU established that remaining continuously during a long period 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Commission, June 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/co_operation/healthcare/docs/COM_en.pdf. 
108 Despite the efforts for clarification (AC Decisions and explanatory notes) Member States still ask for 
enlightenment regarding the interpretation of “necessary treatment”. 
109 Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
110 http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4987&langId=en. 
111 Title of Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
112 In that sense see Petra Von Chamier Glisczinski, C-208/07, EU:C:2009:455. 
113 Article 1(k) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
114 Article 1(j) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
115 Wencel, C-589/10, EU:C:2013:303, paragraphs 45 and 46. 
116 I v Health Service Executive EU:C:2014:1291, paragraph 44. 
117 See point 3. 
118 I v Health Service Executive EU:C:2014:1291, paragraph 44. In his Opinion (EU:C:2014:178), the Advocate 
General considered that Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 was only relevant in the event of 
disagreements between Member States' institutions and therefore did not apply in the case of Mr I. 
119 Mr I. was an Irish national that went on holiday to Germany in 2002 and had to receive urgent unplanned 
healthcare. He was initially diagnosed with tetanus but then he suffered a rare stroke (brain infarct) that led to 
severe quadriplegia, so it was impossible for him to return to Ireland. Years later he was diagnosed with cancer. 
Due to his acute medical condition, Mr I. could not return to Ireland. He required continuous healthcare and had 
to stay in Germany. To that end the Irish service had issued an S2 form (authorising planned healthcare). After 
11 years in Germany and more that 20 renovations of the S2 form, the Irish service claimed that Mr I. was no 
longer residing in Ireland despite the fact that he received a disability allowance from Ireland. Mr I. explained 
that he wanted to return to Ireland where his two children live, as he remained in regular contact with them. 
On the other hand, he did not own a property in Germany and had barely worked there. He had just delivered a 
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of time in another Member State (more than 11 years in the case of Mr I.) does not 
necessarily mean a change of residence for the purpose of the coordination 
Regulations.120 As the other criteria defining residence, mentioned under Article 11 of the 
implementing Regulation, were not useful to clarify the situation it should be checked if 
said situation reflects a personal choice or not. In this regard, as mentioned above, the 
initial purpose of the trip (especially the reasons that led the person to move) has to be 
analysed. In Mr I’s case he was on holiday, on a non-medical purpose trip, compelled to 
stay in Germany on medical grounds, not integrated in Germany and willing to return to 
Ireland. As the CJEU established, he stayed in Germany in an unplanned healthcare 
situation that should be borne by Ireland as the competent Member State, and the 
situation did not change over the years. 
Most of the Member States found the circumstances of this case so exceptional that they 
did not implement any national measures to comply with it. However, the legal basis of 
this ruling, namely the importance of the insured person’s personal choice in determining 
the Member State of residence could be applied in other cases, although it generates 
legal uncertainty, e.g. with regard to pensioners living each half of the year in a different 
Member State and whose centre of interests is not clearly located. 
Unforeseen healthcare treatment 
As already mentioned, the Regulations establish that unplanned healthcare has to be 
unforeseen, meaning that it has to become necessary during a trip that a person has 
undertaken for non-medical purposes,121 i.e. for a reason other than receiving healthcare 
abroad, such as holiday, business or visiting family or friends. 
The concept of unforeseen healthcare, however, requires clarification in some cases, as it 
has been considered broader than emergency care. If the purpose of the journey is not 
to receive healthcare, a pregnant woman has the right to receive care during childbirth if 
she travels on a date close to the delivery date. So does a chronically ill patient who can 
travel and use the EHIC to receive the healthcare that s/he knows that s/he is going to 
need abroad. To this extent, the Administrative Commission has established a list of 
benefits in kind which, in order to be provided during a temporary stay in another 
Member State, require a prior agreement between the person concerned and the 
institution providing the care for practical reasons,122 i.e. because they require 
specialised medical units, staff or equipment.123 This prior agreement should not be 
mistaken with the aforementioned prior authorisation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
few lectures in the University of Dusseldorf. He did not even have a German bank account. The Advocate 
General disagreed with the Irish service. He considered that Mr I. did not plan to move to Germany, but was 
now compelled to stay on medical grounds. The length of the stay does not itself entail the consequence that 
the place of treatment should be considered the habitual residence. So, from the point of view of social security 
coordination, he must be considered a resident in Ireland and a kind of ‘medical refugee’ in Germany. The odd 
thing is that, although it was almost impossible for Mr I. to travel in scheduled airlines, he travelled to Lisbon in 
2004 and to Ireland in 2009. Mr I. passed away on 7 April 2014, but the preliminary question was answered by 
the CJEU considering it relevant for the purposes of the national proceedings. Case I v Health Service Executive 
EU:C:2014:1291. 
120 It is an autonomous concept, different from tax residence or the free movement residence defined by 
Directive 2004/38/EC. 
121 See Recital 6 of AC Decision S1 “The European Health Insurance Card should be used in all situations of 
temporary stay during which an insured person requires health care irrespective of the purpose of the stay, be 
it for reasons of tourism, professional activity or study. However, the European Health Insurance Card cannot 
be used when the purpose of the stay abroad is solely to obtain healthcare.” 
122 Article 19 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
123 See AC Decision S3, establishing that the patient and the unit in the Member State of treatment should 
reach a prior agreement to ensure that this kind of special healthcare is available during the stay. Its objective 
is to guarantee the continuity of the treatment needed by an insured person during a stay in another Member 
State. The prior agreement has to concern the vital nature of the medical treatment and the fact that this 
treatment is accessible only in specialised medical units and/or by specialised staff and/or equipment. The non-
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Logically, it is not always easy for a social security system to determine the purpose of a 
journey or a patient’s actual intentions. In many cases it is simply impossible, as it was 
pointed out above (see 3.2). 
3.3.1.2. Healthcare coverage 
The insured person has the right to treatments that become necessary on medical 
grounds during her or his stay, taking into account the nature of the benefits and the 
expected length of the stay. 
Necessary healthcare treatment 
The concept of necessary treatment remains in need of clarification despite the efforts by 
the CJEU or the Administrative Commission.  
The treatment has to be necessary on medical grounds according to the doctors of the 
Member State of treatment and its basket of services, not necessarily urgent or 
immediate but sufficient for the patient to continue her or his stay under safe medical 
conditions without being forced to return in advance.124 The treatment no longer needs to 
be linked to a sudden illness,125 i.e. it may be linked to a pre-existing pathology of which 
the patient is aware.126 
The coverage is the same as the one a person insured in the Member State of treatment 
would receive, but adapted to the duration of the stay which should be known and taken 
into account by the doctors and pharmacists. 
The insured mobile patient has the right to equal treatment in the Member State of 
treatment, i.e. s/he should be treated in the same way and within the same timeframe as 
domestic (national) patients. However, there is an important difference: s/he has the 
right to treatments considered medically necessary by the doctors of the social security 
systems where s/he is treated in order to continue her or his stay. For instance, a tourist 
could feel sick, go to the doctor and be diagnosed with cancer. If the treatment is not 
urgent and s/he can be medically stabilised to continue her or his stay, this patient would 
not receive the whole treatment envisaged for a national patient insured in the Member 
State of treatment but only those services considered necessary for not being forced to 
return in advance. 
In practice, it is not easy to determine what treatments and pharmaceuticals should be 
considered necessary in each case to continue a stay. When the temporary stay lasts for 
a long time – not necessarily as much as in the case Mr I127 – should there really be any 
difference between the unplanned healthcare coverage and the average national insurers' 
coverage?128 Is a gynaecological check-up necessary for a woman staying in another 
Member State for two months? What about a polio vaccine for her baby? 
                                                                                                                                                        
exhaustive list based on these criteria given in the Annex of AC Decision S3 mentions kidney dialysis, oxygen 
therapy, special asthma treatment, echocardiography in case of chronic autoimmune diseases and 
chemotherapy. 
124 Article 25(A)(3) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
125 This requirement of "immediately necessary care" disappeared in June 2004 with the amendment of 
Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 by Regulation (EC) No 631/2004. This amendment brought into line the rights of 
all insured persons regarding unplanned healthcare. Until that date only pensioners had the right to "necessary 
healthcare". See also Ioannidis EU:C:2003:101. 
126 Recital 3 of AC Decision S3. As mentioned above, in the case of a chronic illness the treatment can be 
subjected to a “prior agreement” to assure the availability of the required service. 
127 See 3.3.1.1, section Temporary stay. 
128 CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D., Cross-border healthcare in the EU: Interaction between Directive 2011/24/EU 
and the Regulations on social security coordination, ERA Forum (2014) 15. p. 371. 
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As a result of this unclear definition, several problems arise. Healthcare providers could 
be tempted to reduce the scope of medically necessary treatments rejecting the usage of 
the EHIC and demanding upfront payments.129 Competent Member States, on their part, 
cast doubt on whether treatments provided are medically necessary to continue a stay or 
are a result of some kind of abuse. 
There is an obligation to accept the medical decisions, findings and choices of treatment 
made by the doctors of the Member State of treatment in accordance with the current 
state of medical knowledge, unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect abuse.130 If 
a benefit was provided within the validity period of the EHIC, a claim of refund to the 
competent Member State that issued the card can only be rejected131 on specific grounds 
related to the formal claim.132 
Duration of stay 
The length of stay is not limited under the Regulations. The CJEU has established133 that 
a temporary stay can be extended for years and it does not need to have a planned 
duration. The temporary stay ends when the person changes her or his residence, i.e. 
s/he has a new centre of interests. 
However, as mentioned above,134 there are other concepts of residence at an EU level 
regarding the free movement of persons and linked to social security benefits. Directive 
2004/38/EC135 establishes that if a person stays in another Member State for more than 
three months, s/he has to register as a resident (administrative residence). To that end, 
s/he needs a comprehensive sickness insurance cover. A valid EHIC cannot always be 
used to fulfil this requirement. Member States may accept it in some cases but reject it in 
others. For instance, Lithuania accepts it in the case of students and inactive persons and 
Spain accepts it only in the case of students under an EU programme. 
Availability of treatment 
The availability of treatment in the Member State of destination is also an important 
issue. Apart from the cases mentioned above, when a prior agreement is needed, the 
patient may have to wait for a treatment as any other domestic patient depending on 
clinical priority. Patients under unplanned healthcare should be offered the option to join 
the waiting lists for receiving any non-urgent but necessary treatment if it is compatible 
with the expected length of the stay. S/he cannot be discriminated against on the 
grounds of nationality but medical services do not have to prioritise her or his treatment 
to the detriment of national patients either. 
If a request for providing a treatment is rejected, the healthcare provider has to prove 
that it concerns a general lack of capacity, especially in the case of urgent vital cases. 
3.3.1.3. The payment and reimbursement procedure 
The EHIC, as already mentioned, is both the proof of entitlement to unplanned cross-
border healthcare and the payment guarantee for the foreign healthcare provider and the 
                                                 
129 In this regard, the implications of the implementation of Directive 2011/24/EU are analysed under 3.4.4. 
130 See Article 3 of AC Decision S9 as clarified by the CJEU in Keller, C-145/03, EU:C:2005:211. 
131 Article 67(5) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
132 See 3.3.1.3. 
133 Mr I. EU:C:2014:1291. 
134 See also part 2.4. 
135 Article 8(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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Member State of treatment.136 Under exceptional circumstances, such as theft or loss of 
the EHIC or departure at too short a notice for an EHIC to be issued, the patient may 
receive and use a provisional replacement certificate (PRC).137 
The competent Member State is responsible for issuing the EHIC. The card is normally 
issued as an independent one, although some countries, such as Italy, issue it on the 
backside of the national healthcare card.138 In other countries the EHIC should be 
requested, normally online. Its validity varies significantly. For example, in Spain it is 
two years, in the United Kingdom it is five years and in Slovenia it is one year except 
for children and pensioners, in which case it is five years; by contrast, in Bulgaria 
pensioners are covered for 10 years. 
The competent Member State, as the State issuing the EHIC, is also responsible for 
reimbursing the healthcare costs to the Member State of treatment or to the patient.139 
The competent Member State, as the debtor Member State, can only reject a claim for 
reimbursement if the claim is incomplete or incorrectly filled out; if the claim concerns 
benefits which have not been received within the validity period of the EHIC or PRC used 
by the patient;140 or if there are reasonable grounds or relevant reasons to suspect abuse 
in accordance with CJEU case law.141 Since 2013, Spain issues a PRC to inactive persons 
who are entitled to healthcare only on a legal residence basis. In these cases, the PRC 
provides coverage abroad for a maximum period of 90 days as said inactive persons will 
lose their entitlement to healthcare in Spain if they reside abroad for more than 90 days. 
If an insured person staying abroad and asking for healthcare does not have a valid 
document of entitlement, i.e. an EHIC or PRC, the institution of the Member State of 
treatment, upon request or if otherwise necessary, may contact the institution of the 
competent Member State in order to obtain proof of entitlement.142 When the patient 
requires an urgent treatment there may not be enough time to check her or his 
entitlement to healthcare in the competent Member State, so s/he will probably be 
charged upfront. 
The EHIC entitles the insured person to be treated as a national insured patient, which, 
depending on the Member State, means being treated free of charge at point of use or 
being subjected to upfront payment. In most cases this also means being subjected to 
the co-payment of medical treatments, transportation and/or pharmaceuticals.143 
Most Member States144 have a national health service or a health insurance fund145 that 
provides healthcare for free at point of use by means of public and/or private 
providers.146 Some States (e.g. FI) provide treatment at public providers free of charge 
and treatment at private providers subjected to upfront payment and partial ex post 
reimbursement. 
                                                 
136 AC Decisions S1 and S2. 
137 The PRC has a limited duration. See Recital 6 of AC Decision S1. 
138 It seems reasonable as both rights are joined: if you are insured at a national level you have the right to 
cross-border healthcare. 
139 AC Decision S1. 
140 Article 1 of AC Decision S9. 
141 Article 67(5) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 and Article 3 of AC Decision S9, mentioning the judgment in 
Keller EU:C:2005:211. 
142 Article 25(A)(1) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009/EC and Recital 5 of AC Decision S1. In some Member 
States such as Spain or Denmark it is possible to get a PRC automatically by mail. 
143 The majority of the Member States envisage certain co-payment of both treatments and pharmaceuticals. 
Some, such as BE or DE, also envisage co-payment of transport. Others, mainly tax-funded or residence-based 
systems such as EL, ES, IE or UK, envisage, as a general rule, only co-payment of pharmaceuticals. 
144 AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, IS, IT, LI, LT, LV, MT, NO PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, SE and UK. 
145 Countries may have several regional healthcare services (ES) or insurance funds (DE). 
146 It varies from one country to another. For example, in AT providers are private ones contracted by the 
regional healthcare services, while in UK providers are usually public. 
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Some Member States (e.g. BE, FR, LU and CH) have reimbursement systems, although 
most of these systems are hybrid. In general, most healthcare provided is subjected to 
upfront payment and ex post reimbursement and may provide some treatments free of 
charge at point of use, depending on the type of treatment or on the type of provider. 
For example, in Belgium or France primary care is provided by private doctors and 
subjected to upfront payment, while hospital care is provided free of charge at point of 
use.  
Healthcare free of charge at point of use 
When healthcare is free of charge at point of use, providers under a national health 
service cannot demand upfront payment from patients. In this regard, the Regulations 
are clearly more advantageous than Directive 2011/24/EU, which always imposes upfront 
payment. 
The reimbursement of cross-border healthcare costs takes place between social security 
institutions.147 The Member State of treatment has to issue a claim based on the actual 
healthcare expenditure in order to be refunded. As national health services were not used 
to invoicing or reimbursing, they had to do a significant organisational and investment 
effort to implement an invoicing system used only by patients insured abroad.148 In fact, 
national health services usually prefer, when possible, to be reimbursed on the basis of 
fixed amounts per patient treated instead of invoicing the actual healthcare 
expenditure.149 
In some countries, providers may offer public and private healthcare simultaneously.150 
Healthcare under the Regulations requires an EHIC or PRC and is often provided free of 
charge at point of use. Purely private healthcare, in contrast, has to be paid upfront and 
is not refundable under the Regulations. Healthcare providers must inform the foreign 
patients whether or not the services offered are part of the public healthcare. If a patient 
is required to pay upfront in a country where healthcare is usually provided free of 
charge, it probably means that s/he is not being treated under the Regulations.151 S/he 
could, however, claim reimbursement from an possible private insurance or under 
Directive 2011/24/EU.152 
Healthcare subjected to upfront payment 
When healthcare is subjected to upfront payment, insured patients are reimbursed ex 
post for the medical costs incurred at authorised healthcare providers. In the case of 
treatments that require a substantial expenditure, the competent institution may 
                                                 
147 Via the E125 form / SED S080. 
148 For instance, establishing public prices that take into consideration the actual cost of the treatment or 
dedicating staff and IT resources to invoicing. According to Point I(3)(a) of AC Decision S5, the “expenditure 
linked to the administration of the sickness insurance scheme, for example costs which are incurred by the 
handling and processing of reimbursements to individuals and between institutions” cannot be charged as part 
of the treatment costs as far as they are not considered benefits in kind. 
149 The Member States “where the use of reimbursement on the basis of actual expenditure is not appropriate”. 
Article 63 and Annex III of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009, listing eight Member States. 
150 In some countries, such as PL, PT and SK, public hospitals can treat patients publicly and privately. In ES 
some private providers simultaneously offer public healthcare on behalf of the social security system and 
private treatments subjected to payment. See also chapter 4 of this report.  
151 The European Commission developed in 2015 a useful, free multi-language app which warns about this risk 
and can be a helpful instrument to avoid it. It provides information on how to use the EHIC in different 
countries within the EU and the EEA as well as information on the healthcare systems themselves, including tips 
to distinguish between providers under the national health service and purely private ones. It also summarises, 
for all countries, updated information on treatments, costs, co-payments, procedures for reimbursement, 
emergency numbers or access to dialysis, oxygen therapy or chemotherapy abroad. 
https://itunes.apple.com/be/app/european-health-insurance/id516504241. 
152 As far as the treatment does not require prior authorisation under the Directive. 
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advance part of the cost of the treatment as soon as that person submits the 
application.153 The amount that is considered a substantial expenditure usually differs 
according to the patient’s economic resources. Perhaps, in order to limit the national 
administrations' margin for discretion, it would be better to define ‘substantial 
expenditure’ as a percentage of the monthly wage. This measure would require a 
previous budget form or template, translated into all official languages, to be filled in by 
the providers. Anyhow, this kind of measure seems most appropriate under planned 
healthcare. 
The reimbursement of healthcare costs is logically limited by the costs actually 
incurred.154 The patient must produce all receipts, prescriptions and invoices, and can 
choose between two options:155 
1) Being reimbursed by the Member State of treatment according to its tariffs and 
legislation. In this case, the competent Member State would refund the State of 
treatment later. 
2) Being reimbursed by the competent Member State according to the tariffs of the 
Member State of treatment.156 
Both of them are the standard options. However according to two obscure paragraphs of 
Article 25(B) of the implementing Regulation – concerning the procedure and scope of 
the right to unplanned healthcare – the competent Member State could even reimburse 
the patients according to its own tariffs: 
1) The first one, Article 25(B)(6)157 of the implementing Regulation, only applicable if 
the insured person agrees, was envisaged for cases where the Member State of 
treatment does not have tariffs to quantify the healthcare provided. After the 
implementation of the Directive this scenario no longer seems possible, as far as 
public and private providers have to be paid upfront and have to produce an 
invoice, so it seems that it has lost its original aim. 
2) The second one, Article 25(B)(7),158 applicable without such agreement with the 
insured person, was defined for cases where the legislation of the competent 
Member State envisages the reimbursement of treatments received from purely 
private providers, i.e. out of the social security system. In this case the economic 
result of reimbursement for the patients would be the same as if the Directive had 
been applied, even if under the latter there may be an increase in administrative 
burden (i.e. prior authorisation or gatekeeping functions by a GP). 
Both provisions should be scrutinised and clarified by the Administrative Commission. 
They could even be repealed by the EU legislature considering the existence of the 
Directive. 
                                                 
153 Article 25(B)(9) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
154 Article 25(B)(8) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
155 Article 25(B)(4) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
156 The competent Member State will issue an E 126 form / SED S067 in order to obtain from the Member State 
of treatment the invoice information and to certify that the healthcare provider was authorised. 
157 Article 25(B)(6) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009: “By way of derogation from paragraph 5, the competent 
institution may undertake the reimbursement of the costs incurred within the limits of and under the conditions 
of the reimbursement rates laid down in its legislation, provided that the insured person has agreed to this 
provision being applied to him/her.” 
158 Article 25(B)(7) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009: “If the legislation of the Member State of stay does not 
provide for reimbursement pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 in the case concerned, the competent institution 
may reimburse the costs within the limits of and under the conditions of the reimbursement rates laid down in 
its legislation, without the agreement of the insured person.” 
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3.3.1.4. The extent of the reimbursement 
The tariff of reference for unplanned healthcare is, as a general rule, the one established 
by the Member State of treatment. The Regulations oblige the competent Member State 
to reimburse or pay a bill that covers the cost of the treatment provided. From this point 
of view, the Regulations could be considered economically neutral for patients, if we 
ignore possible co-payments. 
Member States have no way to control, monitor or reduce its spending derived from 
unplanned healthcare, as it does not depend on the efficiency of the national healthcare 
system.159 For them, the economic impact depends on the type of health system 
involved. For national health services, any reimbursement paid is an extra cost in 
addition to the annual fixed costs they bear.160 For insurance funds and reimbursement 
systems that do not have public facilities, the economic neutrality depends on the foreign 
prices: they could even save money by taking advantage of possible lower prices charged 
abroad. 
Co-payment 
The reimbursement of any possible co-payment is not envisaged under unplanned 
healthcare, as far as the co-payment is not considered a benefit in kind161 and the so-
called ‘Vanbraekel supplement’162 does not apply. Obviously, Member States are free to 
cover foreign co-payment on a voluntary basis,163 but there is no legal obligation. 
The Regulations164 include a constrained version of the Vanbraekel supplement that 
allows the insured person to request the reimbursement of the co-payment paid under 
planned healthcare, if the difference between tariffs makes this possible. This provision is 
in line with the CJEU judgment in Commission v Spain,165 where the CJEU confirmed that 
although freedom to provide services also applies in the case of unplanned healthcare, 
co-payment does not infringe upon the mentioned freedom, so there is no need to 
reimburse it. The CJEU basically founded its judgment on the following two reasons: 
1) Unplanned healthcare is not related to undue delay. As there is no malfunction of 
the healthcare system of the competent Member State, there is no obligation to 
provide a similar level of coverage as the one provided at a national level. 
2) The non-application of the supplement (the non-coverage of the co-payment) is 
not enough to force the patient to rule out travelling to another Member State or 
to force an early return. Returning to the competent Member State is not always 
an option. If the treatment is urgent and cannot be postponed, the patient would 
be medically compelled to stay. But when returning is an option, the CJEU 
considers that the patient would not have enough information to evaluate in 
                                                 
159 Spending derived from planned healthcare, in turn, can be checked, as treatments are subjected to prior 
authorisation, which can be denied if they can be provided by the competent Member State within a medically 
reasonable time. 
160 Following this logic, any reimbursement of healthcare provided to patients insured abroad could be also 
considered an extra income beyond the ordinary funding of the healthcare system. 
161 Point I(3)(d) of AC Decision S5, establishing the costs that cannot be considered benefits in kind. 
162 The Vanbraekel supplement was created by the CJEU in order to preserve the freedom to provide health 
services. Thanks to this supplement, the insured person could receive an additional reimbursement covering 
fully or partially the co-payment if the tariff in the competent Member State were higher than the costs incurred 
including said co-payment. If the tariff of the competent Member State were lower, there would not be room for 
any supplement so the patient would have to bear the cost of the co-payment. 
163 For instance, by applying its own tariffs (provided they top the costs incurred including the co-payment) as 
envisaged in the aforementioned Article 25(B) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
164 Article 26(B)(7) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
165 Commission v Spain EU:C:2010:340. 
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advance the differences between co-payment requirements and tariffs, i.e. s/he 
would not know in advance if there was room for reimbursement of the co-
payment. Therefore, the CJEU considers that the effect of the supplement would 
be uncertain or indirect regarding the making of the decision. 
The latter assertion does not appear to be so sound nowadays, as patients can access 
information on co-payments and tariffs through the Commission itself166 or through the 
different National Contact Points created after the implementation of Directive 
2011/24/EU. Once informed, the patient will be aware of the existence of co-payment 
and of the tariff differentiation, so the effect of not granting the Vanbraekel supplement 
could have a certain, direct and negative impact on the free movement of persons and 
the freedom to provide services.167  
Another important question is whether the fact that cross-border patients under 
unplanned healthcare can be subjected to foreign co-payments without the possibility of 
reimbursement, affects the mentioned freedoms and undermines the economic neutrality 
of the coordination Regulations for the patient.168 
Extra costs 
The so-called ‘extra costs’ are costs ancillary to the treatments, such as sanitary 
transport to the hospital, hospital catering or prostheses. The patient would be 
reimbursed of said costs in the same conditions as a person insured in the Member State 
of treatment according to its basket of services. For instance, if transport is provided to 
national patients for free at point of use or subjected to upfront payment and ex post 
reimbursement, i.e. if it is a service included in the basket of services of the Member 
State of treatment, the EHIC patient has to be transported under the same conditions.169 
Some doubts arise regarding sanitary transport to bring back the patient to the 
competent Member State. The Regulations do not envisage repatriation for medical 
reasons,170 so, in principle, it may not be covered by the EHIC.171 However, if the 
Member State of treatment envisages internal sanitary transport as part of its basket of 
services, should it provide said transport when the destination is another Member State 
and then invoice the competent Member State? Under the freedom to provide services, 
doubts may arise about whether sanitary transport can be denied at EU level being 
covered internally. In the case of patients that are compelled to stay abroad because of 
their medical condition, such as Mr I. mentioned above,172 would it not be better for the 
patient and much cheaper for the competent Member State to bear the cost of a special 
sanitary transport to bring the patient back home instead of bearing the healthcare costs 
abroad? 
                                                 
166 For instance, by means of the EU Commission EHIC card app mentioned above. 
167 CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D., Cross-border healthcare in the EU: Interaction between Directive 2011/24/EU 
and the Regulations on social security coordination, ERA Forum (2014) 15. p. 376 and 377. 
168 Co-payment is a means of financing a healthcare system and preventing abuse; it could be determined 
according to the average income level of its insured population. When it is imposed on specific cross-border 
healthcare it loses its purposes while preserving equal treatment. Besides, it affects patients that already 
finance another healthcare system and could have a lower income level. In this regard, co-payment could be a 
source of inequity or even double contribution. 
169 If a service is not included in the basket of services of the Member State of treatment, the patient would be 
charged and, in principle, not refunded. The competent Member State could, however, decide to reimburse the 
cost according to its own tariffs and legislation. Article 25(B) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
170 Although it is envisaged in the case of accidents at work if internal transport is envisaged in the national law 
of the competent Member State. Article 37(1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
171 The UK National Health Service, for instance, points out on its website that the EHIC does not cover costs 
such as being flown back home or being rescued in a ski resort 
http://www.nhs.uk/chq/pages/1073.aspx?categoryid=68. 
172 See 3.3.1.1, section Temporary Stay. 
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3.3.2. Unplanned healthcare under Directive 2011/24/EU 
In contrast with the blurred legal outline of unplanned healthcare under the Regulations, 
healthcare under the Directive is much more clearly defined and easier to understand for 
patients, although not necessarily more beneficial from an economic point of view. It 
depends, among other reasons, on whether the national implementation has been more 
generous than the Directive itself. For persons insured in Member States which have 
comparatively high treatment tariffs, the Directive can be an economically more 
attractive reimbursement option, as their tariffs may top up the costs incurred abroad 
including any possible co-payment. However, the Directive would be very difficult to use 
for unforeseen treatments if the patient must ask for prior authorisation or fulfil other 
administrative requirements (GP referral). So, in Member States where the legislation 
does not envisage these requirements the Directive would be a feasible alternative. 
The Directive entitles patients to freely select healthcare providers in a cross-border 
situation and obtain full or partial reimbursement of the costs incurred. As already 
mentioned, the purpose of the journey is irrelevant, so there is no distinction between 
unplanned or planned healthcare. There is a certain consensus that the Directive is 
mainly intended for planned healthcare situations, but there is no provision preventing 
persons from using this route if they need healthcare while temporarily staying in 
another Member State. 
The basic characteristics of cross-border healthcare under the Directive are the following: 
 There are two possible situations depending on whether or not the treatments 
require prior authorisation. 
 Healthcare can be given by private or public healthcare providers, disregarding 
whether they are part of the national health services or purely private. 
 Reimbursable treatments are the ones included in the basket of services of the 
Member State of affiliation. 
 Reimbursement is done in accordance with the tariffs of the Member State of 
affiliation. 
 The patient has to pay the costs of the treatment upfront and then claim eligible 
costs from the Member State of affiliation. From this point of view, the Directive 
can be useful for patients who can afford upfront payment. However, some 
national health insurance funds are contracting healthcare providers abroad. For 
instance, the Dutch health insurance fund has reached agreements with foreign 
providers in border and tourist regions, concerning tariffs or quality. As a result, 
the patients do not have to pay upfront as the fund reimburses the healthcare 
provider directly.173 
3.3.3. Unplanned healthcare under purely national legislation 
The reimbursement of cross-border healthcare costs can be based exclusively on national 
law, which could be considered a route different from those based on EU law. Regarding 
unplanned healthcare, two types of national legislation merit mention. 
On the one hand, some national legislations (in AT, NL and BE)174 envisage worldwide 
reimbursement of treatment costs against national tariffs, irrespective of the type of 
                                                 
173 See AC 532/14, Minutes of the Working Party of the AC of 9 October 2014, p. 3. 
174 Under Slovenian legislation, according to a controversial Constitutional Court judgment, there was the 
possibility of obtaining worldwide healthcare coverage, including treatments excluded from the national basket 
of services. This decision, dated 21 March 2014, is only relevant for pending cases. The healthcare and health 
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provider (public, private under contract or purely private) and not subjected to prior 
authorisation. In Austria, the administration applies the tariffs that would have been 
used if the patient had chosen to consult a private doctor. The lack of prior authorisation 
requirements seems especially appropriate in the case of unplanned healthcare, when the 
need of healthcare is unforeseen and, in some cases, urgent.175 
On the other hand, there are other Member States that envisage a system of worldwide 
coverage in cases of medical urgency abroad. In Spain, for instance, the national 
legislation envisages the reimbursement of costs regarding unplanned treatments in 
cases of vital urgency, i.e. situations where the lack of immediate treatment may result 
in the patient suffering an unacceptable loss of functionality of important organs or in 
death. This reimbursement route is applicable in cross-border situations, but only if the 
treatment received is included in the Spanish basket of services. The extent of the 
reimbursement is very comprehensive, as it covers all the health costs incurred and 
invoiced abroad including co-payment. 
3.3.4. Legal and practical problems of parallel application 
The existence of different routes of reimbursement has created complexity and 
confusion, not only for patients but also for providers and national administrations. 
Patients just want to access cross-border healthcare and be reimbursed. They do not 
understand the complexity of the current routes that require them to make choices. 
National administrations have the duty to inform as imposed by the Directive,176 so they 
have to guide patients in this process, even if it is sometimes hard to distinguish which 
instrument should be applied. They might show the patients the whole picture, a 
complete overview of the proceedings and the reimbursement options, including the 
possibilities under national legislation, in order to let them decide which is the most 
beneficial in their interest. 
Providers, on their part, want to minimise the delay in recovery of costs incurred. Thus, 
they prefer upfront payment as envisaged under the Directive. 
3.3.4.1. Parallel application of EU instruments: the Regulations and 
the Directive 
As mentioned above,177 the rules regarding interaction between the Directive and the 
Regulations seem insufficient, particularly in the case of unplanned healthcare as far as it 
only envisages a solution in cases where treatments require prior authorisation under 
both the Regulation and the Directive. 
The interaction rule when prior authorisation is not needed, i.e. in the case of unplanned 
healthcare under the Regulations, should be clarified. However, the AC Secretariat 
considers that in this case the general rule should apply: if the Regulation is more 
advantageous to the patient it will be applied unless the patient expressly requests 
otherwise.178 
Under unplanned healthcare, the availability of information is paramount, as the patient 
has to take decisions within a very short notice when facing an unforeseen healthcare 
necessity, particularly in the case of urgency. 
                                                                                                                                                        
insurance act was modified on 5 November 2013 (transposition of Directive 2011/24/EU and regulation of the 
right to healthcare abroad in the legislative act of the parliament). An abstract of the judgment can be found at 
http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/en/odlocitev/AN03698?q=Up-1303%2F11%2C+U-I-25%2F14. 
175 Regarding other authorised options under planned healthcare see 3.4.3. 
176 See 4.2.2. 
177 See 3.1.1. 
178 AC 246/12, p. 3. AC 532/14 REV. p. 13. 
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When comparing both instruments, the patient should take into account the following 
aspects. 
The first aspect is the administrative burden, i.e. prior authorisation179 and/or other 
administrative requirements, which could make it difficult to use the Directive for 
unplanned healthcare, especially in the case of urgency during a temporary stay. If this is 
the case, the EHIC would be a simpler way to access unplanned healthcare. Besides, in 
the case of urgency, the use of the Directive will be limited to treatments that do not 
require authorisation. Except if the implementation has envisaged ad hoc measures in 
the case of urgency. For instance, Austria has ruled out the prior authorisation precisely 
in the event of urgent care. In Cyprus the evaluation of the claim for prior authorisation 
must take into account the urgent nature and the individual circumstances of the case. 
The same applies to the so-called gatekeeping function of the general practitioners, i.e. 
the obligation of being referred by a general practitioner to a specialist or hospital. Again, 
it seems necessary to rule out this requirement in the case of urgency, as it is done in 
some Member States (LV and NL).180 
The second one is the extent of the reimbursement. In general, reimbursement under the 
Regulations is more generous. However, if the treatment abroad involves co-payment, 
the Regulations neither envisage its reimbursement, nor the application of the 
Vanbraekel supplement. The Directive could be more beneficial if the tariff in the Member 
State of affiliation tops up the cost incurred including the co-payment. Obviously, under 
the Directive the patient could always choose a private provider and avoid co-payment.  
In this regard, the interaction could be simplified by applying the Vanbraekel supplement 
for unplanned healthcare under the Regulations. As already pointed out, it can be argued 
that the circumstances for denying it may have changed.181 Should that be the case, the 
Regulations will always be more economically advantageous than the Directive,182 so the 
obligation to compare reimbursement under both routes could be ruled out. 
A third aspect concerns the extent of the healthcare coverage. The Regulations only 
cover necessary healthcare during a temporary stay. The Directive can always be used 
by the patient as a complementary instrument for the reimbursement of additional 
treatments beyond the ones considered necessary under the Regulations. Besides, the 
Directive could be used when the insured person needs to receive a treatment included in 
her or his basket of services but excluded from the basket of services of the Member 
State of treatment and therefore offered there only by a purely private provider. Anyhow, 
the Directive cannot be used to deny access to healthcare for insured persons who 
possess an EHIC. The Commission services are against this type of practice performed by 
providers who could be misinformed or who prefer to be paid up front.183 This risk has 
not materialised as an issue184 even if Member States expressed concerns.185  
                                                 
179 The only Member States that do not require prior authorisation are EE, FI, LT, NL and SE. 
180 In LV the referral from a GP is not required in urgent cases. In NL Article 13 HIA obliges insurers to include 
in their contracts that care or treatment offered by medical specialists, with the exception of urgent care, shall 
only be “accessible” after a referral by a general practitioner. 
181 See 3.3.1.4 regarding the CJEU judgment in Commission v Spain EU:C:2010:340. 
182 Eventually, the Directive could be as advantageous as the Regulations depending on the applicable tariffs. 
183 Said principle has to be considered in the implementation of the Directive. For more information on this 
issue see AC 246/12, 21 (2012). p. 16. 
184 As reported by BE, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SK and UK. 
185 AC 532/14 REV. p. 13. 
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3.3.4.2. Parallel application of European instruments and national 
legislation 
If the national legislation grants protection that is broader than the EU routes its 
application shall take preference. This statement can be understood from the position of 
the CJEU case law regarding the coordination Regulations: their protective legal basis 
prevents the loss of national rights, i.e. their objective is to provide more rights, to 
favour the position of a person in relation to the situation which would arise for him or 
her from the exclusive application of national law.186 This mandatory principle, known as 
the ‘Petroni principle’, is a very useful tool for the general interpretation of the 
Regulations. Having been created by the CJEU with regard to pensions,187 it has been 
followed in other cases such as Bosmann188 concerning other benefits. Along the same 
lines, the judgment in Acereda Herrera189 regarding the reimbursement of healthcare 
costs stated that the direct application of the Regulations does not preclude national 
legislation from granting broader benefits than those provided for by said Regulations. 
3.4. Access to planned healthcare in a Member State other than the 
Member State of insurance 
European patients who seek healthcare in a Member State other than the Member State 
where they are insured do have certain rights conferred on them by European and/or 
their own national law. In this chapter, this legislation is scrutinised with special focus on 
the parallel application of the different legal routes. 
3.4.1. Planned healthcare under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
The social security coordination legislation offers the opportunity to receive planned care 
since 1972.190 Currently, Article 20 of the Regulation determines the rules under which 
planned medical treatments can be obtained. Most importantly, it provides that anyone 
desiring to benefit from this opportunity and receive medical treatment abroad at the 
expense of the competent Member State “shall seek prior authorisation from the 
competent institution”.191 
The question arises what is to be done if a patient underwent such a medical intervention 
without even requesting an authorisation or, although s/he had asked for it, it was 
refused, or s/he proceeded with the treatment before the authorisation was granted. It is 
apparent from the Regulation’s provisions that – as a principle – those who do not 
comply with the requirements of the Regulation cannot count on the competent 
institution to bear the healthcare costs incurred. It was nevertheless unclear whether 
someone who had justifiable reasons not to ask or not to wait for the authorisation to be 
granted due to the urgency of the treatment in question, but who otherwise met the 
conditions laid down in the Regulation, can refer to this legislation and request 
reimbursement. 
The CJEU first elaborated the issue of ex post facto authorisation in the Vanbraekel 
case,192 and most recently in the Elchinov judgment.193 The CJEU firmly held that where 
the request of an insured person for authorisation has been refused by the competent 
institution and it is subsequently established, either by the competent institution itself or 
                                                 
186 CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D. Cross-border healthcare in the EU: Interaction between Directive 2011/24/EU 
and the Regulations on social security coordination, ERA forum (2014) 15. p. 368. 
187 Petroni, C-24/75, EU:C:1975:129, paragraphs 11 to 13. 
188 Bosmann, C-415/93, EU:C:1995:463. 
189 Acereda Herrera, C-466/04, EU:C:2006:405. 
190 See footnote 88. 
191 Article 20 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
192 Vanbraekel EU:C:2001:400. 
193 Elchinov EU:C:2010:581. 
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by a court decision, that that refusal was unjustified, that person is entitled to be 
reimbursed directly by the competent institution in an amount equivalent to that which it 
would ordinarily have borne if authorisation had been properly granted in the first 
place.194 It follows that the legislation of a Member State cannot exclude, in all cases, 
reimbursement in respect of a medical treatment obtained in another Member State 
without prior authorisation.195 
There are several Member States which explicitly implemented this point of the case law 
into their national legislation and/or administrative practice, such as Belgium, where the 
authorisation can be granted post facto when the patient could not wait for the reply 
before leaving the country, or in the event of force majeure; Finland, where a patient 
who has been treated abroad without prior authorisation can apply for it and for full 
reimbursement of the costs also afterwards; Slovakia, where the insured person may 
also request the issuance of retroactive authorisation no later than within one year from 
the day on which the treatment was provided if the conditions for granting the 
authorisation are fulfilled; and the United Kingdom, where reimbursement or the 
issuing of an authorisation is not usually retrospectively authorised where the patient 
should have applied for prior authorisation but did not do so – unless exceptional reasons 
apply in a particular case, for example circumstances where it was not possible for the 
patient to have applied for prior authorisation before receiving the treatment abroad. 
This is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the facts of the case. 
Retrospective authorisation and reimbursement is given in cases where the initial 
decision to refuse authorisation or reimbursement is overruled on review or appeal. 
Although the Member States hold considerable discretionary powers concerning the 
assessment of requests and granting of authorisation, this power is limited both by the 
Regulation and the case law of the CJEU. 
The competent institution is obliged to accord the authorisation if two conditions are 
cumulatively met, namely (1) the treatment in question is one of the benefits provided 
for by the legislation in the Member State where the person concerned resides and (2) 
where s/he cannot be given such treatment within a time limit which is medically 
justifiable, taking into account his or her current state of health and the probable course 
of his or her illness.196 
(1) The determination of benefit coverage appears to be rather unproblematic in most 
cases, only the Swedish legislation was reported to be debated in this regard, where – 
instead of having an explicit list in terms of what is covered by the healthcare system – 
the concept of “science and evidence-based medicine” is used. Although research results 
and comprehensive clinical experience should guide the delivery of healthcare, the 
concept was criticised for being vague.197 
                                                 
194 Vanbraekel EU:C:2001:400, paragraph 34; Ioannidis EU:C:2003:101, paragraph 61; Leichtle, C-8/02, 
EU:C:2004:161, paragraph 55; Keller, C-145/03, EU:C:2005:211, paragraph 69; Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, 
paragraph 48. 
See also VAN DER MEI, A. P., Cross-Border Access to Health Care within the European Union: Some Reflections 
on Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Vanbraekel, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
(2002) 9/2, p. 211. 
195 Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 49. 
196 Article 20 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
197 The CJEU also addressed the question of determining benefit packages especially in its judgments in the 
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms case (EU:C:2001:404) and the Elchinov case (EU:C:2010:581). Its main 
conclusions were that (1) it is for each Member State to decide which medical benefits are reimbursed by its 
own social security system (Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 59); (2) it is not in principle incompatible with 
Union law for a Member State to establish, with a view to achieving its aim of limiting costs, limitative lists 
excluding certain products from reimbursement under its social security scheme (Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms 
EU:C:2001:404, paragraph 86); (3) Union law cannot in principle have the effect of requiring a Member State 
to extend the list of medical services paid for by its social insurance system (Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms 
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(2) Since the medically justifiable time limit must be determined on a case-by-case basis, 
this holds potential for diverse application in the Member States. However, the CJEU 
defined certain factors which shall form an essential part of the clinical assessment.198 
Most of the Member States set up sophisticated assessment procedures with the 
involvement of different actors such as clinical specialists or expert committees. 
Notably, a few Member States defined legal maximum waiting times and introduced 
waiting time guarantees, meaning that if the treatment in question cannot be provided 
for the patient within the waiting time specified in the national legislation, a prior 
authorisation shall be granted. In Spain, a prior authorisation is granted automatically if 
the expected waiting time exceeds the maximum legal waiting times established at a 
national level regarding some specific treatments.199 In Sweden, it is guaranteed by the 
law that a patient shall have instant contact with the healthcare system for consultation, 
seeing a GP within seven days, consulting a specialist within 90 days, and waiting for not 
more than 90 days after being diagnosed to receive treatment; if the waiting time 
guarantee is not upheld, the request for prior authorisation cannot be rejected. Similarly, 
in Slovenia, if at the time of registration the waiting time which exceeds the longest 
admissible waiting time was set and there is no other healthcare provider in the country 
where the waiting time is not exceeded, the patient has the right to healthcare in another 
EU or EFTA State. 
From the patients’ point of view, setting reasonable maximum waiting times can be seen 
as a source of safety and certainty, and must therefore be considered a good practice. 
The possibility of defining maximum waiting times at a European level is also worth 
considering. However, despite its obvious benefits for the patients, it would be difficult to 
adopt such a measure, since it would not only require significant investments in the 
healthcare sector in certain Member States in order to achieve the codified waiting times, 
but it also goes beyond coordination and as such the current competences of the Union. 
The CJEU also specified procedural requirements which aim to limit the Member States’ 
discretionary power, to guarantee an impartial and objective evaluation of the requests 
and to ensure transparency of the procedures in order to strengthen the patients’ legal 
position by guaranteeing that they are not exposed to an uncontrollable, untraceable 
bureaucratic mechanism.200 
Another good practice reported by some Member States is establishing a so-called 
automatic authorisation rule, which means that if the insured person’s request is not 
decided within the procedural time limit, this can be considered a decision in favour of 
the person in question. This rule appears also in Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 in relation 
to the cooperation between the Member State of residence and the competent Member 
State when the insured person requesting prior authorisation resides outside the 
                                                                                                                                                        
EU:C:2001:404, paragraph 87; Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 58); and (4) where a treatment has been 
sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science, the authorisation cannot be refused on that 
grounds (Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms EU:C:2001:404, paragraph 97). The experimental nature of treatments 
was also dealt with by the EFTA Court in Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08, Olga Rindal (Case E-11/07); 
Therese Slinning, represented by legal guardian Olav Slinning (Case E-1/08) and the Norwegian State. 
198 See among others Watts EU:C:2006:325, paragraphs 62 and 68; and Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 
66. 
199 Regional competent institutions can set even more restrictive time limits. 
200 According to the CJEU the administrative procedure must be based (1) on objective, non-discriminatory 
criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' 
discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily (among others Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 44); (2) on a 
procedural system which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for authorisation will be 
dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable time and refusals to grant authorisation must also be 
capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (among others Watts EU:C:2006:325, 
paragraph 116); and (3) refusals to grant authorisation, or the advice on which such refusals may be based, 
must refer to the specific provisions on which they are based and be properly reasoned in accordance with 
them. Likewise, courts or tribunals hearing actions against such refusals must be able to seek the advice of 
wholly objective and impartial independent experts (among others Watts EU:C:2006:325, paragraph 117). 
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competent Member State.201 In Belgium, the patient has to submit a claim for 
authorisation accompanied by a medical report by the specialist doctor to the advising 
doctor of his or her sickness fund. The advising doctor decides within 45 calendar days; if 
no reply is received within that period, the authorisation is deemed to be granted and an 
S2 form is issued. In Spain, the same time limit is applied with the same legal 
consequence, whereas in Poland the decision must be made not later than 30 days. 
Nevertheless, these deadlines – 30 and 45 days – seem rather long taking into account 
the specific nature of the issues at stake in these procedures. It is certainly left to the 
Member States to define their administrative procedures and the processing times 
thereof, but the interest of the patients should motivate them to reply to requests as 
soon as possible, thus not applying general administrative processing times but setting 
much shorter deadlines. For instance, in Slovenia an administrative decision concerning 
a prior authorisation should be issued within 30 days, but in practice it is usually made 
within several days, if necessary under 24 hours. 
What could further increase the level of legal certainty in favour of the patients is the 
introduction of an EU-wide maximum processing time, including the automatic 
authorisation rule. However, the arguments put forward with regard to the maximum 
legal waiting time for treatments are valid in this case as well. 
Under the social security coordination regime, an insured person who is authorised by 
the competent institution to go to another Member State with the purpose of receiving 
the treatment appropriate to his or her condition shall receive the benefits in kind 
provided, on behalf of the competent institution,202 meaning that – in principle – these 
benefits give rise to full reimbursement which has to be borne by this institution.203 
Generally, the financial provisions included in the Regulation204 and its implementing 
Regulation205 do not seem to cause major problems. However, the reimbursement of 
ancillary costs shows certain diversity throughout the Union. The CJEU laid down206, and 
the implementing Regulation did codify,207 a duty to apply the equal treatment principle 
and to grant reimbursement with regard to additional expenses if such duty exists when 
these costs arise from movements within the competent Member State. 
In Finland, if a patient has a prior authorisation according to the Regulation, travel 
expenses can be reimbursed, as well as overnight stays or travelling of accompanying 
persons or home visits. In Croatia, the right to reimbursement includes the 
reimbursement of transportation costs with public transport for the shortest route. In 
Hungary, the costs of travel and the accompanying persons may be reimbursed – taking 
into account the patient’s request and the advice of the physician – based on equity. The 
Maltese authorities do not provide reimbursement for costs of travel, accommodation or 
transport to the patient who travels for treatment with an S2. 
3.4.2. Planned healthcare under Directive 2011/24/EU 
The coordination mechanism on planned care had been long in place when “a handful of 
dissatisfied patients, some seeking redress at the European Court of Justice by invoking 
                                                 
201 Article 26 (A) (2) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
202 Article 20 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
203 Article 35 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
204 Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
205 Articles 25 (4)-(5) and 26 (6)-(8) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
206 Watts EU:C:2006:325, paragraphs 139-140 and Acereda Herrera, C-466/04, EU:C:2006:405, paragraph 38. 
207 Article 26 (8) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
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the principles of free movement of goods and services”208 offered the CJEU the 
opportunity to change the landscape of Union legislation on healthcare provision.209 The 
main breakthrough of the case law’s approach was the following: whereas the basic 
principle of planned care under the coordination system was that prior authorisation from 
the competent institution was required, under the case law the main rule was that no 
prior authorisation could be prescribed. The cases in which the requirement of prior 
authorisation was accepted were exceptional cases where Member States could justify 
the existence of the authorisation system.210 
Directive 2011/24/EU follows this logic of the case law by stipulating that the Member 
State of affiliation shall not make the reimbursement of costs of cross-border healthcare 
subject to prior authorisation except in cases set out in the Directive itself.211 Therefore, 
when transposing the Directive, the Member States could choose whether or not they opt 
for introducing a scheme of prior authorisation under the Directive. Most of them did 
choose to restrict the free movement of patients in this way. 
Prior authorisation under the Directive 
Prior authorisation required in certain 
cases under the Directive’s regime 
AT, BE, BG, CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, HR, 
HU, IE, IS, IT, LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, 
SI, SK, UK 
No prior authorisation required under the 
Directive’s regime 
CZ, EE, FI, LT, NL, NO, SE 
Not applicable / not yet implemented CH, LI 
 
The exceptions which grant the competent institutions the right to make the 
reimbursement of medical costs abroad subject to prior authorisation can be divided into 
two groups: they partly concern (1) the planning requirement212 and partly (2) medical 
quality and safety issues.213 These exceptions appear in the legislation of the Member 
States which introduced prior authorisation under the Directive, except for France, which 
decided to transpose only the cases based on the requirement of planning. 
The grounds for planning which already appeared in the case law of the CJEU are 
repeated in the Directive: healthcare may be subject to prior authorisation if (a) it 
involves overnight hospital accommodation of the patient in question for at least one 
night or (b) it requires the use of highly specialised and cost-intensive medical 
infrastructure or medical equipment. Nevertheless, the scope of these exceptions is 
somewhat blurred, since the exact definitions of overnight hospital accommodation and 
of highly specialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment are 
not included in the Directive. It is clear from the Directive though that these criteria shall 
be fulfilled in the Member State of affiliation, which shall notify the categories of 
                                                 
208 MCKEE, M.; BUSSE, R.; BAETEN R.; GLINOS, I., Cross-border healthcare collaboration in the European 
Union: Placing the patient at the centre, Eurohealth, (2013) 19/4, p. 4. 
209 The CJEU’s main consideration was that (1) healthcare services are not different from any other services 
which move freely within the Union (among others Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 36); (2) therefore, any 
national measures and legislative arrangements which hinder patients, as the recipients of these services, to 
obtain medical treatments abroad must be seen as a barrier to free movement and as breaching Union law 
unless properly justified (among others Kohll EU:C:1998:171, paragraph 35). 
210 Although eu law does not in principle preclude a system of prior authorisation, the conditions attached to the 
grant of such authorisation must nonetheless be justified with regard to the overriding considerations examined 
and must satisfy the requirement of proportionality. Among others Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 41. 
211 Article 7 (8) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
212 Article 8 (2) (a) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
213 Article 8 (2) (b) and (c) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
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healthcare subject to the planning requirement – thus to prior authorisation – to the 
Commission.214 
(a) Whereas in most of the Member States the determination of the exact scope of the 
first situation is lacking, it is worth noting that Belgian law defines hospitalisation by 
reference to whether overnight stay is required in the State of treatment, and not 
whether that is required in Belgium. In Romania, overnight stay implies hospitalisation 
that exceeds 24 hours. 
The Commission’s report on the operation of the Directive drew attention to the 
phenomenon that several Member States require prior authorisation if the healthcare 
provision involved overnight stay in the Member State of treatment.215 That is, however, 
not in line with the current wording of and the intention behind the adoption of the 
Directive. The prior authorisation scheme based on initial planning serves the purpose of 
ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality treatment, 
of controlling costs and of avoiding the wastage of financial, technical and human 
resources in the Member State of affiliation.216 It is thus desirable to precisely determine 
which treatment does fall into this category and which does not. This categorisation shall 
be made by the Member State of affiliation and shall not be dependent on the Member 
State of treatment or on the way the treatment is provided in that Member State. 
(b) Concerning treatments requiring the use of highly specialised and cost-intensive 
medical infrastructure or medical equipment, numerous Member States set a list of 
treatments which necessitate a prior authorisation on these grounds. This technique is 
used by Belgium, Spain, France, Croatia, Hungary, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. 
In terms of administrative procedure and requirements attached to the right to 
reimbursement, numerous patterns can be identified among the Member States. On the 
one hand, most of the Member States which apply a prior authorisation requirement 
created a uniform procedure where the authorisation process under the Regulation and 
under the Directive are merged and go through the same steps. On the other hand, some 
Member States decided to keep the procedures under the two different legal tools 
separated. 
Authorisation procedure under the Directive’s regime 
No prior authorisation procedure 
under the Directive’s regime 
CZ, EE, FI, LT, NL, NO, SE 
Uniform authorisation procedure 
under the two different legal 
tools 
AT, BE, BG, DE, EL, FR, HR, HU, IS, LU, LV, PL, 
PT, SI, SK, UK 
Separate authorisation 
procedure under the two 
different legal tools 
CY, DK, ES, IE, IT, MT, RO 
Not applicable / not yet 
implemented 
CH, LI 
 
                                                 
214 Article 8 (2) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
215 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Commission report on the 
operation of Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, COM (2015) 
421 final. 
216 Article 8 (2) (a) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
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As Member States are free to impose on border-crossing patients criteria of eligibility and 
regulatory and administrative formalities as on patients receiving healthcare on their own 
territory,217 many Member States insist on a medical doctor’s referral if a patient wishes 
to invoke his or her right to reimbursement and it is required also when the healthcare 
service is obtained on the territory of the Member State of affiliation.218 
The Directive provides that the costs of cross-border healthcare shall be reimbursed or 
paid directly by the Member State of affiliation up to the level of costs that would have 
been assumed by the Member State of affiliation, had this healthcare been provided in its 
territory without exceeding the actual costs of healthcare received,219 meaning that the 
Member States apply their own domestic tariffs. However, in situations where different 
national tariffs can be applicable to the same treatment (e.g. depending on the insurance 
status of the patient or the type of provider), this rule of the Directive does not always 
offer a satisfactory solution and leaves space for diverse interpretation. This problem 
could be easily tackled by stipulating that if different tariffs can be applied, the option 
which is the most favourable for the patient must be chosen. 
3.4.3. Planned healthcare under purely national legislation 
Remarkably, some national legislations provide for an additional path for patients (1) to 
ensure that also those who cannot benefit from the above opportunities can gain access 
to the treatment which their medical condition requires, or (2) to ensure that they can do 
so under more favourable circumstances.220 
(1) Numerous Member States offer the possibility to request authorisation in relation to 
healthcare services which are otherwise not included in the benefit package of the 
country or are not provided in the territory of the country for any other reasons. 
According to both Swiss national rules and national law in Liechtenstein, the 
government establishes a list of benefits in kind that are not available in these countries 
and may therefore be obtained abroad. The Estonian Health Insurance Act provides for 
a possibility for insured persons to get health services which are not provided in Estonia, 
in a foreign country (not only in the EU, but in the whole world). Treatments not provided 
in the country can be authorised in a very similar manner in Croatia, Iceland (for 
example, when a PET scan or transplantation other than kidney transplantation is 
requested), Poland and Slovenia. In the latter country, insured persons have the right 
to healthcare in another country (EU Member State or any third state), or the right to 
                                                 
217 Article 7 (7) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
218 The requirement of a medical referral is closely related to the gatekeeper function of general practitioners. 
Gatekeeper function is regulated in public healthcare systems of some Member States: generally in AT, in BG, 
CY, DK for group 1 patients, EE (although referral is not required for trauma, tuberculosis, eye disease, 
dermatosis or venereal disease or if gynaecological or psychiatric care is provided or if the provider of 
specialised medical care leaves the patient under observation or treatment by the provider of specialised 
medical care due to the state of health of the patient, by students who are insured in EE and studying abroad), 
ES, FI (medical centres after the SOTE reform), HR, IE, LV, SI and UK. 
In some public healthcare systems it is more informally stimulated, i.e. a patient may choose a gatekeeper 
regime for slightly lower social security contributions: in CH, DE, HU (if the patient needs medically necessary 
treatment, it is advised to see a general practitioner, i.e. ‘háziorvos’, first). Or, reimbursement might be more 
favourable if a GP refers a patient to a specialist: in BE, FR (for persons who have not declared a referring GP 
or who consult a doctor other than their referring GP, the reimbursement rate will be lower and the doctor can 
charge extra fees), NO (regular primary doctor refers a patient; if the patient consults a specialist directly, s/he 
must pay higher cost-sharing charges, and the specialist may get a lower refund). 
In some Member States, a GP is not established and has no function as a gatekeeper: in CZ, IS, LI (the GP is 
not a gatekeeper, but after consulting a physician for the first time, the patient can only see a second physician 
for the same illness if the first one gives his or her authorisation), LU, RO (a patient needs a referral from the 
family doctor or a specialist doctor in order to receive the medical care in a hospital), SE. 
As a rule, there is an exception from referral by the GP in the case of emergency. 
219 Article 7 (4) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
220 PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F., Planned cross-border healthcare – PD S2 Questionnaire, Report 
prepared in the framework of Network Statistics FMSSFE, 2014, p. 16. 
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reimbursement of such costs, if any available possibilities of medical treatments are 
exhausted and with the treatment abroad healing or improvement or prevention of 
worsening of medical condition can be expected. In Hungary, the so-called equity 
procedure is the most frequently used cross-border healthcare route, which intends to 
ensure that treatments not recognised by the social insurance can be claimed abroad, if 
they are medically acceptable and result in a realistic health gain. While assessing the 
request, the competent institution may also decide the treatment to be executed in 
Hungary with the assistance of a foreign specialist. If it is established that a healthcare 
service cannot be provided in Portugal and the Portuguese competent institution 
authorises the patient to travel abroad, it will assume the full payment of all medical 
expenses, accommodation, travel, meals and medication. Romania applies such a 
procedure to patients who are sent to a country outside the EU. A referral for a treatment 
abroad is approved only if the treatment is not available in Romania, for patients who are 
registered with a GP and who exhausted all available medical possibilities within the 
country. In Sweden, the competent institutions (Country Councils) are free to refer a 
patient to a healthcare provider in another Member State, in which case they have to 
bear the costs. 
(2) Austrian national law allows patients to receive healthcare abroad without prior 
authorisation. A patient who received cross-border healthcare in another Member State 
(or elsewhere) is entitled to reimbursement of costs in the same amount as if this 
healthcare measures would have been received from an Austrian service provider who 
has no contract with Austrian social insurance. The right to reimbursement of costs 
received in another Member State is according to national Austrian law always limited to 
80% (for non-hospital treatments) or a certain lump sum (for hospital treatments). 
Belgian national law exhaustively enumerates situations in which treatments obtained 
abroad can be reimbursed, on the basis of the Belgian law and Belgian tariffs. These 
include for example persons suffering from TBC, provided that the advising doctor 
considers a sanatorium cure abroad to be necessary; persons who have their main 
domicile in a frontier area and who received treatment from a healthcare provider 
established abroad, yet within a 25 kilometre radius from their domicile, provided that no 
similar institution is located more closely in Belgium; and persons who obtain certain 
treatments in Luxembourg or France, provided that their main domicile is located in 
certain Belgian cantons. 
3.4.4. Legal and practical problems of parallel application 
What patients are likely to find very confusing about the Union’s legislation on cross-
border healthcare (including both unplanned and planned care) is that different legal 
tools (partly) cover the same issues (such as authorisation and reimbursement) and 
apply different rules to the same issues under their own, individual regimes. 
Article 2(m) of the Directive indicates that the Directive should apply without prejudice to 
the coordination Regulations, which implies that they are applicable in parallel and that 
there is no order of priority between them. At the same time, the Directive also provides 
that with regard to requests for prior authorisation made by an insured person with a 
view to receiving cross-border healthcare, the Member State of affiliation shall ascertain 
whether the conditions laid down in the coordination Regulations have been met. Where 
those conditions are met, the prior authorisation shall be granted pursuant to those 
Regulations unless the patient requests otherwise.221 It is questionable though whether 
there is a case in which it would be more advantageous for the patient to apply the 
Directive’s regime, if the Regulation can be applied too. If the Regulation cannot be 
applied (e.g. in the case of a treatment received from a purely private provider), then of 
course the Directive might offer a solution for the patient, but if the insured person is 
entitled under both legal instruments, it would be desirable to pinpoint that the 
                                                 
221 Article 8 (3) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
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Regulation has an absolute priority as it is more beneficial for the patient. This does not 
exclude that the patients could still be provided with the right to expressly refuse to use 
the Regulation’s mechanism for instance in the case of planned outpatient care, which 
can be obtained without prior authorisation in accordance with the Directive, if they 
confirm that they are aware of the implications of this decision on their entitlements (i.e. 
the possibly different financing mechanism). 
Some practical problems due to the parallel application of the two different legal tools 
were reported. 
In Belgium, when a person requests prior authorisation, the sickness fund informs him 
or her as to the differences between the Regulation and the Directive and asks him or her 
to choose expressly between them. In principle, the Regulation is consulted first. Then, 
the law implementing the Directive is applied. As a third step, the more favourable 
national law is applied: where the medical circumstances for a hospitalisation are more 
favourable abroad than in Belgium and the treatment falls within the Belgian insurance 
package, the advising doctor can grant authorisation to receive the treatment abroad. 
Nevertheless, there is a concern that sickness funds do not always follow this method in 
practice and do not comply with their obligation to inform the patients about all their 
possibilities. It is reported by Denmark that the application of the two tools does not 
only result in a complex and often prolonged application process; it also places a high 
administrative burden upon the authorities, which aim to ensure that the citizen benefits 
from the most advantageous option, and thus often deal with the applications twice. 
Reportedly, in Spain it causes difficulties that patients are not used to pay for medical 
treatments upfront (this applies to other benefit in kind systems as well); and it can also 
be highly problematic and discourage patients to use the Directive’s route that the 
treatment tariffs in other Member States usually exceed the domestic tariffs, thus leaving 
part of the costs to be borne by the patient. In Finland, people might find it hard to find 
information on the real costs of treatments or up-to-date information on the services 
abroad. It is also challenging that there are remarkable differences in the administrative 
apparatus in various countries especially when considering the processing times. In 
France, insured persons do not understand or criticise the tariffs which are used as a 
base for the reimbursement of care abroad. The amounts reimbursed are often much 
lower than the expenses actually incurred. The cause of the disputes may be that the 
tariffs applicable in France are not public. The option to be chosen by the insured person 
between the tariffs of the country of care and of the country of affiliation raises problems 
since patients lack information. In general, they do not know which institution to contact 
abroad in order to get reliable information. Most of the time they choose the French 
tariffs which might be disadvantageous. Some private healthcare institutions in charge of 
the supplementary coverage refuse to refund the expenses not covered by the statutory 
scheme if they do not receive an official form from the French social security or if the 
invoices are not translated into French. Some of them refuse to proceed to any refund for 
the sole reason that the invoice has been issued abroad. In Hungary it was observed 
that the technical settlement of the issues of finance of healthcare providers and 
pharmacies is much more complex if a foreign insured EU citizen receives the healthcare 
benefit or has medicine prescribed for himself herself. For this reason, some healthcare 
providers (e.g. general practitioners in villages or small pharmacies) send the EU citizen, 
who is insured in another Member State, to another service provider to ensure that the 
administrative burden and costs are lower. Latvian patients do not often use the 
Directive’s route as they should advance the medical costs; as in the majority of cases 
Latvian tariffs are substantially lower than healthcare tariffs in other Member States; as 
extra costs occur related to travel and accommodation; and as they are afraid of 
linguistic difficulties. 
It can thus be concluded that the most problems reported are related to (1) the lengthy 
and burdensome administrative procedures, (2) the disadvantageous financial 
arrangements and (3) the lack of comprehensive and reliable information. 
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In addition, there were a few national court cases which shed light on the practical 
problems as well. In Spain, there was a case that showed that a court had problems 
distinguishing and applying the different instruments of reimbursement correctly. The 
judge ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement under the national 
legislation, controversially considering that there was a vital urgency, but simultaneously 
it limited the amount of the reimbursement by applying the limits envisaged in the 
Directive. In Finland, the court found a procedural fault in the authorisation procedure, 
since the competent institution had not given the client the opportunity to have his or her 
say after the expert opinion from the public healthcare institution. The procedural 
instructions of the institution were changed after the judgment to avoid similar mistakes 
in the future. 
Furthermore, also a number of good practices can be identified seeking to ensure the 
smooth operation of the complex legal framework. 
The Cypriot national practice shows that the existence of a single committee handling 
cases both under the Regulation and the Directive facilitates a coherent and consistent 
approach to the parallel application of these instruments. In Denmark, the insured 
person might receive more reimbursement according to the Regulation than the Directive 
and vice versa depending on the concrete case; therefore, if reimbursement is rejected 
or unsatisfactory, the person is encouraged by the competent authority to reapply using 
the option yet untried. The Ministry of Health will probably pass new guidelines for the 
regions requiring them to apply based upon both legislations in order to ensure the best 
possible reimbursement to the citizen. In Slovenia, administrative problems were settled 
bilaterally between the respective National Contact Points. 
Although administrative, organisational and legal anomalies might occur, more than half 
of the Member States seem not to have faced major problems due to the parallel 
application of the Regulation and the Directive. 
Still, a significant problem which was repeatedly mentioned was the lack of patients’ solid 
knowledge of their rights and the implications of their choices. This points to the 
unquestionable importance of informing the patients, an issue which is discussed in the 
last chapter of this report. 
3.5. Special rules for frontier workers 
3.5.1. Special rules under de coordination Regulations 
According to the EU coordination Regulations, the peculiarity that defines frontier workers 
is that, on the one hand, they do not reside in the State where they work and are 
insured222 and, on the other hand, they must as a rule return to the State of residence223 
daily or at least once a week.224 Member States cannot invoke the non-performance of 
the residence requirement by the frontier workers as grounds for barring their entrance 
or registration in their social security system. Consequently, they should be treated as 
national insured employees or self-employed persons, as far as they cannot be 
discriminated against on grounds of nationality like any other migrant worker. Besides, 
as the CJEU has recognised, frontier workers take part in the labour market of the 
Member State of employment and have established, in principle, a sufficient social “link 
                                                 
222 Applying the general conflict rule lex loci laboris. 
223 Where their centre of interest is. See Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009.  
224 See Article 1(f) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. According to the wording of this Article, frontier workers do 
not have to be residents in one of the neighbouring countries. A person residing in Madrid who works in London 
or Paris and returns to Madrid every week can apparently be categorised as a frontier worker. See 
CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D., The concept of the frontier worker and unemployment protection under EU 
coordination regulations, In SANCHEZ RODAS NAVARRO, C. et al, Good Practices in Social Law, Thomson 
Reuters Aranzadi (2015). p. 127 
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of integration”. They would be entitled to benefit from the principle of equal treatment as 
compared with national workers and resident workers.225 
Considering those specific characteristics, the coordination Regulations envisage the 
following ad hoc rules regarding frontier workers’ access to healthcare while they are 
active and when they are retired. 
Firstly, frontier workers have, as a privilege, a double healthcare coverage. They have 
unrestricted rights to benefits in kind in the Member State of employment, i.e. the 
competent Member State, and in the Member State of residence,226 according to its 
legislation and as if they were insured there.227 The frontier workers are obliged to 
register with the institution of the place of residence by presenting the PD S1 issued by 
the Member State of employment in order to certify that they have the right to benefits 
in kind and that said Member State of employment is going to bear the cost of the 
healthcare received in the Member State of residence.228 
As a general rule, the same applies to the family members of a frontier worker, who also 
enjoy derived unrestricted rights to benefits in kind in both Member States. However, 
there is an exception when the Member State of employment is listed in Annex III of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.229 The family members of a frontier worker employed in 
said States are only entitled to unplanned healthcare in the Member State of 
employment, with all its limitations, and have to request an authorisation in order to 
obtain planned healthcare from the competent Member State.230 
Annex III should have been reviewed before 31 October 2014 by the Commission on the 
basis of a report by the AC. The AC unanimously approved in June 2015231 the final 
report presented by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the Member States 
still listed in Annex III.232 The report underlined that it was not possible to provide a 
detailed impact assessment as far as the group could not find hard data on the 
significance, frequency, scale and costs of the application of the provisions of Annex III. 
However, the available figures suggested that the financial impact of the abolition of the 
Annex would be rather marginal,233 concluding that the reasons to maintain it would rely 
on political considerations.234 In the light of that report, the Commission shall decide 
                                                 
225 In order to access social advantages, it has been said that “the link of integration arises, in particular, from 
the fact that through the taxes which they pay in the host Member State, by virtue of their employment there, 
migrant and frontier workers also contribute to the financing of the social policies of that State”. See Caves 
Krier, C-379/11, EU:C:2012:798, paragraph 53 and Commission v Netherlands, C-542/09, EU:C:2012:346, 
paragraph 65. However, thanks to bilateral double taxation agreements frontier workers often do not pay taxes 
in the State of employment. 
226 As defined in Article 1(j) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
227 See Articles 17 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
228 See Article 24 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. The PD S1 is issued upon request of the insured person or 
upon request of the institution of the place of residence. The PD S1 remains valid until the competent institution 
informs the institution of the place of residence of its cancellation. Healthcare costs incurred by a frontier 
worker and her or his family members will be reimbursed on the basis of actual expenditure. 
229 Currently HR, DK, FI, SE and UK. However, HR, FI and SE submitted notes to the Administrative Commission 
requesting their removal from the list (see Note AC 265/14 of Finland, Note 273/14 of Croatia and Note AC 
382/4 of Sweden). The Annex also includes two EFTA States, NO and IS. 
230 The competent Member State could take into account the information provided by the Member State of 
residence regarding whether the treatment required can be provided in its territory without undue medical 
delay 
231 AC note 324/15. 
232 Created by the AC at its 338th meeting on March 2014. Composed by representatives of DK, IS, IE, NO and 
UK. 
233 There are only a very limited number of frontier workers working in the countries which are still in Annex III. 
Persons tend to choose the Member State of treatment based on reasons such as habit, family support and 
familiarity with medical provisions, so they seldom use the healthcare services of the Member State of 
employment of the frontier worker. 
234 Some of the Member States listed in Annex III argue that providing double coverage to the family members 
of the frontier workers is not justified by the equal treatment principle. They consider that double coverage 
could even put other insured persons at a disadvantage and does not increase freedom of movement as far as 
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whether to submit a proposal concerning a review or removal of the Annex, the latter 
being the most probable, as far as the AC report does not provide compelling reasons not 
to do so.235 Member States shall ensure that, if that is the case, they inform properly on 
the changes in rights and obligations as a result of its removal.236 
Secondly, the Regulations envisage two special rules granting additional healthcare 
protection for retired frontier workers. The costs derived from the rights to benefits in 
kind in the Member State of residence, in favour of the pensioner or of her or his 
survivors, has to be borne by the competent Member State.237 
The first rule enables a former frontier worker to continue a healthcare treatment 
(including investigation and diagnosis) begun in the Member State of employment (the 
competent Member State) before being retired due to old age or invalidity. As this 
additional right to healthcare is limited to the specific treatment, it usually has a 
temporary nature.238 In the case of a chronic illness, however, it cannot be ruled out that 
it becomes a lifelong right. The same rights apply, mutatis mutandis, to members of the 
family of a frontier worker if the competent Member State is not listed in the already 
mentioned Annex III of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.  
The second rule grants an additional, and in principle indefinite, right to full healthcare 
coverage in the Member State of employment to certain retired frontier workers. In 
particular, this rule protects pensioners who: a) in the five years preceding the effective 
date of obtaining an old-age or invalidity pension, have been pursuing an activity as an 
employed or self-employed frontier worker for at least two years; and b) both the 
Member State of employment and the Member State of residence are listed in Annex V of 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.239 This is, thus, a reciprocal right voluntarily granted by 
the seven Member States listed in said Annex. For instance, a pensioner who was a 
frontier worker in France during the last three years before retiring receives two 
pensions: one from France and one from Belgium, where s/he also worked before s/he 
became a frontier worker. Belgium is the competent Member State as the pensioner 
resides there. This Member State has to bear the costs of the benefits in kind in France 
(planned and unplanned) issuing an PD S3240 as far as both these Member States are 
included in Annex V of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
The same applies to members of the family of the frontier worker if the competent 
Member State is not listed in the already mentioned Annex III of Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004, and they have claimed healthcare in the Member State of employment of the 
frontier worker according to Article 18(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. This rule 
applies even if the frontier worker died before her or his pension commenced, provided 
s/he was a frontier worker for at least two years in the five years preceding her or his 
death. These additional healthcare rights for the retired frontier worker (own right) and 
her or his family members (derived right) expire if the beneficiaries become insured as 
an employee or self-employed person in a Member State.241 
                                                                                                                                                        
these persons enjoy full healthcare coverage in the Member State of residence and unplanned healthcare 
coverage in the competent Member State. 
235 See Article 87(10) (b) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
236 See Article 87(11) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
237 See Article 28(5) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
238 See Article 28(1)(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
239 AT, BE, FR, DE, ES, LU and PT. See also Article 28(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
240 See Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
241 See Article 28(3) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
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3.5.2. Special rules under the Directive on the application of patients’ 
rights in cross-border healthcare 
Frontier workers are not explicitly mentioned in Directive 2011/24/EU, something that 
can give rise to doubts. Applying the Directive, in principle they should be treated as any 
other person residing outside the competent Member State. Retired frontier workers 
would be treated as other pensioners. Anyhow, a separate ad hoc treatment of frontier 
workers in the Directive would have been advisable. 
For active frontier workers and their family members it is clear that the Member State of 
affiliation is the competent Member State, as far as the two exceptions contained in 
Articles 20(4) and 27(5) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 do not apply to active frontier 
workers and their family members, because their healthcare costs are always reimbursed 
on the basis of actual expenditure. For retired frontier workers, however, those rules 
could be relevant if the pensioner resides in a Member State that opted for being 
reimbursed on the basis of fixed amounts,242 as this latter Member State is the 
authorising Member State under the Regulations and would therefore be the Member 
State of affiliation bearing the reimbursements under the Directive. 
It is also clear that frontier workers and their family members are not covered by the 
Directive for healthcare treatments received in the Member State of residence, as far as 
they are not in a cross-border situation.  
Doubts arise regarding their right to cross-border healthcare under the Directive in the 
competent Member State, i.e. the Member State of employment and also the Member 
State of affiliation under the Directive. In this scenario, it would appear logical to ensure 
that there is not an actual cross-border situation. Frontier workers would not be entitled 
to reimbursement under the Directive as far as they are entitled to full healthcare 
coverage under the social security scheme of the competent Member State as if they 
were residing there. The same would apply to their family members if the competent 
Member State is not listed in Annex III. Would be in a similar situation: the retired 
frontier worker who wants to be treated in the competent Member State mentioned in 
Annex IV of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 or in the Member State where s/he was 
frontier worker and where s/he also has full healthcare coverage according to Article 
28(2) and (3) and Annex V of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
However, as pointed out above, family members of active frontier workers insured in a 
Member State listed in Annex III are not in the same situation, as they do not enjoy full 
healthcare coverage in the competent Member State. In this case, if they receive a 
healthcare treatment in the competent Member State it seems reasonable to state that 
they are in a cross-border situation for the purposes of Article 7(1) of the Directive, as 
they are not treated as a national insured person. Therefore, it also seems reasonable 
that they have the right to reimbursement under the Directive of the healthcare costs 
incurred. 
It has been stated in a guidance note by the Commission services issued on 21 May 
2012243 that Article 7(2)(b) of the Directive could be relevant for the aforementioned 
specific group, i.e. family members of frontier workers insured in a Member State listed 
in Annex III of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
Article 7(2)(b) of the Directive is far from clear and needs some clarification.244 Among 
its possible interpretations, it could be understood that the competent Member State, the 
one that “is, in the end, responsible for reimbursement of the costs” (not the State of 
                                                 
242 The Member States mentioned in Annex 3 of Regulation EC/987/2009. 
243 See AC 246/12, p. 22 and 23. 
244 See e.g. AC 532/14 REV p. 8 and 16: “many delegations had asked about the meaning of Article 7.2.b) of 
the Directive 2011/24/EU, in particular whether private healthcare falls under this article”. 
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affiliation when they are not the same), should assume the cost of healthcare provided in 
its own territory if no prior authorisation is required under the Directive and the 
treatment in question has not been provided in accordance with the Regulations. In such 
a case, the competent Member State would assume the costs of the healthcare in 
accordance with the terms, conditions, criteria for eligibility and regulatory and 
administrative formalities that it has established, provided that these are compatible with 
the Treaties. 
The mentioned guidance note underlines that this Article does not create any new rights 
to access to healthcare and only establishes which Member State is liable to bear the cost 
of the treatment once it has been received. In view of these considerations it can be 
stated that this Article is not relevant for family members of active frontier workers as far 
as the competent Member State is always the Member State of affiliation and no 
clarification is needed. 
Under this assumption, Article 7(2)(b) would only be relevant in the case of retired 
frontier workers, i.e. pensioners in general, when both Member States (competent and 
affiliation) are not the same, and this only occurs when pensioners are not residing in the 
competent Member State but in a Member State that is compensated on the basis of 
fixed amounts. Besides, the competent Member State, where the pensioner wants to 
receive non-authorised healthcare under the Directive, does not have to be listed in 
Annex IV of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.245 As DG SANCO stated on October 2014, 246 
this Article 7(2)(b) is the result of a compromise reached by the Member States 
regarding the sharing of healthcare costs. “The compromise was that the competent 
Member States would cover the costs of healthcare which is not subject to prior 
authorisation in the Member State of residence. The Member State of residence would 
cover the costs that are subject to prior authorisation”. For instance, what happens when 
a person receiving a United Kingdom pension and residing in Spain wants to receive in 
the United Kingdom a treatment that is not subject to prior authorisation under the 
Directive? Because of the aforementioned compromise, the United Kingdom would be 
responsible for the reimbursement of the treatment costs. Conversely, should the 
healthcare be authorised (by Spain, as Member State of affiliation) then Spain would 
reimburse the treatment costs. 
Article 7(2)(b) also states that the “Member State may assume the costs of the 
healthcare in accordance with the terms, conditions, criteria for eligibility and regulatory 
and administrative formalities that it has established, provided that these are compatible 
with the TFEU”. This assertion could be applied, for instance, to the basket of services, 
the co-payment required or other general formalities such as the ‘gatekeeping’ procedure 
with a general practitioner.247 However, it is not clear if it could be used for denying 
access to purely private healthcare providers248 when the national legislation does not 
envisage its reimbursement, i.e. when there is no internal freedom to provide healthcare 
services. For instance, if a British pensioner is treated in the United Kingdom by a purely 
private healthcare provider and reimbursed under the Directive, s/he would enjoy a right 
that a British pensioner residing in the United Kingdom does not have. 
                                                 
245 If it were mentioned in the Annex, Article 7(2)(a) would apply and there would be no reimbursement. 
246 See AC 532/14 REV p. 16 “[…] as to who is responsible for the cost of healthcare received outside the 
Member State of residence (where that Member State has opted to receive reimbursement on the basis of fixed 
amounts) by pensioners and family members.” 
247 See, in this sense, ‘Guidance note of the Commission services on the relationship between Regulations (EC) 
883/2004 and 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems and Directive 2011/24/EU on the 
application of patients’ rights in cross border healthcare’, p. 23. 
248 “[...] many delegations had asked about the meaning of Article 7(2)(b) of Directive 2011/24/EU, in 
particular whether private healthcare falls under this article”; AC 532/14REV 9-10-2014, ‘Draft Minutes of the 
Working Party of the Administrative Commission on cross-border healthcare’, p. 16. 
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3.6. Healthcare under social security agreements between the 
Member States 
Although numerous bi- and multilateral agreements exist between EU Member States 
which touch upon the issue of healthcare provision,249 there is one which was reported to 
play an essential role in the access to cross-border planned treatment, namely the 
bilateral agreement between Malta and the United Kingdom. 
The services offered under the Malta-United Kingdom bilateral agreement are considered 
to be an extension to the healthcare services offered by the Maltese healthcare system, 
and when considering requests for treatment abroad, priority is given to healthcare 
services offered under this agreement. Based on this arrangement, Maltese patients are 
offered medical treatment in United Kingdom NHS hospitals just like any United Kingdom 
national registered with the NHS system, and patients are not required to pay for the 
treatment. In addition to the medical treatment, approved patients are means-tested to 
assess whether they qualify for free air tickets. The Maltese health authorities also have 
accommodation agreements with various service providers who offer accommodation 
services to patients receiving treatment. Payment to these institutions is made directly 
by the Maltese health authorities. Patients receiving treatment in the United Kingdom are 
also provided with transport from and to airports and for hospital appointments. 
                                                 
249 PACOLET, J. and DE WISPELAERE, F., Planned cross-border healthcare – PD S2 Questionnaire, Report 
prepared in the framework of Network Statistics FMSSFE, 2014, p 16. 
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4. PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE PROVISION OF HEALTHCARE 
In the present chapter aspects of public and private provision of (cross-border) 
healthcare are analysed. With full awareness of the complexity of healthcare systems in 
all layers (from health insurances or national health service schemes to various forms of 
healthcare provision) in various Member States some notions are being standardised in 
order to simplify the text. Among them are: 
 Patient (any natural person seeking or receiving preventive or curative 
healthcare):250 
― public patient: a patient covered by social health insurance251 or national 
health services and acting as such in relation to healthcare providers; 
― private patient: a patient acting as a private seeker and direct payer of 
healthcare; such patient could be 
o covered neither by social health insurance nor national health 
services, could be privately insured; or 
o publically covered, acting as a private patient at the time of the 
healthcare delivery, but may act as a public patient later on when 
asking to be reimbursed from the public healthcare system);252 
― national patient (a public or private patient seeking or receiving healthcare 
in the country where s/he is covered by the public healthcare system); 
― mobile patient (a public or private patient seeking or receiving cross-
border healthcare); 
 System: 
― healthcare system (political and legal organisation of a public and private 
healthcare system in the respective Member State); 
― public healthcare system (organised within the social security system as 
social health insurance or national health service, although national health 
services may sometimes be considered as outside of social security stricto 
sensu);253 
― private healthcare system (organised in parallel to a public healthcare 
system, at the private health insurance market and with purely private 
healthcare providers). 
 Provider: 
― public healthcare provider (public or private healthcare provider included in 
the public healthcare system); 
                                                 
250 Also palliative healthcare could be added, although non-medical services are in the forefront. 
251 Social health insurance is also known as mandatory health insurance or statutory health insurance. 
252 Also Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare makes a 
distinction between an “insured person” and a “patient” (who might be a public or private patient). Cf. Article 
3(b) and 3(h). 
253 E.g. IE, UK and PT. Therefore, also Directive 2011/24/EU refers to providers who are not part of the “social 
security system or public health system” of that Member State (Article 1(4) of the Directive). 
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― private healthcare provider (a natural or legal/juridical person providing 
healthcare within or outside of the public healthcare system; if within the 
public healthcare system, referred to as contracted or conventioned 
provider); 
― purely private healthcare provider (a private healthcare provider outside of 
the public healthcare system). 
4.1. Mixtures of public and private providers of healthcare 
It could be argued that in every Member State a specific mix of public and private 
responsibilities for healthcare exits. It depends not only on the State’s level of economic 
and social development, but also on the responsibility it assumes for promoting health of 
individuals and ensuring healthcare benefits. Hence, healthcare and its provision is not 
only a legal and economic, but also a political and ideological issue.  
One of the core legal questions of social security law is how the burden of securing good 
health and the ability to be productive in a society should be distributed between public 
and private legal subjects. To what extent is it the duty of legal subjects governed by 
civil law (the individual him or herself, his or her family or employer), and where should 
solidarity, i.e. the responsibility of the community represented by legal persons governed 
by public law (the state, municipalities or other local/regional communities254 and public 
institutes), commence? 
Until a couple of decades ago, we could witness not only the trend of increasing legal 
regulation, i.e. juridification,255 but also of de-privatisation or socialisation of income 
security, also in case of increased costs due to sickness. Arrangements governed by 
public law were given priority over private law solutions. The rule of law demands that 
social security, including healthcare systems,256 has to evolve constantly in order to 
reflect changes in social relations.257 Recently, a reverse trend could be observed, i.e. 
shifting the responsibility for healthcare (back) to private persons. 
Public and private responsibilities, when implementing the internationally and 
constitutionally protected right to social security and health (care) rights are interrelated 
at various levels.  
One of them is the administration of the healthcare system, since the normative design 
of the public healthcare system is shaping possible markets of private health insurances. 
Private health insurance may range from basic (for those not covered by a public 
scheme), supplementary (for co-payments, e.g. in HR or SI), additional (for services not 
covered by the public scheme), substitutive (e.g. for high-income earners in DE) and 
parallel (for faster access to the same services offered also by a public healthcare 
system) health insurance.258 In some Member States private sickness insurers may also 
                                                 
254 For instance, in SE the county councils are responsible for the largest part of the health and medical care, 
but the municipalities have the primary responsibility for certain groups (like basic care and treatment for 
elderly persons, the chronically ill, the disabled and other persons living in special types of accommodation such 
as care/nursing homes and service flats). A limitation in the responsibility of the municipalities is that it does 
not include examination or treatment by a doctor. All such care is the responsibility of the county council. Thus, 
there is a need for continuous cooperation between the different authorities in the care of the elderly and the 
disabled, a team work that is sometimes criticised for not working satisfactorily. 
255 More on various dimensions of juridification, e.g. BLICHNER, L. CHR., MOLANDER, A., What is juridification?, 
Arena, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Working Paper No 14, March 2005. 
256 Although sometimes considered to be outside of social security, but clearly within social security 
(coordination) in EU law. 
257 According to the Slovenian Constitutional Court, the legislature does not only have the right, but is under the 
obligation to adapt the legislation, if this is dictated by the changed relations in the society (Decision No U-I-
69/03, 20.10.2005, OdlUS XIV, 75). 
258 E.g. in SE there has been an emergence of supplementary private health insurance which increases the 
share of private funding to almost 20% of all healthcare. A supplementary insurance primarily provides faster 
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administer the public healthcare system (e.g. in CH next to public sickness funds, or 
exclusively in NL). 
Other levels are the way of financing and the scope of benefits. Public healthcare systems 
are financed by taxes and social security contributions and private healthcare systems by 
insurance premiums. The costs for benefits in kind (healthcare) can be covered in full, or 
certain co-payments of insured persons are required (with possible private insurance 
against such direct payment, as mentioned above).259 
At the same time co-payments are a way of (privately) financing healthcare providers. 
They themselves may be public, contracted private or purely private.  
Public healthcare systems are under the obligation to guarantee healthcare benefits to an 
entitled person in time of sickness or injury. There is a variety of options to provide 
healthcare (i.e. medical services and medicinal goods) to entitled persons. Public 
healthcare systems may do so 
 themselves directly, by owning and administering healthcare providers (e.g. 
hospitals, like in AT; DK, where regional councils own regional hospitals; UK; IE 
or MT; 
 by contracting healthcare providers (e.g. GPs, health centres, policlinics, 
hospitals, pharmacies, spas etc), which may be public or (profit or non-profit)260 
private providers (provision of benefits in kind), e.g. in Germany or the 
Netherlands;  
 by limiting their responsibility to reimburse healthcare costs, but regulating 
(quality, safety and prices of) healthcare providers through other mechanisms; 
the reimbursement of healthcare costs might be a rule in some Member States 
(e.g. in BE, FR, LU), but is gaining importance also in all other Member States at 
least with regard to cross-border situations; or 
 by means of a combination, for instance by providing some benefits themselves 
and concluding contracts for others, or stipulating that some services in the public 
interest cannot be provided by private providers (e.g. blood products and organ 
transplants, coroner’s services, public health services in SI). 
We shall focus on the interplay between public and private providers (e.g. physicians, 
nurses, midwifes, health centres and hospitals), providing healthcare to public and 
private patients,261 especially in cross-border situations. For instance, when healthcare is 
delivered by public providers to public patients and when it is delivered by private 
healthcare providers to private patients, the distinction between public and private 
healthcare provision is rather clear. 
However, also public providers may (under certain conditions) deliver healthcare to 
private patients, and vice versa private providers may be contracted to deliver healthcare 
                                                                                                                                                        
access to healthcare and may also cover healthcare that is usually not offered by the public healthcare, such as 
naprapathy, chiropractic, home service, fast health advice etc. 
259 STRBAN, G., Cost sharing for Health and Long-term Care Benefits in Kind, MISSOC Analysis 2014/1, 39 p. 
260 The latter may be motivated by altruism or religion. BENNET, S., The Mystique of Markets: Public and 
Private Healthcare in Developing Countries, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, 1991, p. 
35, argues that the objectives of these organisations are more closely aligned with those of the government 
and there is a greater scope for collaboration.  
261 Also just some non-medical services and goods (e.g. provision of food in hospitals) may be contracted out to 
private organisations. WHO, The role of the Private Sector and Privatisation in European Health Systems, 
Regional Committee for Europe, Copenhagen, 2002, p. 6. 
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to public patients. Choosing the desired way of receiving healthcare might be even more 
challenging for cross-border patients, who might lack all the relevant information. 
4.1.1. Private providers delivering public healthcare 
Maybe an even more important distinction than between public or private ownership of a 
healthcare provider, e.g. a primary health centre or a hospital (static view), is the 
distinction between activities of public or private provision of healthcare (more dynamic 
view), i.e. the regime under which a healthcare provider is operating. More specifically, 
public patients might be interested in receiving healthcare paid by the public healthcare 
system, regardless whether it is provided by a publicly or a privately owned organisation. 
Member States themselves shape a network of public healthcare provision (in some 
Member States referred to as public health service). In such network, public (owned by 
the state, municipality or region) and private healthcare providers (owned by 
congregations or private persons) are included.262  
They are often referred to as contracted providers (e.g. in AT,263 BG, CZ, DE, PL, PT, 
where the ministry of health concludes conventions, RO, SI, SK and UK). For instance, 
in Latvia an agreement with the National Health Service is required and in Lithuania a 
contract with territorial branches of the National Health Insurance Fund. Ad hoc 
agreements exist e.g. in Malta. 
In Estonia contracted providers are listed in government regulation, and in Spain a 
specific agreement, i.e. a concierto is concluded with a private provider, who is then 
listed by the Regional Healthcare Service. 
In France providers are registered or contracted, i.e. conventionné with the French 
healthcare scheme or with a public health institution. However, there is a distinction 
between ‘contracted sector I’ and ‘contracted sector II’ providers. The former (sector I) 
apply the entire state registration agreement, including state-regulated fees, and 
reimbursement to the patient may be higher. The latter (sector II) apply the state 
registration agreement with the exception of the clauses pertaining to rates. Hence, they 
are free to set their own rates, meaning that there is less solidarity and reimbursement 
might be lower. Such system could lead to a lack of transparency, especially for mobile 
patients.264  
In Belgium the notion of conventioned providers is used. They are providers who fully 
adhere to collectively negotiated tariffs. A similar situation exists in Luxembourg, where 
providers have to be authorised and conventioned. Under Dutch law, providers are 
private; they operate in a market setting, but within public law. 
Interestingly enough, in Finland a voucher can be obtained for private providers from 
which a municipality has purchased treatment. In Sweden, accreditation and a contract 
with a county council are required. 
                                                 
262 A network of public healthcare provision is (usually) planned by the state or local community, since it 
reflects the healthcare needs of inhabitants. From a national point of view, it may be a closed network of 
contracted healthcare providers or open network of all healthcare providers in the state. An interesting question 
of competition law (in the internal market) could be the competition between public and private healthcare 
providers for public funds, i.e. from a public healthcare system, especially if there is a closed network of public 
healthcare. 
263 For instance, in AT providers which are run directly by Austrian Health Insurance (AHI) or by private 
persons/companies who have a contract with AHI are considered to be part of the AT social security system. 
264 It is possible to check the category of a doctor on an official website (http://annuairesante.ameli.fr/). This 
link can be found on the CLEISS website. The site gives the name and address of the doctor and the category 
s/he belongs to, but it does not indicate the price of a consultation or the reimbursement rate. For contracted 
hospitals the law of 2010 tried to improve the information provided. 
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In Croatia there is a system of concession for private providers. Similarly, in Slovenia 
private providers require an administrative concession as well as a contract with a 
mandatory health insurance carrier (Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia). 
In Ireland, there are Health Service Executive (HSE)265 hospitals and hospitals 
authorised to provide services to the HSE for public patients with full and for those with 
limited eligibility. In Italy private facilities are accredited with the National Health 
Service (Il Servizio sanitario nazionale – SSN) and healthcare is purchased by specific 
agreements with a region. 
Contracts with private healthcare providers are not necessarily territorially limited. They 
may be concluded with providers in another Member State (e.g. the BE Sickness and 
Invalidity Institute, the RIZIV/INAMI, concluded contracts with foreign hospitals for 
hadron therapy not available in BE). 
In some Member States almost all healthcare providers work within the public healthcare 
system (e.g. in BE they are within the social security system through the aforementioned 
‘conventioning method’; in FR almost all private hospitals are contracted) or at least a 
majority of them (e.g. in EE providers are mostly covered by private law and many are 
incorporated in the social security system; purely private providers operate in limited 
areas only; in LI the number of providers outside of mandatory health insurance is very 
small; in LT providers are mainly governed by public law; in MT healthcare is mainly 
provided by the state, while the private sector exists for those who wish to access private 
healthcare; in SI almost all primary care private providers are covered, which does not 
apply to all dentists; in SE public and private providers are generally publicly funded, but 
the legislation has opened up more and more for private providers). It may also be the 
case that the majority of the healthcare providers are public providers (publicly funded 
and managed) and that there are only some private providers (like in the ES National 
Health Service). 
Conversely, at certain levels (most notably at primary healthcare level), providers might 
be exclusively or predominately private, although many of them are contracted or 
conventioned (e.g. in DE, LU, in LV 70 to 80% of health centres are private, mostly in 
Riga; in PL up to 85% of general healthcare is provided by private providers, 65% of 
outpatient specialist services and only %6 of hospital treatments; in PT with the reform 
of 2005 approximately 90% of National Health Service hospitals were transformed into 
public enterprises, i.e. EPE – entidades públicas empresariais). In many Member States, 
predominately private and only to a certain extent included in public healthcare system 
are also dental practices and pharmacies. 
Joint public-private ventures, from which the public sector purchases services, may be 
established in some Member States (e.g. CY). For instance, in some regions of Spain 
there are public hospitals and medical centres that have been provided by means of 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) contracts that include the provision of medical services. 
These facilities have been privately funded and are privately managed but are publicly 
owned (the private partner provides the service on behalf of the public administration) 
and are therefore considered part of the Regional Healthcare Services. It seems that also 
in Portugal some public hospitals are managed by private entities in the form of a PPP. 
In the Slovak Republic public providers are owned by the state or a municipality, but 
some state-owned providers have been organised as companies under commercial law 
(e.g. cardio centres are joint-stock companies operating under private law).  
However, also in Member States where no contracts are concluded with public healthcare 
providers (and the system is based on the reimbursement of costs), there is a distinction 
                                                 
265 More on HSE, which is running all of the public health services in Ireland, at www.hse.ie.  
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between public and private providers. For instance, in Belgium the law266 does not, 
strictly speaking, regulate the medical profession, but by defining the framework for 
reimbursement, they regulate the sector. 
Usually, special provisions apply to hospitals, since they require planning essential for 
public health and even survival of the population, maintaining the financial balance of the 
social security system and reaching the objective of maintaining a balanced medical and 
hospital service open to all, and any wastage of financial, technical and human resources 
should be avoided.267 Hospitals are planned in many Member States using various 
planning instruments (e.g. in CH they have to be listed by the competent canton; in DK 
private hospitals are listed in the national health act; in RO emergency hospitals are set 
up and operate as public hospitals only; in DE Plankrankenhäusern have a special status, 
as well as in AT).268 In some Member States also purely private hospitals may be paid by 
the public healthcare system (although not being included in it). This might be in the 
case of urgent treatment or if the public and contracted/listed providers cannot meet the 
requirement of treatment within a certain period (e.g. so-called extended free choice or 
udvidet frit sygehusvalg after two months in DK). 
Some Member States are planning reforms that would emphasise the role of private 
providers of public healthcare. For instance, the government of Finland is preparing a 
big reform, which is planned to change the ideas of social care and healthcare quite 
fundamentally. The problem in Finnish healthcare is that municipal healthcare centres 
have long queues and are overcrowded. Finland belongs to those countries that have the 
largest socio-economic health differences in the OECD. Healthcare and social services 
(including long-term care) should be transferred to entities larger than a municipality 
(i.e. to social and healthcare areas). The areas will provide services themselves, or 
alternatively use private or third-sector service providers to offer services. The 
government has proposed that all service providers should be organised as private 
companies. Therefore, public providers should also be reorganised as (public) limited 
companies. The government encourages initiatives from private and third-sector 
providers. At the same time critical voices have risen against the heavy reliance on 
private providers.269 
4.1.2. Purely private healthcare providers 
Purely private healthcare providers were either not selected or have not applied to be 
included in a network of public healthcare provision. They are often referred to as non-
contracted or non-conventioned providers (in AT; some non-conventioned private 
hospitals in BE; in EE; SI; and many other Member States). 
Nevertheless, they are authorised to provide healthcare on the territory of a Member 
State to private patients (who may be socially insured as well, but have for one reason or 
other, also for avoiding waiting lists, chosen to act as private patients). They have to 
obtain a licence (e.g. in CY) or permit (e.g. in FI and SI) or accreditation (e.g. in HU) by 
the ministry of health or authorisation by the municipality and a Region (e.g. in IT). 
                                                 
266 The Law concerning the mandatory insurance for medical care and allowances coordinated on 14 July 1994 
and its implementing measures. 
267 Cf. Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms EU:C:2001:404, Müller-Fauré and van Riet EU:C:2003:270, and Watts 
EU:C:2006:325. Not considered in the case law and subsequently in Directive 2011/24/EU is that in some 
Member States primary health centres might require planning as well. 
268 In AT, special rules apply to hospitals due to constitutional reasons. All hospitals which are financed by AHI 
and the Federal Lands via taxes by the Federal Health Fund (Landesgesundheitsfonds) are considered to be 
public hospitals. Beside these public hospitals also private hospitals exist which have a contract with an AHI 
carrier. These private hospitals are again co-financed by a fund (PRIKRAF/Privatkrankenanstalten-
Finanzierungsfonds) fed by contributions of the AHI carrier. These private hospitals are treated equal to public 
hospitals. All healthcare provider bodies which have no contractual relationship to AHI or who are not (partially) 
financed by it are considered to be private. 
269 OLLI KANGAS O. and KALLIOMAA-PUHA L., ESPN Country Report [Finland], European Social Policy Network, 
Brussels: European Commission, 2016. 
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Moreover, physicians themselves also require a licence to practice medicine, which has to 
be periodically reviewed. 
As a rule, purely private healthcare providers have shorter (or no) waiting lists, also due 
to less patients (e.g. in AT, BE, CY, EE, ES, FR, HR, IE, IT, LI, LV, MT, PT and SI). 
Therefore, they may devote more time to them during their visit and provide additional 
conveniences, like coffee or a newspaper (reported e.g. for EE). They might also provide 
more privacy (e.g. single rooms in hospitals) than contracted providers who serve a 
larger number of public patients. 
At the same time, they might have fewer patients also because their tariffs are higher. 
This applies e.g. for non-conventioned providers in Belgium, or non-contracted providers 
in France (whereby there are only a few in France, which are free to set their fees and 
there is virtually no reimbursement for the patient), and Switzerland (although there 
are not many private patients in CH). A similar situation is found in other Member States 
(e.g. CY, CZ, EE, ES, HR, IE, IS, IT, LI, NL, PL). For instance, in Slovenia prices for 
non-contracted providers are set by the Ministry of Health following the proposal by the 
Medical Chambers of Slovenia and are as a rule higher than for contracted healthcare. In 
Hungary purely private healthcare can be three to five times more expensive than public 
healthcare.  
In the Slovak Republic the prices are liberalised and set on the market, e.g. clinics 
providing one-day surgery or stomatology in regions with a higher willingness to pay may 
prefer direct payments instead of a contract with health insurance in order to charge a 
higher price. Hospitals which carry out private activities are also free to set their fees 
(e.g. in FR). The bills have to be settled either directly by the patients or by their private 
health insurance. 
In some Member States also purely private providers may be reimbursed by the public 
healthcare system, but usually at a lower tariff than public healthcare providers (i.e. 
public and private providers under the public healthcare system). The question might be 
raised whether they are still purely private providers. In any case they remain non-
contracted and non-conventioned providers. For instance, non-contracted practitioners of 
choice, i.e. Wahlärzte in Austria may charge higher fees than public providers and are 
reimbursed 80% of the fee under the public healthcare system (which may make a 
difference of more than 20% due to distinctive levels of fees). Similar rules apply to non-
conventioned providers in Belgium and there is also partial/small reimbursement of such 
providers in Denmark. However, in many Member States purely private providers are 
not reimbursed from the public healthcare system (unless in a case of urgent treatment). 
4.2. Steering a patient or the freedom to choose between public 
and (purely) private providers 
4.2.1. A clear distinction between public and private healthcare 
provision? 
In some Member States, there is a clear division between public and purely private 
provision of healthcare. For instance, in Liechtenstein providers are allowed to practice 
either inside the social security system or outside of it, but not within both legal regimes 
at the same time. In Austria and Poland public providers may treat private patients 
only as long as they do not have a contract for public provision of the same services.270 A 
                                                 
270 In AT, contracted doctors are obliged to provide benefits in kind and not treat patients as private patients. 
However, there is an exception if a medical practitioner provides services in two different professional areas and 
a contract exists only for one of them. In PL, private entities can provide services publicly and commercially. 
Public entities can sell their services as long as they do not have a contract for the same services with the NFZ. 
An interesting question in this regard may be whether a specific physician is allowed to practise (and provide 
healthcare) for various healthcare entities. 
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clear distinction between public and private provision seems to exist also in 
Switzerland, where a provider who does not want to practice under the social security 
law must clearly announce this to the competent authorities and possible patients. 
However, the number of such providers is very small. The distinction is clear also in 
Finland, where public healthcare is provided by municipalities.271 
However, in many Member States, public healthcare providers (i.e. public or private 
providers within a public healthcare system) are allowed to medically treat private 
patients as well. This goes for public providers and even more so for private providers 
delivering public healthcare. They are, as a rule, allowed to (partially) remain on the 
private healthcare market and deliver medical services to private patients. For instance, 
in Belgium there are part-time conventioned and part-time non-conventioned providers. 
In Spain private providers of the National Health Service governed by public law can also 
keep offering private services at the same time, although this is not standard practice. 
The same goes for Estonia, under an important condition, i.e. that private provision does 
not affect the performance under the contract for public healthcare provision. In France, 
hospitals conduct a public activity, but some of them may also have private patients.272 
Interestingly, in Hungary the provider must have an operating permit for separate 
treatments, which should be during office hours or in a hospital room separate from 
those for public patients. Similarly, in Slovenia the same person can act as a public or 
private patient and can be treated by the same provider, but s/he can act and be 
received as a private patient, i.e. a self-paying patient (samoplačnik), only outside of 
public working hours. In Italy accredited private providers can offer services to public 
and private patients, which applies also in many other Member States (e.g. CY, DE, HR, 
IE, IS, LV, LT, MT, PT, RO, SK, UK). 
When the same provider offers the same medical services for public and private patients, 
a tendency might arise at the healthcare provider to treat them as private patients. The 
advantage for a patient might be that there are no waiting lists and they could be treated 
immediately in a nicer setting and the personnel might invest a bit more effort due to 
direct payment. The reasons for acting as a private patient may vary. Private healthcare 
provision might have a better reputation, investments in public facilities might be slowed 
down and salaries of medical and supporting professions lowered or stagnating, which 
was especially the case in some Member States during the time of the recent economic 
recession. This might lead to shortages even in basic medical supplies and 
infrastructure.273 Moreover, patients may desire to exercise consumer control over 
providers. If no third party (social health insurance or national health service) is involved 
in the transaction, this makes the provider accountable directly to the patient, and the 
provider responds accordingly. 
However, such direct payment of a private patient is generally less convenient for the 
majority of patients and may be afforded only by a limited number of well-off private 
patients. The prices for private patients are set distinctively as for public patients and are 
as a rule higher than the agreed prices for public healthcare provision. A specific problem 
may exist where direct payments are informal. Although much of the evidence of such 
covert or hidden payments is anecdotal, since it is illegal in many countries, experts 
acknowledge that such payments exist in some countries.274 
The question of steering a patient becomes even more relevant for a mobile patient. A 
mobile public patient was (and still is) allowed to visit public healthcare providers in the 
Member State of treatment, as a rule after obtaining a prior authorisation under 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The possibility of visiting purely private providers and be 
                                                 
271 In LU there seem to be no purely private providers acting outside of the public system. On the contrary, all 
providers in NL seem to be private. 
272 Even if a law of 26 January 2016 aims at reducing this system, it is likely to keep applying in many cases. 
273 See e.g. Petru, C-268/13, EU:C:2014:2271. 
274 G. Strban, Cost sharing for Health and Long-term Care Benefits in Kind, MISSOC Analysis, 2014/1, p. 12. 
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publically reimbursed (as a rule without prior authorisation) was partially created by the 
decisions of the CJEU and even more so with the adoption of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
The CJEU argued that prior authorisation might hinder (passive) free movement of 
medical services also if it were to present a (non-proportional) ban on reimbursement of 
private hospital treatment in another Member State.275 The Directive provides for prior 
authorisation only as an exception, which might be tolerated when hospital stationary 
(i.e. overnight) treatment or highly specialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure 
or equipment is required.276 There is no distinction between public and (purely) private 
providers in another Member State. The Directive applies to healthcare provision 
regardless of how it is organised (as social health insurance or national health service), 
delivered (in kind or reimbursement of costs, as well as public or private) and financed 
(by contributions, taxes or other means). No distinction between public and (purely) 
private providers under the Directive (as opposed to the social security coordination 
Regulations) is emphasised also in the guidance note.277 Moreover, possible practice of 
informal direct payments may be damaging especially for a mobile patient, who cannot 
ask for reimbursement of healthcare costs in the Member State of affiliation, if no official 
(and in some countries officially translated) invoice can be produced. 
4.2.2. The patient’s free and informed choice 
As a rule, a patient is free to choose to visit either a public or a (purely) private 
healthcare provider. A mobile patient should not lose his or her right to use the EHIC278 
due to the public and private mix of providing healthcare in a certain Member State. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that acceptance of the EHIC might still be limited in practice 
(like in DE or UK).279 It is possible that private providers will require direct payment and 
a public patient can lose the right to use his or her EHIC (e.g. in LV), or will have to wait 
until the next month if public services for the existing month are exhausted (e.g. in 
RO).280 
However, in some Member States in reality the healthcare system does not provide a 
wide range of choices for a patient (e.g. in CY there is only one public hospital in each 
district and the patients prefer staying in their own district instead of going to a private 
hospital in Nicosia). Conversely, in some Member States the right to extended free choice 
may exist. For instance, in Denmark an insured person can also access healthcare 
                                                 
275 Stamatelaki EU:C:2007:231. 
276 Article 8 of Directive 2011/24/EU. See also Commission v France EU:C:2010:579 (on major medical 
equipment). 
277 It is argued that the Directive covers all providers, including non-contracted or private providers, while 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 does not impose any obligation on the Member States with regard to treatment 
given by providers who are not subject to the national legislation of the Member State of treatment, such as 
certain non-contracted or private providers (p. 4). All healthcare providers, including non-contracted or private 
providers without contracts with the national health system, are covered by the Directive. Under the Directive 
Member States cannot refuse reimbursement in cases of treatment by certain non-contracted or private 
providers which are not covered by the Regulations. See Guidance note of the Commission services on the 
relationship between Regulations (EC) Nos 883/2004 and 987/2009 on the coordination of social security 
systems and Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients' rights in cross border healthcare, note from 
the Commission of 21 May 2012 (AC 246/12), p. 4, 8, 13, 17. An Appendix to this guidance note was issued on 
28 May 2013 reinforcing the Commission’s view. 
278 E.g. in CZ it is convenient and quite common that EU mobile patients are treated within the public system on 
the basis of their EHIC. In fact, many foreign patients, especially from DE (and also other countries) are treated 
within the CZ system. It is convenient also for e.g. DE health insurance companies, as the healthcare is 
provided on a high level, with lower costs. This, on the other hand, does not reduce the possibility of patients 
from abroad to use the CZ private system – e.g. services of private dentists or plastic surgery etc. Similar 
services are quite popular among foreign patients, as they are less costly compared to other countries. 
279 In the UK there is some anecdotal evidence of healthcare providers now refusing the EHIC card on grounds 
that Directive 2011/24/EU takes precedence. There is an incentive for healthcare providers to do this as it 
minimises delay in receipt of payment, i.e. they are paid upfront instead of needing to arrange reimbursement.   
280 More on refusal of the EHIC by healthcare providers in Pacolet, J. and De Wispelaere, F., The European 
Health Insurance Card, Reference year 2015, European Commission, June 2016, p. 26. 
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provided by other, i.e. non-listed or purely private, providers if public and listed private 
providers cannot meet the requirements for treatment within two months). Similarly, but 
only among public providers, if the waiting time guarantee is not upheld in Sweden, the 
patient is entitled to receive healthcare in other county council. 
Steering the patients towards public or more likely purely private provision of healthcare 
by healthcare providers is as a rule not allowed. For many Member States it is clearly 
emphasised that providers have no discretion to force the patients to use purely private 
and higher priced services. The patients have to waive the right to be treated by the 
public healthcare system (in which case they lose their right to use the EHIC, e.g. in IE). 
Moreover, a written consent to be treated by purely private providers might be required 
(e.g. in ES, if a mobile patient does not have an EHIC and agrees in writing to use 
private healthcare services, s/he could be treated outside of the social security system 
and reimbursement could only be requested under the Directive).281 
However, especially the mobile patient usually lacks all specific information on the public 
and private healthcare provision in the Member State of treatment, in order to make an 
informed and truly free choice. Some healthcare systems might be quite complex (e.g. 
mobile patients might not be aware of the FR hospital system, making it far from obvious 
that there is a real choice made by the patient). In some Member States public providers 
may also offer private healthcare. In this case it is actually essential which door the 
patient opens, the one for public or the one for private healthcare. The situation is even 
more blurred in Member States where private practices are established within public 
health centres, especially for foreign tourists, hence, also those from other Member 
States.282 
Therefore, in some Member States there is an assumption that if a patient enters the 
public healthcare provider (public or private contracted one) s/he wants to be treated as 
a public patient. The desire to be treated as a private patient has to be expressly 
communicated from the outset of the treatment.283 
In some Member States the distinction between public and (purely) private providers has 
to be clearly marked. Contracted providers have to display the fact that they have a 
contract for providing public healthcare (e.g. in AT or ES). For instance, in Croatia they 
have to use a sticker, showing they are contracted providers, which is the case also for 
medicinal aid suppliers in Slovenia. In Switzerland a provider practising outside the 
public healthcare system has to inform possible patients about such practice. Also in the 
Czech Republic purely private providers have to inform patients before the treatment 
that they will have to pay it directly. Since many foreigners use private services, 
information is provided in multiple languages. Patients have to be informed also in other 
Member States (e.g. in HU, SK, RO). Moreover, doctors may have to show their status in 
the waiting room, specifying whether they are conventioned, conventioned only part-time 
or not conventioned at all (e.g. in BE).  
Information can be provided also by sickness funds. For instance, in Liechtenstein the 
federation of sickness insurers has to publish a list of all care providers who signed the 
tariff contracts. Sickness funds might develop internet tools showing the status of the 
healthcare provider (e.g. in BE), or waiting lists with public healthcare providers (e.g. in 
                                                 
281 Compare with the reimbursement rules in Article 25(B) of implementing Regulation (EC) 987/2009. 
282 Reportedly, this may apply to Member States (e.g. HR), where tourism is among the leading branches of 
economy. 
283 E.g. the UK Department of Health guidance states: “If providers (including providers from the independent 
sector contracted to deliver NHS services) accept a visiting patient for treatment, they must not assume that 
such patients wish to be considered as private patients even though the patient is not coming through a usual 
NHS route and is not referred formally by their state health system. This is because they are exercising their 
rights under the Directive and may themselves receive reimbursement from their state system for eligible costs 
under the provisions of the Directive. At the same time, patients who specify from the outset that they do wish 
to be treated privately may be charged in the same way as at the equivalent cost to private patients resident in 
England.” 
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DK, SI). Internet information (which is provided in all Member States and has been 
encouraged also by establishing the National Contact Point for cross-border healthcare) 
and information directly from providers is making the situation clear (e.g. in MT). In 
some Member States GPs may present the alternatives between public and private 
providers (e.g. in IT, which is mainly to the benefit of Italian patients). This might apply 
also in Member States where a referral of a GP is required (hence, e.g. in LV the 
distinction for LV patients is rather clear). 
Sometimes, the distinction between public and (purely) private providers is not very 
clear. For instance, in Austria the distinction might not always be clear with regard to 
hospitals, although private hospitals normally show that they are private by displaying 
“Privatkrankenanstalt”. Similarly, in Estonia confusion might occur with contracted 
hospitals partially providing private healthcare as well, but they do inform patients if they 
have to pay directly or large hospitals ask for partial pre-payment for private services to 
make sure the patient is using the electronically registered appointment time. In Cyprus, 
the distinction is either obvious or empirical. Especially the empirical distinction may 
cause difficulties for less informed mobile patients. 
In Finland outsourced services may blur the situation, especially in institutional care and 
if vouchers are used. Moreover, in France there might be a lack of transparency of prices 
to be paid, but equal treatment of mobile patients covered by EU law should be 
guaranteed. Nevertheless, it might be difficult to know whether equal treatment is always 
applied in practice. Reportedly, in Iceland, it is difficult for the patient to know the 
difference, apart from the distinctions in waiting lists and prices. It could be argued that 
also in the UK the information is not always easily accessible to patients and would have 
to be made available in easily understood formats.284 
4.3. Equal or different pricing 
In cross-border healthcare one of the core questions for the mobile patient is how much 
s/he will have to pay for the healthcare in the Member State of treatment. This question 
as a rule does not arise when cross-border healthcare is sought and provided according 
to the social security coordination Regulations. In the latter case prior authorisation is a 
rule, the patient may only visit public healthcare providers, and the payment is settled 
among the involved Member States and their institutions. 
The situation got more complex with the CJEU decisions, more or less codified in 
Directive 2011/24/EU, according to which public and purely private providers may be 
contacted, as a rule without prior authorisation, and the service has to be paid by the 
patient, who may be reimbursed later on in the Member State of affiliation according to 
the prices in that State. 
Therefore, it is essential that the Member State of treatment ensures that healthcare 
providers apply the same scale of fees for domestic and cross-border patients in a 
comparable medical situation.285 Some Member States oblige conventioned healthcare 
providers to use negotiated tariffs for mobile patients, regardless of whether their right 
stems from Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 or Directive 2011/24/EU. For instance, 
                                                 
284 To help achieve this, the NHS (Cross-Border Healthcare) Regulations 2013 place a legal requirement on both 
NHS England and local CCGs to provide patients with the information they need. Department of Health, Cross 
Border Healthcare and Patient Mobility in Europe: Information to accompany the implementation of Directive 
2011/24/EU – on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. 
285 Article 4 of Directive 2011/24/EU. Moreover, Article 4 (2) (b) of the Directive obliges healthcare providers to 
inform patients inter alia on treatment options and prices. However, providers will be acquainted with the prices 
they usually apply and not all the prices, which may be differ between public providers, between private 
providers, and most obviously between public and private healthcare providers. 
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Belgium has adopted the Act on Various Provisions on Health,286 with which the health 
insurance law was adapted with regard to tariffs which the healthcare providers may 
claim from foreign insured persons. It should prevent indirect discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality. 
This law was clearly motivated by the CJEU decision in the case Ferlini.287 In this rather 
specific case, the CJEU compared the legal position of a person covered by the Joint 
Sickness Insurance Scheme according to the EU Staff Regulations and the legal position 
of an insured person in Luxemburg. It argued that higher incomes of EU officials when 
services are not income-dependent cannot be a valid grounds for differentiation in prices. 
Therefore, Mr Ferlini and the members of his family, who were affiliated to the Joint 
Scheme, were considered to be in a situation comparable to that of nationals affiliated to 
the national social security scheme. It should be noticed that Ms Ferlini, the wife of an 
official of the European Commission, was also residing in Luxemburg, where she gave 
birth. 
However, it is not always possible to compare the legal positions of all mobile patients 
with that of national public patients. As national patients, also mobile patients may act as 
private patients, i.e. seeking healthcare with purely private providers, in order to avoid 
waiting lists and at the same time be willing to pay higher healthcare prices. Moreover, if 
all (public and private) mobile patients would be priced at the same scale as national 
public patients, only a small group of national private patients (and an even smaller 
group of non-EU patients, if not covered by any international agreement) would be 
subject to higher private prices of healthcare. 
Therefore, mobile patients, behaving as public patients (e.g. adhering to waiting lists at 
public, including contracted private providers, in some Member States showing his or her 
EHIC) should be compared to national public patients and treated as such. Conversely, 
mobile patients behaving like private patients (also avoiding waiting lists by visiting 
purely private providers and paying them directly) should be compared to national 
private patients and treated as such.  
Directive 2011/24/EU itself makes the distinction between insured persons (i.e. public 
patients) and (all) patients (who may behave as public or private patients).288 A more 
practical issue may be that purely private healthcare providers will not be acquainted 
with public prices, since they do not apply them for national patients, and would be 
hesitant to calculate public prices for (private) mobile patients. 
It could be argued that not the mere status of a mobile or of a national public patient, 
but the substance (provided healthcare) should be compared. Therefore, many Member 
States apply the same scale of fees for national and mobile patients, depending on their 
behaviour as public or private patients (e.g. in CY, CZ, ES, FI, FR, HR, IE, IS, IT, LI, 
LV, LT, PL, SI, SE and UK289). For instance, in Estonia for planned healthcare under the 
Directive at contracted hospitals the tariffs are the same as for domestic public patients 
and non-contracted hospitals are free to set the price, whereby they are not allowed to 
differentiate national and mobile patients. In this way (public or private) national and 
mobile patients are treated equally and the same (public or private) scale of fees apply to 
comparable groups of patients. 
                                                 
286 In Flemish Wet houdende diverse bepalingen inzake gezondheid and in French Loi portant des dispositions 
diverses en matière de santé), Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Belge 29 March 2013. 
287 Ferlini, C-411/98, EU:C:2000:530, where the CJEU argued that the unilateral application of scales of fees for 
medical and hospital maternity care (to EU officials) which are higher than those applicable to residents 
affiliated to the national social security scheme constitutes discrimination on grounds of nationality.  
288 Article 3(b) and (h) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
289 In the UK, patients who specify from the outset that they do wish to be treated privately may be charged in 
the same way as at the equivalent cost to private patients resident in England. Department of Health, Cross 
Border Healthcare and Patient Mobility in Europe: Information to accompany the implementation of Directive 
2011/24/EU – on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. 
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4.4. Supervision 
Supervisory and control mechanisms are important in every Member State. They should 
guarantee that a free and informed choice can be made by a patient who wishes to 
access either public or purely private healthcare. Moreover, they should prevent 
excessive or unjustified charges imposed especially on mobile patients. 
Therefore, not only transparency and full information is required, but also supervision, 
guaranteeing the proper implementation of national and EU law, is essential. Supervision 
of healthcare providers may be performed by state or local communities’ bodies, special 
agencies and public healthcare system institutions (e.g. verifying the fulfilment of 
contractual obligations). For instance, in some Member States the public healthcare 
institution (social health insurance fund or NHS) may monitor direct payments made by 
the patients to contracted providers. They may even terminate a contract with private 
healthcare providers if they find that such provider deliberately defers treatment in order 
to be able to charge direct payments (e.g. in LV) or administers waiting lists and 
ordering of patients against the law (e.g. in SI, where also a claim for possible damages 
is admissible). 
Supervision may be exercised by professional bodies. They may execute internal (within 
the healthcare provider itself) or external supervision (by a special medical association, 
like the medical chambers). Another external supervision of healthcare provision is 
administrative control over the legality of the businesses conducted by public and private 
healthcare providers. It may be exercised by the ministry of health, as a form of regular 
or irregular supervision. The latter can also be initiated by a patient (e.g. in SI). 
Next to administrative, legal and financial supervision, complaint procedures and judicial 
review is available in many Member States. Mobile patients have the same complaint end 
review possibilities as national patients. Of course, these possibilities are only useful if 
they are aware of all the options. The relation between a healthcare provider and a 
patient may be a bit of a grey area in some Member States, regulated more by rules of 
professional bodies than legislative acts. 
It goes without saying that extra charges on top of existing public tariffs or private prices 
for mobile patients, just because they are coming from another Member State, would 
clearly be against EU law. This would constitute an unlawful distinction on the grounds of 
nationality, if not justified on objective grounds. 
Also in this case many bodies and institutions may be included in the supervisory 
processes, from public healthcare institutions (social health insurance funds or national 
health service), to ministries of health and health inspectorates. For instance, in Latvia 
the Health Inspectorate supervises that price lists are available at public and private 
providers. Moreover, in the Slovak Republic the failure of a provider to comply with 
healthcare regulations is linked to a possible fine and the provider’s permission to provide 
healthcare may be revoked in the event of repeated infringements. 
In all Member States the same rules have to apply to national and mobile patients. This 
may be formally stipulated in legislative acts (e.g. in HR). For instance, in Poland the 
law from 2014 prohibits differentiating the healthcare prices, and in Cyprus any form of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited according to Law 149(I)2013, which 
covers also equal tariffs for domestic patients.290 In France Articles L6112-1 and L6112-
                                                 
290 Moreover, in CY the Safeguarding and Protection of the Patients’ Rights Law 2005 (Ο Περί της Κατοχύρωσης 
και της Προστασίας των Δικαιωμάτων των Ασθενών Νόμος του 2004, Ν. 1(Ι)/2005), addresses, amongst others, 
the prohibition of unfavourable discriminations.  
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5 of the Public Health Code prohibit the invoicing of extra rates for urgent hospital care, 
which applies to public and contracted private hospitals.291  
Special rules may be found also in public contracts with healthcare providers (e.g. in RO 
and LT) or in special orders of the minister of health describing the rules on provision 
and payment of healthcare services to mobile patients (e.g. in LT). More informal 
guidelines and brochures were published in many Member States. 
The control mechanism may also rely primarily on the patient, who may complain, and 
the public healthcare fund or national health service may also intervene on his or her 
behalf. For instance, in Belgium a successful complaint would lead to the reimbursement 
of the surplus. A similar claim is possible also in Spain. Moreover, systematic breaches of 
this rule may be followed up by the Service for Medical Control, leading to sanctions (e.g. 
in BE). 
Moreover, supervision may be exercised via EU mechanisms, like SOLVIT centres or the 
European Commission itself, when ensuring proper implementation of the EU legislation 
on cross-border healthcare. 
4.5. Public healthcare system costs and financing 
4.5.1. Reimbursement rules for public and private healthcare 
provision 
When cross-border healthcare is used according to Regulation (EC) 883/2004, the 
national public healthcare system has control over the public healthcare budget, since 
prior authorisation is normally required for such care. When the path of Directive 
2011/24/EU is used, such control tends to get weaker. The national public healthcare 
carrier in many Member States has to negotiate a healthcare programme with national 
public (i.e. public and contracted private) healthcare providers to a smaller extent, since 
reservations have to be made for non-authorised healthcare (or care for which 
authorisation was not but would have to be issued) provided in another Member State, 
which has to be reimbursed by the Member State of affiliation. This may negatively 
influence the functioning of the national healthcare system, or higher social security 
contributions and taxes may have to be collected in order to maintain the same scope of 
healthcare in the Member State of affiliation.292 
The condition for reimbursement is that the treatment is among the benefits in the 
Member State of affiliation.293 The costs should be reimbursed up to the level that would 
have been assumed by the Member State of affiliation, had this healthcare been provided 
in its territory. A more extensive coverage of medical costs in the Member State of 
                                                 
291 In FR, for planned care in hospitals who do not follow public service aims, the prohibition of extra fees for 
patients from another EU country is laid down in Article L174-20 of the Social Security code. 
292 See Petru EU:C:2014:2271, where the CJEU faced the question of why equal or equally effective healthcare 
cannot be provided in due time in the Member State of affiliation. The Advocate General made an interesting 
distinction between occasional shortages on the one hand and structural, generalised and prolonged, systemic 
deficiency, which was not adopted by the CJEU. One may wonder what the consequences might be. Could the 
quality of healthcare be reduced (would it still be equal or equally effective), or would the so-called basket of 
(public healthcare) benefits have to be reduced (argumentum ad absurdum only to provide urgent healthcare)? 
This has an influence on the public and private relationship, since in such case healthcare would have to be 
provided to a larger extent by purely private providers. The decision concerned prior authorisation according to 
the Regulation. According to the Directive, the question might be whether the general interest of the State 
would force it to limit the application of the rules in reimbursement of cross-border healthcare costs (and notify 
the EC, according to Article 7(9) and (11) of the Directive). 
293 Also Recital 13 of the Directive reiterates that only costs of healthcare to which a person is entitled according 
to the legislation of the Member State of affiliation should be reimbursed.  
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affiliation compared to the ones in the Member State of treatment could be required, e.g. 
if the latter had a larger co-payment regime than the State of affiliation.294 
However, reimbursement should not exceed the actual costs of healthcare received,295 
which is emphasised also in all Member States. Hence, enrichment (or ‘making 
money’)296 with the so-called Vanbraekel supplement,297 which had to be paid, even 
when the actual costs in the Member State of treatment were lower than the 
reimbursement tariffs in the State of affiliation, is avoided. This has already been 
indicated also by the CJEU.298 
Member States may apply different methods of reimbursing cross-border healthcare. 
Some Member States treat foreign providers as national, purely private ones. In Austria 
for instance, the right to reimbursement is linked to a system of prior authorisation. If 
cross-border healthcare was received with authorisation, the reimbursement is the same 
as for national contracted providers and if it is received without it, the reimbursement is 
the same as with national non-contracted providers, i.e. 80% of the price (due to 
additional administrative costs). Similarly, in Germany the reimbursement is according 
to German tariffs, but a deduction is made by social health insurance carriers for 
administrative costs, a lack of control of healthcare provision 
(Wirtschaftlichkeitsprüfungen) and co-payments according to German law.299 Also in 
Belgium, foreign providers are considered to be non-conventioned, which leads to 
slightly lower reimbursements than for conventioned ones (this does not apply for 
doctors and dentists). The same applies for Finland, where reimbursement according to 
the Directive equals the one for Finnish private sector providers (and is lower than for 
public sector providers). 
In Switzerland, reimbursement is made only according to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, 
and if the Member State of treatment makes a distinction between public and private 
providers, so does the Swiss insurer for the reimbursement (e.g. if a person was treated 
in AT, DE, BE or FI). This similarly applies to Liechtenstein. 
Some Member States reimburse the healthcare costs according to the cost that would 
incur in the national public healthcare system (e.g. in CY, CZ, EE, ES, HR, IE, HU, IS, 
IT, LU, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, in SK: average public price, in SE: price of a treatment 
in the county council where a patient is resident, and UK). For instance, in France public 
costs are taken into account for non-authorised treatments. For authorised treatments 
they may be calculated according to the tariffs of the State of treatment or French tariffs, 
depending on the legal path the patients choose. 
Interestingly enough, in the Netherlands for non-contracted non-hospital care the 
insurance carriers are entitled to limit the amount up to a level that is considered to be 
reasonable according to Dutch market conditions, leaving it almost entirely up to them to 
decide how much they will actually reimburse. Reportedly, there was an interesting 
debate in the Netherlands concerning reimbursement. The Dutch legislature argued that 
Article 7(4) of the Directive allows limitation of the reimbursement up to the level of care 
offered in the Netherlands. Hence, if reimbursement of non-contracted care obtained in 
                                                 
294 An explanation of reimbursement in case of comfort requests by the patient could be found in the Appendix 
to the guidance note of the Commission, point II. 2. 
295 Recital 32 and Article 7(4) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
296 HATZOPOULOS, V., HARVEY, T., Coming into line: The EU’s Court softens on cross-border healthcare, Health 
policy, economics and law, 8, 2013, p. 1. 
297 Vanbraekel EU:C:2001:400. Compare with Article 26(7) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
298 Elchinov EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 81, as well as the operative part of the judgement (maybe not so 
explicit in English, but very clear in German, French and Bulgarian, which was the language of the case, i.e. 
“jedoch nur bis zur Höhe der tatsächlichen Kosten”, “dans la limite des frais réellement exposés”, “но в 
границите на действително направените разходи”, respectively). 
299 See http://www.eu-patienten.de/, September 2016. 
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the Netherlands can be reduced to zero, so could reimbursement of non-contracted care 
received abroad. After an intense debate, and considering that the number of contracted 
foreign providers is still very low, the government was forced to withdraw the proposal, 
mainly for internal political reasons. Moreover, could it be argued that purely private 
healthcare is not among the benefits in the Member State of affiliation and hence 
treatments at purely private healthcare providers could not be reimbursed? The situation 
might get complicated if the treatment is within the so-called basked of benefits in the 
Member State of affiliation, but not in the Member State of treatment. Then it would have 
to be provided by purely public providers and still be reimbursed by the Member State of 
affiliation (e.g. argued for SK). 
In some Member States not only public costs, but average costs at public and purely 
private providers in their country are taken into account for reimbursement purposes 
(e.g. in SI).300 Interestingly, some Member States do not provide reimbursement of costs 
at all up to a certain minimum amount (e.g. HU up to 2,000 HUF, approximately € 6.25). 
As a rule, Member States may also deduct co-payments according to their legislation. If 
private insurance for co-payments exist, private insurance companies may be required to 
reimburse the part covered by privately insured co-payments (e.g. in SI). 
As a rule, no distinction is made in the scale of reimbursement (according to the 
Directive) if the healthcare provider in the Member State of treatment is public or 
(purely) private (e.g. in AT, EE, FI, FR,301 HR, IE, IT, LV, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO and SI). 
4.5.2. Private gatekeeper in another Member State? 
The so called gatekeeping function of the general practitioner (GP) could be preserved in 
Member States where it is regulated, and so-called doctor hopping or doctor shopping 
prevented (mainly to control the costs of hospitals and clinics),302 also according to 
Directive 2011/24/EU. The Directive enables the Member State of affiliation to impose 
the same conditions, criteria of eligibility, regulatory and administrative formalities to a 
cross-border patient as they apply to healthcare provision on its territory. This includes 
the assessment by the GP with whom the patient is registered.303 Question is whether an 
insured person could choose a GP and register with him or her in another Member State, 
since the GP provides outpatient treatment and no formalities may be discriminatory or 
constitute an obstacle to the free movement of patients, services and goods. 
This question is interesting also from the public or private healthcare provision aspect, 
since in some Member States the primary healthcare level is publicly and in many 
Member States predominately privately organised. This is even more the case if we 
compare the primary healthcare level to the secondary and tertiary levels, i.e. hospitals 
and clinics. 
A ‘family doctor’ (or ‘primary care practitioner’ or ‘GP’) can be consulted in another 
Member State, but as a rule cannot assume the public healthcare task and responsibility 
of performing a gatekeeper function to secondary and tertiary healthcare. For instance, 
some Member States require the same conditions for cross-border healthcare as for 
                                                 
300 If reimbursement is sought under Directive 2011/24/EU, costs are reimbursed according to the average 
price of such healthcare in Slovenia, but not more than the actual costs. The law (ZZVZZ) does not limit the 
average price to the healthcare provided in the public network. Hence, it might be argued that in the average 
price both public and purely private prices are taken into account. It should be noted that such average prices 
are higher (more beneficial for the EU mobile patient than the average taken only from mandatory health 
insurance). 
301 This is the result of case law: a person insured in France has the right to be reimbursed for a treatment 
provided in a private UK hospital even though the treatments are not covered by UK law (Cass. soc., 28 March 
2002, case 00-15.903).  
302 STRBAN, G., Temelji obveznega zdravstvenega zavarovanja, CZ, Ljubljana, 2005, p. 260. 
303 Article 7(7) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
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healthcare delivered on their territory,304 which is in line with the administrative formality 
of a gatekeeper’s function. At the same time they may allow public patients to consult a 
GP in another Member State. For instance, in Spain this should be acceptable, as far as 
the Royal Decree 81/2014 establishes that the request for evaluation by a GP cannot be 
an obstacle to the freedom to provide services. Patients insured in France and receiving 
healthcare abroad do not have to comply with the French ‘referring GP’ procedure 
(possibly avoiding the gatekeeping function altogether). 
Some Member States may explicitly exclude the possibility of a GP’s gatekeeper function 
in another Member State. For instance, in Croatia there is a free choice of a doctor and a 
dentist, but as a rule only at the insured person’s place of residence. In Portugal a GP of 
another Member State cannot replace the function of a professional of the Portuguese 
National Health Service. Moreover, in Slovenia the primary care level is excluded from 
cross-border healthcare, because a patient has to consult his or her GP first, i.e. always 
visit a gatekeeper before consulting any other physician in Slovenia or any other Member 
State. 
Conversely, as a rule public patients from another Member State are not required to 
comply with the GP gatekeeper function in the Member State of treatment (e.g. explicitly 
mentioned as information provided by the FR national contact point).305 
4.6. Reverse discrimination or a better legal approach? 
The social security coordination Regulations apply as a rule to the public provision of 
healthcare, and Directive 2011/24/EU shall not affect the laws and regulations in Member 
States relating to the organisation and financing of healthcare in situations not related to 
cross-border healthcare, i.e. in purely national situations. This means that a national 
public patient may not be able to visit purely private healthcare providers in his or her 
home Member State (i.e. the state of affiliation or insurance),306 but this would be 
possible if s/he crossed a border and received purely private healthcare in another 
Member State, since the Directive covers public and purely private healthcare providers. 
In such a situation so-called reverse discrimination might occur, i.e. when an EU citizen 
finds him or herself in a purely internal legal situation of a certain Member State. Since 
s/he is not in a cross-border situation, s/he cannot rely on EU law (on the free movement 
of services) to obtain a certain benefit. Only national law of the Member State concerned 
could be invoked, which might turn out to be less favourable than EU law.307 
A mobile patient relying on the Directive will have the option to choose a public or purely 
private healthcare provider in the Member State of treatment. Limitations in healthcare 
                                                 
304 E.g. the ES Royal Decree 81/2014 envisages “the same conditions and steps are required that would have 
been imposed had the healthcare been delivered on Spanish territory for the corresponding healthcare services 
assigned”. Said steps and conditions refer basically to the GP’s gatekeeper function. 
305 “If you are insured in another EU member state or Switzerland, the provisions of French law pertaining to 
the healthcare pathway (appointing a primary care physician, who must be consulted before consulting a 
specialist) do not apply to you. You must show the (general practitioner or specialist) doctor you see your S2 
certificate as proof that the healthcare pathway does not apply to you, and to make sure that you are not 
charged an extra fee”, http://www.cleiss.fr/particuliers/venir/soins/ue/soins-programmes_en.html (August 
2016). 
306 In many Member States cooperation between public and contracted private providers exists only within the 
public healthcare system (and in medically urgent matters). There is hardly any cooperation between public and 
purely private providers as well as (public or private) providers in other Member States. Only rarely are 
contracts concluded with providers in another Member State (for treatments not available in the home country). 
307 VERSCHUEREN, H., Reverse Discrimination: An Unsolvable Problem, in: MINDERHOUD, P., TRIMIKLINIOTIS, 
N. (eds), Rethinking the free movement of workers: the European challenges ahead, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen 2009, p. 99. STRBAN, G., Social security of EU migrants – an interplay between the Union and 
national laws, Faculty of Law, University of Budapest, 2011, p. 91. JORENS, Y. (ed.); SPIEGEL, B. (ed.); FILLON 
J-C, STRBAN G., Key challenges for the social security coordination Regulations in the perspective of 2020, 
trESS Think Tank report 2013, p. 11, 17, 27, 50, 51. 
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provision, like waiting lists, may apply to public providers, but not to purely private ones. 
Such patient could be treated by purely private physicians, who would be directly paid by 
the mobile patient. However, the latter will be reimbursed by the public healthcare 
system in the Member State of affiliation. The patient, whose situation is limited to one 
Member State, might have no access to purely private healthcare providers. Such 
concern was voiced by several Member States.308 Special situations might arise for 
pensioners.309 Moreover, the discrimination argument may also be advanced by purely 
private healthcare providers, who cannot be paid or reimbursed by the public healthcare 
system. It cannot be ruled out that purely private providers located very close to a 
border would be tempted to establish themselves in the neighbouring Member State in 
order to provide healthcare with the possibility of reimbursement under the Directive. 
This could be a side effect of applying the freedom to provide services in the healthcare 
sector.310 
It is true that the Directive expressly stipulates that it does not oblige a Member State to 
reimburse costs of healthcare provided by healthcare providers established on its own 
territory, if those providers are not part of the public healthcare system (i.e. social 
security system or public health system) of that Member State.311 
However, such reverse discrimination has negative implications on the legal position of 
persons whose case is limited to purely internal situations, and may lead to unjust 
outcomes. The question is what the solution could be. Could it really be argued that 
reverse discrimination is in complete accordance with the law, i.e. EU law and national 
law of the Member States? 
On the one hand, it could be argued that there is actually no discrimination. Similarly as 
in international private law, when more than one legal regime applies to a person, the 
most suitable one can be chosen. In the case at hand, this would be EU law. On the other 
hand, also the CJEU has already recognised the rights based on EU citizenship without 
any (direct) movement within the Union.312 It could be argued that the argument of 
Union citizenship could be applied also to combat undesired results of reverse 
discrimination.  
Reverse discrimination could also be against the national constitutional law prohibiting 
discrimination. The question emerges whether the legislation of the Member State 
tolerates a less favourable legal status for individuals compared with the one they would 
enjoy under EU law.313 Since a non-discrimination provision cannot be applied alone, it 
has to be linked with at least one personal circumstance and one human right. For 
instance, it might be linked to discrimination on the grounds of property (money is 
required to visit purely private providers) or the health situation (with purely private 
providers there are no waiting lists) in relation to the right to social security or the right 
to (public) healthcare. 
Although the Directive is de iure not concerned with purely internal legal situations, it 
may de facto influence them. Some national public healthcare systems would have to 
                                                 
308 E.g. the Italian delegation underlined an issue regarding private care providers. The Directive covers 
privately provided healthcare. However, if patients receive care from a domestic private provider without a 
cross-border element, they cannot be reimbursed, which is controversial. Minutes of the Working Party of the 
Administrative Commission, A.C. 532/14REV, Brussels 9 October 2014, EMPL/-2261/14 – EN, p. 9. 
309 E.g., could a pensioner resident in Member State B, covered by Member State A, be treated in the latter by 
purely private providers due to cross-border movement, although there is no such possibility for persons 
insured and resident in Member State A? 
310 CARRASCOSA BERMEJO, D., ERA Forum (2014) 15/3, p. 366. 
311 Article 1, paragraph 4 of Directive 2011/24/EU.  
312 Zambrano, C-34/09, EU:C:2011:124; also Government of the French Community and the Walloon 
Government v The Flemish Government, C-212/06, EU:C:2008:178. 
313 EICHENHOFER, E., Application of the Coordination Regulation in the context of Decentralisation and 
Regionalisation in matters of Social Security, in: Y. JORENS (ed.), 50 years of Social Security Coordination, 
Past-Present-Future, EU 2010, p. 84. 
FreSsco Analytical Report 2016 
85 
 
provide benefits in kind and at the same time they might have to extend the 
reimbursement of costs rules, enabling also medical treatment by a non-contracted 
(purely private) healthcare provider also in purely national situations. The question is, 
could the reimbursement of purely private providers (in the home Member State and in 
the Member State of treatment) be set at zero (as proposed in the NL). Could it be 
limited to 10, 20, 30 or 80% (as in AT and DE and some other Member States providing 
lower reimbursement for healthcare provided by purely private providers)? 
National health policy should not only be concerned with technical rules of 
reimbursement of costs. Their main concern should be equal (and equitable)314 access to 
high quality and sustainable healthcare for all.315 For some Member States it is argued 
that quality control of purely private providers is more difficult to ensure than of 
contracted private providers. 
Could the solution be to modify EU law instead, the Directive and possibly the TFEU? The 
question might be whether it really has the power to change the substance of national 
public healthcare systems and in a way harmonise, not just coordinate them. 
                                                 
314 Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. STRBAN, G., Cost sharing for Health and 
Long-term Care Benefits in Kind, MISSOC Analysis 2014/1, p. 9. 
315 Communication from the Commission, Working together, working better: A new framework for the open 
coordination of social protection and inclusion policies in the European Union, COM(2005) 706 final, Brussels, 
22.12.2005, reinforced in 2008 by the Communication from the Commission, A renewed commitment to social 
Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, COM(2008) 418 
final, Brussels, 2.7.2008. 
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5. INFORMATION ON CROSS-BORDER HEALTHCARE 
When empowering patients, information is the key. In the internet era, people get tons of 
information each day. Thus, it is of utmost importance to provide them with clear, easily 
accessible, understandable, up-to-date and accurate information. In the Member States 
various actors are involved in information spreading practices and a big variety of means 
of information-sharing is used, both of an online and offline nature. 
5.1. Information flows 
Reportedly, patients in the different Member States can rely on various information 
sources when investigating cross-border healthcare issues. Although each Member State 
had to establish a National Contact Point and healthcare providers are obliged to provide 
certain information, patients have preferences when it comes to collecting cross-border 
healthcare information. 
Preferred sources of information on cross-border healthcare 
Competent healthcare 
institutions 
AT, BE, CH, CY, DK, EE, EL, FI, FR, HR, HU, IS, 
IT, LI, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, SK, UK 
National Contact Point(s) AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, 
HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, 
RO, SE, SI, SK, UK 
 
Healthcare providers EE, IE, LV 
NGOs RO 
 
Since obtaining cross-border healthcare is a multi-player situation, different information 
flows can be identified between the parties involved, namely (1) information from the 
healthcare authorities316 – for the patients and the healthcare providers; (2) information 
from the healthcare providers for the patients and the healthcare authorities; and (3) 
information from the patients – for the healthcare providers and the healthcare 
authorities. 
(1) National healthcare authorities – irrespective of how the healthcare system is 
organised in the Member State concerned – are the most traditional sources of 
information when it comes to healthcare rights, entitlements and conditions attached to 
them. They have the required knowledge both concerning legislative background and 
concerning daily practice. They are often even involved in one way or another in the 
legislative procedures. Thus, they are very well-positioned to offer expert advice to 
patients in cross-border healthcare situations and to inform healthcare providers on their 
duties in such cases. 
In the framework of the principle of good administration, the coordination Regulations 
provide rules on the Member States’ information obligations. According to these rules, 
the healthcare authorities are required to respond to all queries within a reasonable 
period of time and provide the persons concerned with any information required for 
exercising the rights conferred on them by the coordination Regulations.317 The 
Regulations do not specify what ‘reasonable time span’ means in this respect. The 
question can be raised whether a deadline could be inserted into the Regulations 
stipulating that all queries must be answered within – for example – five working days 
                                                 
316 Including ministries, healthcare institutions and National Contact Points. 
317 Article 76(4) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. See also Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009. 
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unless a longer time span is justified by the special nature of the question (e.g. if advice 
from an expert has to be sought in order to answer). 
It must be noted, though, that these authorities, healthcare funds, health insurers – 
besides taking into account the patients’ interests – have financial concerns too: while 
patients want to benefit from the most favourable situation possible, the national 
healthcare authorities have to balance between the interest of the patient and of the 
national healthcare system itself. Consequently, they might tend to encourage patients to 
opt for the alternative which is more economical for the state. Moreover, the Regulations 
oblige the Member States to inform patients only about their rights under the 
Regulations, so – in theory – they can comply with this obligation without even 
mentioning that alternatives do exist also outside the scope of the Regulations. 
The Directive did create special bodies responsible for providing information for patients 
in relation to cross-border healthcare: the National Contact points (NCPs). Their very 
existence is a great achievement and an added value of the Directive. They are neutral 
sources of reliable, transparent and easily accessible information on cross-border 
healthcare issues. Since they are created to carry out this specific task, it can be 
rightfully expected that the persons working at the NCPs can answer most of the 
patients’ relevant questions related to cross-border treatments, and in case they cannot, 
that they have the competence to find the answer quickly through their professional 
network of NCPs in other Member States, healthcare providers, healthcare authorities 
and other organisations. Whether this is the case remains uncertain. Therefore, it is 
highly important that the NCPs work closely together both with the European and 
national institutions involved and with each other. 
The Directive precisely determines the scope of information which has to be 
communicated to the patients and clearly splits the responsibility between the Member 
State of affiliation and the Member State of treatment. Whereas the Member State of 
affiliation is obliged to provide information on the patients’ rights and entitlements under 
its national legislation,318 the Member State of treatment is obliged to provide information 
on the standards and guidelines on quality and safety laid down by this Member State.319 
Reportedly, national authorities often receive inquiries not only from patients but also 
from healthcare providers in relation to cross-border healthcare. Since – as mentioned 
above – national authorities have the required expertise on these – mostly legal – issues, 
they shall cooperate with the healthcare providers and inform them on all relevant 
aspects. Thematised seminars, webpages designed for healthcare professionals or a 
hotline for providers are possible good practices. 
(2) Although patients might trust healthcare providers the most – as they usually have 
direct, face-to-face contact with them – and expect the information primarily from 
them,320 they are often neither trained nor willing to function as a source of non-medical 
information. The Directive, however, confers a specific obligation on them as well: they 
have to provide individual patients with all relevant information to help them make an 
informed choice, including information on treatment options, on the availability, quality 
and safety of the healthcare they provide in that state, on prices, as well as on their 
authorisation or registration status, their insurance cover or other means of personal or 
                                                 
318 Article 5(b) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
319 Article 4(2)(a) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
320 European Commission – Eurobarometer (2003): European Union citizens and sources of information about 
health. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_179_en.pdf (16 September 2013), p. 5. 
88 
 
collective protection with regard to professional liability.321 One may wonder though 
whether healthcare providers are prepared to fulfil these obligations.322 
Training opportunities should be offered for healthcare professionals and for other staff 
members of healthcare providers to enable them to provide patients with the information 
required. At the same time, national healthcare authorities – in cooperation with the 
European Commission – should develop a monitoring system to ensure that all the 
obliged parties fulfil their information obligations. 
Healthcare providers do not only need to provide information for patients, they have to 
communicate financial information (and other relevant information related to the specific 
healthcare provision in question) to the national healthcare authorities in order to receive 
reimbursement for the costs of the treatment provided for a foreign patient under the 
coordination regime. 
(3) Certain information has to be provided by the patients as well: they have to provide 
information on their entitlements for healthcare providers by presenting proof (usually an 
EHIC, PRC, PD S2, authorisation under the Directive or a medical referral in lack of an 
authorisation where applicable) and to communicate financial information (and other 
relevant information related to the specific healthcare provision in question) to the 
national healthcare authorities in order to receive reimbursement for the costs of the 
treatment received from a foreign provider under the Directive’s regime (and also under 
the coordination regime in the case of reimbursement systems where the patients are 
invited to pay the costs of the treatment on the spot). 
Normally, this latter information provision takes the form of an invoice. Patients are 
required to hand in the original invoices and other relevant medical documentation. 
Reportedly, some Member States insist on official translations of these documents which 
might cause considerable costs for the patients and the exact content of the invoices are 
also not always clear. The Directive obliges the healthcare providers to issue clear 
invoices323 and the Member States to cooperate in order to clarify the content of 
invoices.324  
Nevertheless, the difficulties related to unclear invoices and different invoicing methods 
could be significantly reduced by introducing a standardised European invoice, the form 
of which would be the same in each Member State just like the Portable Documents used 
under the Regulation regime. 
                                                 
321 Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
322 See also JELFS, E. and BAETEN, R., Simulation on the EU Cross-border Care Directive, 2011. 
http://www.ose.be/files/publication/2012/CrossBorderHealthcareSimulation_FinalRep_09052012.pdf, p. 21. 
323 Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
324 Article 10(1) of Directive 2011/24/EU. 
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Sources of information on cross-border healthcare 
FROM 
TO 
Healthcare authorities Healthcare providers Patients 
Healthcare 
authorities 
Cooperation with other 
healthcare authorities 
within the country and 
in other Member 
States 
Financial information 
related to 
reimbursement under 
the Regulation 
Financial information 
related to 
reimbursement under 
the Directive 
Healthcare 
providers 
Information on 
different aspects of 
cross-border 
healthcare provision, 
especially on their 
obligations 
Not mentioned by the 
Regulation or the 
Directive, but existing: 
professional 
organisations at 
national level and at 
EU level (e.g. 
Standing Committee 
of European Doctors - 
CPME, European 
Hospital and 
Healthcare Federation 
– HOPE) 
Presenting proof of 
entitlement, such as 
an EHIC, PRC, PD S2, 
authorisation under 
the Directive or a 
medical referral in lack 
of an authorisation 
where applicable 
Patients Information on 
different aspects of 
cross-border 
healthcare provision, 
especially on their 
rights and 
entitlements 
Relevant information 
to help patients to 
make an informed 
choice 
Not mentioned by the 
Regulation or the 
Directive, but existing: 
patient organisations, 
NGOs at national and 
EU level (e.g. 
European Patients’ 
Forum) 
 
5.2. The form and means of the information 
Information is shared in various forms: some ways of sharing information are more 
traditional (e.g. leaflets, personal or phone consultation) or more widely used (e.g. 
websites), whereas others (e.g. smart phone applications) are rather new and 
progressive setting an example for other countries to follow. 
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Means of spreading information on cross-border healthcare reportedly used in 
different Member States 
Website of ministry of health AT, CY, IT, MT, PT, SK 
Website of competent 
healthcare institutions 
AT, BE, CH, DK, EE, EL, FI, FR, HR, HU, IS, IT, LI, 
LT, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, SK, UK 
Website of National Contact 
Point(s) 
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, 
HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, RO, SE, SI, 
SK, UK 
E-mail CY, DE, ES, HR, HU, SI 
Phone CY, DE, ES, FI, HR, HU, LV, MT, PL, SI, SK 
Smartphone application CZ 
Mass media LT 
Personal consultation CY, DE, ES, FI, HU, LV, MT, SI, SK 
Leaflets / information letter / 
posters 
HU, IT, LT, LU, MT, PL, RO, SI 
Videos PL 
Thematised seminars MT 
E-learning course PL 
 
5.3. Content of the information 
It is essential that both the content and the form of the information are appropriate. 
It is reported that in several Member States (e.g. ES – in some regions – or LI) 
information is not only hard to find but also too general to get all the details a patient 
intending to receive healthcare abroad might need. NCPs have a unique role and a great 
potential which should be used more effectively in some Member States. It should be 
investigated how the development of the network of the NCPs can be facilitated by the 
Union, for instance via standardising the content of their websites, training their staff on 
EU level or connecting the national entities by a European one. It can be seen as a good 
practice that certain meetings and workshops involving communication and social 
security experts from national ministries and institutions and from the European 
Commission have been taking place with the aim of focusing on how to better coordinate 
EU communication actions with those of the Member States, by creating synergies, 
avoiding overlaps and filling gaps.325 
Besides, some Member States do not provide information in English or the information 
provided in English is not of the same value (e.g. Portugal). Although Member States 
are not obliged to share information in any other languages than their own, in practice, it 
would be very useful to have these contents in the most widely used language in Europe. 
This would also allow the patient to compare the possibilities and circumstances offered 
in the different Member States. 
It is very important that patients receive comprehensive information all at once. Thus, it 
is worth considering to standardise the content of the websites of the NCPs and to 
                                                 
325 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=849&langId=en&eventsId=552&furtherEvents=yes.  
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require that – besides their national language – they provide the same value of 
information also (at least) in English. Moreover, since the European Commission’s EHIC 
application became rather popular and proved to be useful in unplanned cross-border 
healthcare situations, a similar smartphone application could be developed also for other 
cross-border healthcare rights related to planned care. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Access to cross-border healthcare has become more complex due to the constant 
development of national healthcare systems, including the mixture of public and private 
providers of healthcare, and developments in EU law, especially as a result of CJEU case 
law and its codification in Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare. A mobile patient is confronted with the complexity of healthcare 
systems, in which many legal relations are established (e.g. between a public patient and 
a public healthcare institution, the State and/or local or regional communities, and public 
or private healthcare providers) and various legal paths to access healthcare in another 
Member State are available. Among these paths are the coordination Regulations, the 
Cross-border healthcare Directive 2011/24/EU, the Residence Directive 2004/38/EU (with 
the requirement of comprehensive sickness coverage), the Free Movement of Workers 
Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 (as some benefits might be social advantages), and the 
Treaties, all subject to interpretation by the CJEU. Next to this there are possibilities 
under national law and bilateral agreements between certain Member States, which are 
important mainly in regional cross-border cooperation. All this taken into account, it 
should not be forgotten that distinctive rules apply for unplanned and planned cross-
border healthcare. Mobile patients might perceive such complexity as a ‘healthcare 
jungle’, in a field that is already (also in a purely national setting) characterised by 
information asymmetry (usually to the detriment of the patient). 
It is argued that clear information should be available for various possibilities of affiliation 
of EU mobile citizens (including students, pensioners and frontier workers) to the 
healthcare schemes of the Member States, where the complexity of the system or the 
lack of information regarding the process of affiliation can pose a problem (although not 
many problems were reported, but such generalisation is of no use to a mobile patient 
facing a specific problem). The solution could be that healthcare systems are fine-tuned 
and that there are no gaps in health coverage. But even if there are gaps, they should be 
solved to the benefit of mobile persons, as the Belgian example of administrative practice 
shows. The complexity of national procedures to affiliate to the healthcare schemes of 
the Member States should be screened and best practices to facilitate access to 
healthcare should be shared among the Member States with the support of the European 
Commission. 
It should, however, be emphasised that the affiliation of economically active mobile EU 
citizens is reportedly a rather unproblematic area, both in contribution-based and in 
residence-based systems. The way national healthcare systems are financed does not 
seem to play an obstructing role either. In that regard it is not surprising that, regardless 
of coordination provisions facilitating cross-border access to healthcare, Member States 
have generally not introduced specific national measures to facilitate mobile EU citizens’ 
access. 
In contrast, access for non-active EU citizens appears to be less unproblematic, as the 
grey area in EU legislation is larger. In that regard, more unified information and an EU-
wide clarification of the “comprehensive sickness coverage” condition under Directive 
2004/38/EC would be required. The relationship between the comprehensive sickness 
requirement and sickness benefits coordination would be necessary in order to avoid 
different (narrower or broader) interpretations by the CJEU (as is the case with the 
sufficient resources requirement for non-active persons). Moreover, the different 
concepts of residence in the Regulations and in the Directive cause problems. For 
instance, if a person stays in another Member State for more than three months, s/he 
has to register as a resident. To that end, s/he needs comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover. It needs to be clarified which role healthcare entitlements based on EU social 
security coordination can play in that regard, certainly after recent CJEU case law which 
seems to confirm the deep impact of legal residence on the EU coordination framework. 
More information would also be required on possibilities to receive unplanned or planned 
treatment in another Member State, be it at public or private healthcare providers. 
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However, merely providing complete, clear and easily accessible information is not 
enough. Certain legal questions remain unanswered and they have to be solved by legal 
action. The distinction between unplanned and planned care remains controversial. Both 
its existence under the Regulation’s regime and its lack under the Directive’s regime lead 
to certain concerns. The fraudulent use of administrative procedures under the 
Regulations must be closely monitored and preferably prevented, and if the parallel 
application of the two tools continues, it would be desirable to expressly codify into the 
Directive that the reimbursement of costs of medical services which become necessary 
during a temporary stay abroad (e.g. unplanned hospital treatment) cannot be made 
dependent on a prior authorisation of any kind. Otherwise, problems with the application 
of the Directive to unplanned treatment would continue. The question is whether the 
application of the Directive to unplanned care was actually the intention of the legislation 
and whether the application only to planned treatment and a proper interpretation of the 
existing rules would not solve many problems. 
A solution would be to introduce clear rules on unplanned and planned treatment in a 
single legislative instrument. If this is not feasible, clarifying and additional rules in the 
Directive, also better regulating the interaction with the Regulation would be necessary. 
Moreover, the Regulation might be amended as well. The notion of unplanned healthcare 
under the Regulation is based on undefined legal concepts such as “temporary stay” or 
“necessary treatment” with ‘chronic’ interpretation problems. The implementing 
Regulation, the AC Decisions and Recommendations and the CJEU have tried to clarify 
this blurred legal outline that sometimes makes it difficult to determine which situation 
the mobile person is in, and more importantly, which Member State has to bear the 
healthcare costs and to what extent. Healthcare providers might even be tempted to 
reduce the scope of medically necessary treatments rejecting the usage of the EHIC and 
demanding upfront direct payments by mobile patients. 
Not only amendments, but also the consolidation of certain legal rules would be 
appropriate. For instance, some provisions of the implementing Regulation, especially 
Articles 25(B)(6) and 25(B)(7), should be scrutinised and clarified by the Administrative 
Commission. They could even be repealed by the EU legislature considering the existence 
of the Directive. The same goes for Annex III of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Also 
Article 7(2)(b) of the Directive is far from clear and would require legal clarification, also 
with respect to access to purely private healthcare providers in the Member State that is 
“in the end, responsible for reimbursement of the costs”. The existence of the so-called 
Vanbraekel supplement in the implementing Regulation might be questioned. 
Concerning planned cross-border healthcare it is worth considering the possibility to 
introduce EU-wide maximum waiting times concerning certain treatments and waiting 
time guarantee which allows the patient to obtain the treatment abroad in the event that 
it cannot be provided in the competent Member State within this waiting time, although 
for now the EU lacks competence to adopt harmonising measures in the field of social 
security. Similarly, the introduction of a European maximum processing time together 
with the automatic authorisation rule would strengthen the patients’ legal position and 
grant them the certainty to receive a reply to their request within a reasonable time. The 
question can be raised whether a deadline could be inserted into the Regulations 
stipulating that all queries must be answered within – for example – five working days 
unless a longer time span is justified by the special nature of the question (e.g. if advice 
from an expert has to be sought in order to answer). 
It is desirable to precisely determine which treatment does fall into the category of 
healthcare subject to prior authorisation under the Directive’s regime. This categorisation 
shall be made by the Member State of affiliation and shall not be dependent on the 
Member State of treatment or on the way the treatment is provided in that Member 
State. 
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The difficulties related to unclear invoices and different invoicing methods could be 
significantly reduced by introducing a standardised European invoice, the form of which 
would be the same in each Member State just like the Portable Documents used under 
the Regulations’ regime. 
Moreover, purely national rules have to be taken into account. There should be a clear 
rule that if the national legislation grants wider protection than the EU legal routes, it 
shall be of preferential application also in cross-border situations between Member 
States. This would be an emanation of the co-called Petroni principle, which would be 
stretched from the fields of pensions and family benefits to the field of cross-border 
healthcare. 
The mixture of public and contracted private providers on one side, and purely private 
providers on the other poses a particular problem, especially for mobile patients who at a 
certain point act as private consumers of healthcare services and goods, although they 
are in the period before and after that acting as public patients (with possible period 
authorisation and certainly when requesting reimbursement of healthcare costs in the 
home Member State).  
There is a tendency to treat mobile patients as private patients, with no waiting lists, but 
with higher fees, which have to be paid directly. The burden of requesting ex post 
reimbursement of costs is shifted to private patients. Such steering of mobile patients 
might deprive them of their rights and is against national and EU law on the prohibition 
of (de facto) discrimination if not justified on objective grounds. Therefore, not only 
proper information, but also strict supervisory/complaint/review mechanisms have to be 
installed, with possibilities of terminating the contractual relation with the public 
healthcare provider, if the situation of a mobile patient was abused. The will, expressly 
stated or emanating from mobile patients’ behaviour should be decisive in whether s/he 
should be treated as a public or as a private patient. 
Also reimbursement rules should be unified and reverse discrimination of national 
patients prevented. It could be argued that the instruments enabling cross-border 
healthcare aim primarily at equal treatment of mobile patients with national patients. 
However, national patients might have no access to purely private healthcare providers 
on the account of the public healthcare system. The EU cannot disregard this, since the 
situation of (mainly) Union citizens is concerned. It might be difficult to argue that the 
Directive does not apply to purely private providers and that a basket of benefits is only 
public. However, Member States have the possibility to determine the reimbursement 
rate of costs incurred at purely private providers, equally in national as well as in cross-
border situations. The related question might be how low a Member State can go? At the 
same time a good practice may be to offer a patient extended free choice (like in 
Denmark) in a home country, if the required medical treatment is not available in due 
time. 
In order to make a truly free and informed choice, unified and transparent information 
has to be provided. It is not enough that each Member State provides more or less 
complete (or more or less piecemeal) information applying all or some modern 
communication tools. The legal duty of institutions and healthcare providers to provide 
relevant information is regulated in implementing Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 (Article 
22(1)) and Directive 2011/24/EU (Article 4(2)(b)). 
It is highly important that the National Contact Points work closely together both with the 
European and national institutions involved and with each other. It could be suggested 
that information is provided EU-wide, in a uniform manner, and that it is easily accessible 
(also language-wise) to the patients. Establishing an EU contact point for cross-border 
healthcare may be worth considering.  
Thematised seminars, webpages designed for healthcare professionals or a hotline for 
providers are possible good practices to educate healthcare providers to make sure they 
can fulfil their information obligations under the European cross-border healthcare 
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legislation. Training opportunities should be offered for healthcare professionals and for 
other staff members of healthcare providers to enable them to provide patients with the 
information required. At the same time, national healthcare authorities – in cooperation 
with the European Commission – should develop a monitoring system to ensure that all 
the obliged parties fulfil their information obligations. 
As long as a single EU website is not established, the content of the websites of the 
National Contact Points should be standardised and – in addition to their national 
language – should provide the same value of information also in other languages (and at 
least in English). Moreover, since the European Commission’s EHIC application became 
rather popular and proved to be useful in unplanned cross-border healthcare situations, a 
similar smartphone application could be developed also for other cross-border healthcare 
rights related to planned care. 
We may conclude with the statement that all legal rules pertaining to cross-border 
healthcare and their interpretation should be to the benefit of mobile and national 
patients. Access to (cross-border) healthcare has to encompass not only geographical 
access, but also timely access (which is sometimes lacking in the home country), 
financial access (which may pose problems if costs of healthcare have to be advanced by 
the patient, who might not be fully reimbursed), informational access (which is seriously 
lacking in cross-border healthcare) and procedural access (regarding the steps needed to 
be taken in order to receive healthcare in another Member State). Next to these forms, 
access has to be equitable, meaning that all mobile patients should have equal access to 
cross-border healthcare of the highest quality. At the same time, based on EU 
citizenship, the same should apply to patients who are (for one reason or other) not 
moving within the EU. 
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